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Miriam G, Carroll
HC-I IBOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
Plaintiff, in propria persona

AT

O'CLOCK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Hc-I I BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR
Plaintiff,

) TRIAL BY JURY.
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two lrvington Centre
702 King Farm Bivd.
Rockville, MD 20850
1-800-830-2793

1

1
1

COMES NOW, Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff and for causes of actions against
Defendant(s) alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION -STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND DAMAGES
1.

That Plaintiff is a natural person and a resident in Kamiah, in the

County of Idaho, the State of Idaho.

2.

That Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (previously AAA

Financial Services), is a Corporation organized in the State of Delaware with its
principal business location at P.O. Box 15026, Wilmington, DE 19850-5026.
3.

That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a consumer contract on

and about the 15" of March, 1980.
4.

That the contract provided for Plaintiff to obtain a revolving open-

ended account with Defendant.

5.

That the original contract was governed in part by the Truth In

Lending Act. 15 USC section 1601 etseq [TILA] by Plaintiff.
6.

That the original contract provided for Defendant@)to respond to

any inquiry under TlLA made by Plaintiff.

7.

That Plaintiff made an inquiry with Defendant@)on and about the

~ 3 of' December,
~
2004 as to the inaccuracies on the monthly statement and
requested further information and documentation.
8.

That Defendant(s) received said inquiry on and about the 3rd of

January, 2005.
9.

That Defendant(s) has a duty to comply with any inquiry under T l l A

made by Plaintiff.
10.

That more than ninety (90) days has elapsed since the time

Defendant(s) received the billing inquiry from Plaintiff.
11.

That as of this date Defendant(s) has ignored, failed andlor

neglected Plaintiff's inquiry by failing to respond to the same. This act was willful
and knowing.
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12.

That by failing to respond Defendant is prohibited under TllA to

proceed with any collection efforts.
13.

That by failing to respond Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666

et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. These acts were willful and knowing.
14.

That Defendant's wrongfully and negatively reported to the credit

reporting agencies that Plaintiff was delinquent on the contract. This act was
willful and knowing.
15.

That as a result of Defendant's wrongfully reporting the foregoing to

the credit reporting agencies Defendant(s) violated 15 USC section 1666 et seq
and 12 CFR section 226.13 ef seq. This act was willful and knowing.
16.

That Defendant(s) ignored and disregarded the TlLA provisions by

proceeding with collection efforts by filing a Claim with the National Arbitration
Forum ("Forum"). This act was willful and knowing. A true and correct copy of
the Claim is herewith attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A."

17.

That by filing said Claim Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666

et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing.
18.

That as a result of the foregoing Plaintiff is entitled to relief under

TILA.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT
19.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs Ithrough 18 herein

and above by this reference.
20.

That Plaintiff is not currently in possession of the original contract,

but will seek to obtain a copy thereof in discovery andlor will seek leave of court
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to amend this complaint to incorporate a copy of said contract at that time when a
copy can be ascertained.
21.

That if called to testify Plaintiff will testify that the original contract

between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain any provision or clause to submit
any dispute arising out the agreement to arbitration.
22.

That the original contract between Plaintiff and Defendant did not

contain any provision that would allow Defendant to change or add new terms to
the original agreement to include arbitration.
23.

That Plaintiff never received a copy of any change or addition of

new terms to the original agreement.
24.

That Defendant filed a claim against Plaintiff in the Forum alleging

that an agreement exists containing provisions to arbitrate any dispute arising out
of the agreement.
25.

Plaintiff filed

a

MOTION TO

DISMISS

FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the Forum prohibiting the
Forum to arbitrate the matter absence any provision, clause or contract
authorizing either Plaintiff or Defendant to submit a claim to arbitration.
26.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arbitrator and the Forum entered

an award against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant in the amount of Thirty
thousand two hundred forty one and 411100 ($30,241.41) Dollars, as evidenced
by attached Award that is incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B."
27.

Defendant(s) sewed upon Plaintiff a copy of the Award on and

about the 6'hof August, 2005.
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28.

That Defendant(~) obtained the Award illegally and without

authority, using the Forum whereby breaching the original contract between
Plaintiff and Defendant.
29.

That the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and

illegally entered an Award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no
agreement existed between parties to arbitrate.
30.

That Plaintiff would be prejudiced and adversely affected if

Defendant is allowed to proceed with confirming the Award and a judgment is
entered against Plaintiff.
31.

That Defendant had no right to force Plaintiff to arbitrate a claim

when no agreement existed to arbitrate between parties.
32.

That Defendant had no right to obtain an Award against Plaintiff for

any amount sought.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS

33.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32 herein

and above by this reference.

34.

That Plaintiff's Rights will be severely impaired if the Award is

enforced in a court of law and against Plaintiff.
35.

That the award and claim was filed and entered in violation of

Plaintiff's Right to Due Process under the Law.
36.

That by filing said claim, Defendant(s) violated Plaintiff's Right to

use the courts as a means to resolve the dispute. This act was willful and
knowing

-
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37.

That by filing the claim, Defendant attempted to violate Plaintiff's

Right to Due Process under the law. This act was willful and knowing.
38.

That by filing the claim, Defendant violated Plaintiffs Right to a trial

by jury. This act was willful and knowing.
39.

That by filing the claim, Defendant violated the obligation of the

original contract, thus impairing the protection and security of obligation of
contract under the Constitution. This act was willful and knowing.
40.

That all of Defendant(s)'s actions have impaired and adversely

affected Plaintiff, which is now entitled to immediate relief under the law.

-

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION IMMEDIATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
41.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 herein

and above by this reference.
42.

That Plaintiff has no other immediate remedy under the law except

to file this action.
43.

That Plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief from the arbitration

award.
44.

That the award must be vacated immediately before further harm is

done to Plaintiff.
PRAYER AND RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant(s) and each
of them, on each and every cause of action and count as follows:
1.

For immediate relief from Arbitration Award;

2.

For $30,241.41;
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3.

For unliquidated damages that may be ascertained by the court or

jury;
4.

For punitive, general and special damages;

5.

For cost of this suit herein;

6.

For Violations of Rights;

7.

For such other relief as the court deems proper and demanded

herein.

Date:

cT-;<Ci

C>

1
-

Signed and respectfully submitted by:

Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff
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;>AHQ COLIN?! DISTRICT COuR-

FILED

AT^ ', 0 O'CLOCKPlaintiff, in propria persona.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Case NO:J'(

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Hc-I IBOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962

0 5-37q7
b~ b

COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR
TRIAL BY JURY.

Plaintiff,

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two l ~ i n g t o nCentre
702 Kina Farm Blvd.

COMES NOW, Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff and for causes of actions against
Defendant@)alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1.

- STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AND DAMAGES

That Plaintiff is a natural person and a resident in Kamiah, in the

County of Idaho, the State of'ldaho.
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2.

That Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., is a Corporation

organized in the State of Delaware with its principal business location at P.O.
Box 15026, Wilmington, DE 19850-5026.
3.

That Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a consumer contract on

and about the 15'~of March, 1980.
4.

That the contract provided for Plaintiff to obtain a revolving open-

ended account with Defendant.
5.

That the original contract was governed in part by the Truth In

Lending Act. 15 USC section 1601 ef seq [TIM] by Plaintiff.
6.

That the original contract provided for Defendant@) to respond to

any inquiry under TlLA made by Plaintiff.

7.

That Plaintiff made an inquiry with Defendant@) on and about the

23rd of December, 2004 as to the inaccuracies on the monthly statement and
requested further information and documentation.
8.

That Defendant@) received said inquiry on and about the 3rd of

January, 2005.

9.

That Defendant($ has a duty to comply with any inquiry under T I M

made by Plaintiff.
10.

That more than ninety (90) days has elapsed since the time

Defendant@)received the billing inquiry from Plaintiff.

11.

That as of this date Defendant(s) has ignored, failed andlor

neglected Plaintiffs inquiry by failing to respond to the same. This act was willful
and knowing.
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12.

That by failing to respond Defendant is prohibited under TllA to

proceed with any collection efforts.
13.

That by failing to respond Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666

et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. These acts were willful and knowing.
14.

That Defendant's wrongfully and negatively reported to the credit

reporting agencies that Plaintiff was delinquent on the contract. This act was
willful and knowing.
15.

That as a result of Defendant's wrongfully reporting the foregoing to

the credit reporting agencies Defendant(s) violated 15 USC section 1666 et seq
and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing.
16.

That Defendant(s) ignored and disregarded the TlLA provisions by

proceeding with collection efforts by filing a Claim with the National Arbitration
Forum ("Forum"). This act was willful and knowing. A true and correct copy of
the Claim is herewith attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A."

17.

That by filing said Claim Defendant violated 15 USC section 1666

et seq and 12 CFR section 226.13 et seq. This act was willful and knowing.
18.

That as a result of the foregoing Plaintiff is entitled to relief under

TILA.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT
19.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 18 herein

and above by this reference.
20.

That Plaintiff is not currently in possession of the original contract,

but will seek to obtain a copy thereof in discovery andlor will seek leave of court

Complaint Page 3 of 7

to amend this complaint to incorporate a copy of said contract at that time when a
copy can be ascertained.
21.

That if called to testify Plaintiff will testify that the original contract

between Plaintiff and Defendant did not contain any provision or clause to submit
any dispute arising out the agreement to arbitration.
22.

That the original contract between Plaintiff and Defendant did not

contain any provision that would allow Defendant to change or add new terms to
the original agreement to include arbitration.
23.

That Plaintiff never received a copy of any change or addition of

new terms to the original agreement.
24.

That Defendant filed a claim against Plaintiff in the Forum alleging

that an agreement exists containing provisions to arbitrate any dispute arising out
of the agreement.
25.

Plaintiff filed

a

MOTION TO

DISMISS

FOR

LACK OF

JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the Forum prohibiting the
Forum to arbitrate the matter absence any provision, clause or contract
authorizing either Plaintiff or Defendant to submit a claim to arbitration.
26.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arbitrator and the Forum entered

an award against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant in the amount of Thirty
thousand two hundred forty one and 411100 ($30,241.41) Dollars, as evidenced
by attached Award that is incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "6."
27.

Defendant(s) served upon Plaintiff a copy of the Award on and

of August, 2005.
about the €jth
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28.

That Defendant(s) obtained the Award illegally and without

authority, using the Forum whereby breaching the original contract between
Plaintiff and Defendant.
29.

That the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and

illegally entered an Award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no
agreement existed between parties to arbitrate.
30.

That Plaintiff would be prejudiced and adversely affected if

Defendant is allowed to proceed with confirming the Award and a judgment is
entered against Plaintiff.
31.

That Defendant had no right to force Plaintiff to arbitrate a claim

when no agreement existed to arbitrate between parties.
32.

That Defendant had no right to obtain an Award against Plaintiff for

any amount sought.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION -VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS
33.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32 herein

and above by this reference.
34.

That Plaintiff's Rights will be severely impaired if the Award is

enforced in a court of law and against Plaintiff.
35.

That the award and claim was filed and entered in violation of

Plaintiff's Right to Due Process under the Law.
36.

That by filing said claim, Defendant(s) violated Plaintiff's Right to

use the courts as a means to resolve the dispute. This act was willful and
knowing.
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37.

That by filing the claim, Defendant attempted to violate Plaintiff's

Right to Due Process under the law. This act was willful and knowing.
38.

That by filing the claim, Defendant violated Plaintiff's Right to a trial

by jury. This act was willful and knowing.
39.

That by filing the claim, Defendant violated the obligation of the

original contract, thus impairing the protection and security of obligation of
contract under the Constitution. This act was willful and knowing.
40.

That ail of Defendant(s)'s actions have impaired and adversely

affected Plaintiff, which is now entitled to immediate relief under the law.

-

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION IMMEDIATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
41.

That Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 herein

and above by this reference.
42.

That Plaintiff has no other immediate remedy under the law except

to file this action.
43.

That Plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief from the arbitration

award.
44.

That the award must be vacated immediately before further harm is

done to Plaintiff.
PRAYER AND RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant(s) and each
of them, on each and every cause of action and count as follows:
1.

For immediate relief from Arbitration Award;

2.

For $30,241.41;
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3.

For unliquidated damages that may be ascertained by the court or

jury;
4.

For punitive, general and special damages;

5.

For cost of this suit herein;

6.

For Violations of Rights;

7.

For such other relief as the court deems proper and demanded

herein.

Date:

m

%

c

-

Signed and respectfully submitted by:

u,

-2,

G - c-r-3

Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff
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IN T H E
NATIONAL ARBRXATION FORUM "
CLAIM

3151

MBNA America Bank. N.A.1
c/o Wolpoff & Ahramsou, L.L.P.
Attorneys iu the Practice of Debt Collectiou
Two Irviugtou Ceutre
702 King Fam1 Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850

i

LZXj7"lfSII

/-1

RE:
Foruni File Number:
FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number:
0135832603
Account No.:
4313033111006016
Card member Agreement Type: AGMT90

Miriam G Carroll
Hc 11 Box 366
Kamiah ID 83536.9410

For a Claim against Respoudeut(s), CIaiuiaut states:

1

By way of contract aud nse of the credit accouul at issue, Respoudcut(s) became boeud by the terms of a credit agreement
(hereiuafter the "Agreement"). which is attached hereto and iucorporated hereiu hy refereuce.

2. Respondeut(s) islare in default uuder the terms of the Agreemeut aud islare uow iudebted to Claimaut in the amount of
$24730.31 ,as reflected iu the attached account summary, plus iuterest of $290.50
as of the date of filing. and at
8.75%
thereafter.

3. Despite repeated demauds for paymeut, Respoudent(s) haslhave not paid the au~o~ruts
due.
4.

Claimant requests au Award fnr the auiouuts reflected iu Paragraph 2, plus all arhitratiou fees iucurred, Process of Service
fees aud Attoruey Fees of $3709.54 , if allowed by law, equaliug 15% of the outstauding principal balance.

5 . The attached Agreemeut coutaius a Delaware choice of law provision and a provisiou for "reasouahle" attorney fees.
Delaware law specifically provides that an attoruey fee may he awarded iu an aulouul up to 20% on an uupaid claim if
allowed by law. &. 10 Del. Code Sec. 3912 (Pleading & Practice).
6. The attached Agreemeut contains a maudatory arbitration provisiou under the Rules of the National Arhitratiou Fonrm

("NAF").
The uudersigned couusel for Claimant asserts, uuder penalty of pcrjury, that the iuformatiou coutained in this Claim and
the supporting documents attached hereto are accurate hased upon iuformatiou provided by Claimaut to the undersigued counsel.
WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, L.L.P.
A t t o n ~ e y111~ rl~ePruclrrcrice of Debt Collecrio!~

By:
Neal J. Levitsky, Esq.
ADMITTED: (DE)

Jamie B. Vodoklys, Esq.
ADMITTED. (MD)
Co n el for the Claiu~ant
If Respondent o r counsel wishes to contact Claimant, please call o r write:
Paralegal Department
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two Irvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd., 5th Floor
Rockville, MD 20850
1-800-830-2793

NO CARD

NATIONAL
ARBITRATION

FORUM.
MBNA America Bank, N.A.
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre
Rockville, MD 20850-5775
CLAIiiTAiWs),

-"

AWARD

.

.

.

RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll

-

_. - I

File Number: FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016
Miriam G Carroll
Hc 11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410

The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FINDS:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

That no known conflict of interest exists.
That on or before 0311712005 the Parties entered into an agreement providing that this matter shall be
iesolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Fomm Code of Procedure.
That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6.
That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Fomm and served it on the Claimant.
That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure.
The Parties have had the opportunity to present all evidence and information to the Arbitrator.
r 1s case.
That the Arbitrator has reviewed all evidence and information submitted in t?'
That the information and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated.

Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES:
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $30,241.41.
Entered in the State of Idaho

st e$XA! Moore, Esq.
&mior

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby
certifies that a copy of th_isAwag,dwas sent by fust class
mail postage p r e p a i d f a ~ ~ ; " P @ a ; i yabove
@ ~ hreferenced
e
addresses, or their,Kepresenbt@eqon this date.

AT

JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615
LISA B. RASMUSSEN, ISB No. 493 1
WILSON, McCOLL & RASMUSSEN
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: 208-345-9100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for Defendant

3165O'FILED
CLOCKJ.M.
ROSE E. GEHRING
STRICT COURT

EPUrY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)

CV36747

1
1

ANSWER

)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

1
1
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., by and through its attorney of
record, Lisa B. Rasmussen of the firmWilson McColl & Rasmussen and answers the Complaint on
file herein as follows:
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted

herein.
2. Answering paragraph 1,20, and 21, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein at
present for lack of knowledge, information or belief.

32,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,42,43, and 44, Defendant denies the allegations contained

therein.
ANSWER - 1

4. Answering paragraph 4, Defendant admits that the account between the parties was a
credit card account.
5. Regarding paragraphs 5,6,9, 12 the allegations contained therein are legal conclusions
and therefore no response is necessary.
6. Answering paragraph 24, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
7. Answering paragraph 26 and 27, the arbitration proceeding is still pending and therefore
Defendant cannot admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 26 and 27.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court:

1. Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice;
2. Award Defendant its attorney's fees and costs;
3. Award such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED

day of December, 2005.
WILSON, McCOLL & RASMUSSEN

r)

;kZq/$~6~fA'+
LISA B. RASMUSSEN
Attorney for Defendant

ANSWER - 2

------

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

&day of ~ecember,2005, I mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ANSWER by regular United States mail with the correct postage affixed
thereon addressed to:
Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536

By:
Lisa B. Rasmussen

ANSWER - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS
Plaintiff,
vs.
MBNA AMERICA BANI(.
Defendant

1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1

Case No. CV 05-36747
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

1
1

-

This case comes before me on defendant MBNA America Bank's (MBNA Ban)
motion for summary judginent regarding saparate claims by Miriam Carroll and David
Capps, residents of Kamiah who live together. The claims are substantially equivalent

and have been consolidated. Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps arc suing MBNA Brink. for
violations of certain provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act related to the
resolution of credit card disputes, for breach of contract rights incident to a credit card
agreement between them and MBNA Bank,and for violations of theif rights to due
process, their right to aooess the courts, and their right to the sanctity of contract. They
ask for damages and also for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration awards entered
in favor of MBNA Bank. against each ofthem individually.
MBNA Bank has sued to confirm the arbitration award against M.T. Capps. It
claims that both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps failed to pay their credit card debts as
required undcr their agreements. It htther claims that the credit card agreements
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requixed biding arbitration in the event of a dispute. Ms. Catroll and Mr. Capps each
say there was no agreement to arbitrate.
FACTS
Both Mr. Capps and MBNA bank agree that a credit card agreement was formed
betmen Mr. Capps and MBNA Rank in Febmary of 1999. Ms. Carroll and the Bank
also agree that an agreement between them existcd, although they do not agree as when it

was formed. MBNA Bank says the agreement was formed in April of nineteen-seventy-

seven, whereas Ms. Carroll says their agreement was formed in March of nineteeneighty.
Subsequently, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps incurred debts under the agreement. In

Dccember 2004, after receiving a monthly statement from MBNA Bank, they mailed a
letter to MBNA Bank. The lctters were equivalent in language?but because hYo different
credit cards were at issue the amounts and statement dates refcned to in the lctters
differed. Ms. Carroll's lettw purported to place in dispute a liability in excess oF twcntyfour thousand dollars, and Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in disputc a liability in
excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. Each letter Btated the following:
I am writing regarding tho above account. 1believe that my most recent

statement . . . is inaccurate. . . .I am disputing the above amount because I
believe that you failed to credit my account For prepayments you agreed to
credit on the [December] statement . . . . It was my understanding that
when I entered into the agreement with you that you would accept my
signed note(s) or other similar instmment(s) as money, oredit$or payment
for previous account transactions, and then reflect those credits inthe

21
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[December] statement

)

. . . . They do not appear in the statement and I am

wondering why. The sunount of the credits on the prepayments of money
or credit accepted by you should be the approximate amount that I list
above. I am making this billing inquiry becausc I am uncertain of all the
dates of the prepaid credits, charges and also because there may be
additional credits that 1am entitled to. Please provide me with a wrinen
explanation why these credits are not showing. . . . T am requesting that
you provide me with an acknowledgement of this billing error and
complete a full investigation by sending me a written explanation reporl
related t~ the subject matter of this billing enor. .. . I am also requesting
additional documc:ntary evidence of indebtedness of the account chargcs,
which includes copies of the account charges and entries that made you
arrivc at the recent balance shown on my statement. .. . I am exercising

m y right to withhold the disputed amount until you comply. . . .
Neither Ms. Canoll nor Mr. Capps received a reply to their letter. In March 2005
they each wrote a follow-up letter to MBNA Bank, noting that thcy had received no
response to their inquiry, and urging the bank to "comply with the resolution procedurks
to avoid noncompliance." Subsequently both Ms. Carro1l and Mr. Capps noted that their

credit reports with Experian had listed their accounts as closod by the creditor and
overdue. Each thcn wrote a letter to MBNA Bank, Mr. Capps in June and Ms. Carroll in
October, asking the Bank to observe certain procedures for resolving billing disputes as
required by federal regulations. Each asked the bank to amend the report to indicate that
the account balancc was in dispute rather than overdue, to remove any reference to late
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payments, and to report a balance on the account as of the day when the purported billing
dispute was initiated, less the late fees and intercst accrucd since that time.
At some point MBNA Banis.filed claims against both of them with the National
Arbitration Fonun (NAF), requesting that the disputes be arbitrat:ed. In April 2005 Ms.
Carroil wrote to the NAP and moved to dismiss the claim filed with them. In 11er motion
to dismiss Ms. Carroll asserted that lhc original agreement she had with MBNA Bank
involved no agreerncnt to arbitrate, that she had received no notice of any amendment to
the agreement which added an arbitration clause and allowed her the opportwity to optout, and that consequently there was no cunent agreement which gave the NAF authority
to arbimte her dispute with thc bank. In July 2005 Mr. Capps sent an equivalent lettcr.
In each case the NAF acknowledged receipt of the motion to dismiss and
requested thc subniission of evidence %omthe paties to the dispute. On August 3,2005
the NAF issued a decision in regaxds to the claim against Ms. Carroll. The N M
arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agteement between the parties granting
it authoxity to resolve the dispute. The arbitrator &her found that the information and

evidence submitted in the case supported the issuance of an award to MBNA Bank in the
amount of thirty thousand two hundred and forty-one dollars and forty-one cents. On
September 30.2005 a different arbitrator made similar hdings in the claim against Mr.
Capps and issued an. award in the amount of twenty-eight thousand one hundred fifty-six
dollars and forty-nine cents in the favor of MBNA Bank.
On September 30,2005 Ms. Cmoll filed a complaint in Idaho County. In hcr

first cause of action Ms. Carroll claimed that MBNA Bank had violated federal law when
it failed to follow the procedures required by the Tmth in Lending Act to rcsolve the
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billing dispute raised by her letter of December 2004. A second cause of action alleged
that her contract rights under her crcdit card agreement were breached when the Bank

movcd to arbitrate its claim against ber, asserting that there was no valid agreement to
arbitrate disputes. The third cause of action allcged that the hebitration claim and award
had "impair[ed] the protection and security of obligation of conttact under the
Constitution" and had also violated her rights to due process, her right of access to the
courts, and her right to trial by jury. A fourth cause of action asked for immediate
injunctive reliefinvalidating the arbitration award. On November 3,2005 Mr. Capps
filed an equivalent complaint against MBNA Bank alleging the same causes of action and
requesting the same relief.
On .Tanuary 17,2006 MBNA Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award
against Mr. Capps. The request was incorrectly filed in Lcwis County and was
subsequently transferred to Idaho County. On March 29,2006 MRNA Bank moved for
summary judgment in its favor regarding the complaints fited by both Ms. Carroll and
Mr. Capps. On May 1I, 2006 1 consolidated the cases.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summaryjudgment is only appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, demonstrate that there is no material issue of fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. McColnz-Traska v. Baker, 139
Idaho 948,950-51 (2004); Thornson v. City oflowiston, 137 Idalto 473,476 (2002);

X.R.C.P.56(c). All allegations of fact in the record and all inferences from the record are
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construed in tl~elight most favorable to the non-moving party. Civ oflellogg v. Mission
Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239,243 (2000).

Summary judgment is improper whcn a conflict in affidavits respecting issues of
material fact exists or when the relevant pleadings, depositions and affidavits raise any
question of credibility ofwitnesses. On ihe otl~ethand, a mere scintilla of cvidencc will
not create a genuine issue of material fact suficicnt lo preclude summary judgment.
Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792,798 (2002)(citations omitted).

The initial burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving
party. Where the moving party has supported its motion, however, the non-moving party
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but tho party's
responsc, by mdavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that therc is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(c); Thompn, 137 Idaho at
476; Doc 11. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,469 (1986).
DISCUSSION
The Arbitration Clause
This outcome of this litigation depends in part of the t m s and validity of the
contract between MBNA Bank and its cardholders Ms. Carroll and Mx. Capps. A crucial
issue is whether or not a valid, enforceable arbitration clause was contained in the
agreement between thc parties at the time the disputes arose. Thc

of Ms.

Carroll and Mr. Capps state that there was no agreement lo agreement and that they were
unaware of any attempt by MBNA Bank to amend their original credit card agreement to

obtain one. Gregory Canapp. a Senior Personal Banking OEcer at MBNA Rank, states
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that therc was an agreement and purports to attach a copy of the current operative
agreement and copies of monthly stateinents.
No such documents are attached, a fact notcd by Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps in
their brie& in opposilion to the motion for summaryjudgment. MBNA Bank has taken
no steps to rcmedy this situation. As a result I am left only with the patties avcrments as
lo whether an arbitration agreement governed their dispute. S u m a r y judgment on the
arbitratton agreement dispute is not possible on such a record.
Violation of the Fedcrai Credit Billing Act
The issue of whether or not MBNA Bank violated federal law, howevcr, requires
more discussion. Both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps claim that MBNA Bank has violated
relevmt provisions of the Truth in Lending Act. Specifically they claim that thc bank
failed to follow the procedures rcquired by law when a consumer raises a billing dispute
regarding an opcn-ended revolving credit agreement. They each claim that their letter of
December 2004 raised such a dispntc. MBNA Bank acknowledges receiving thc letters
but denies that thc letters raised a billing dispute. It therefore claims it was not requircd
to follow the procedures cited by Ms. Cmoll and Mr. Capps.
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), ori&ally enacted in 1968,was the first federal

consumer protection law. Ksrz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 273 F.Supp.2d 474,477(S.D.

N.Y. 2003); see 15 U.S.C.$ 1601 et seg. The overall pu.rposc of TXLA is to "assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the variaus credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices." 15 U.S,C. 1601(a); Citibank(South Dakota) N.A. v. Mincks, 135 S.W.3d 545,
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552-53 (Mo. App. S.D.2004). As a remedial act TILA must be strictly construed against

creditors and liberally construed in favor of consumers. Kurz, 273 F.Supp.2d at 477;
Minck, 135 S.W.3d at 553.
Congress also sought to force creditors to be more responsive to their customers
by displaying relevant information clearly and by responding promptly to complaints

regarding billing errors. Kurz, 273 F.Supp.2d at 477. To advance this purpose Congress
enacted thc Fair Credit Bijling Act, which added a number of provisio~lsto TILA and set
for& the required procedure to be followed if the obligor wishes to query a bill in
conncctionwith an extension of consumer credit. 88 Stat. 1512; 15 U.S.C.8 1666(a);
American &pres,s Co. v. Koernsr, 452 U.S. 233,234-35 (1981); Kt~rz,273 F.Supp.2d at

477.
I fthe debtor believes that the sbtemenl:contains a billing enor, he then may send

the creditor a written notice setting forth that belie< indicating thc amount of the enor
and the reasom for his belief that it is an error. Koernev, 452 U.S. at 235-36. More
precisely, the statutory language requires that the notice: "(1) set[] forth or otherwise
enable[] the creditor to iderltifL the name sad account numbcr (if any) of the obligor, (2)
indicate[] the obligor's belief that the statement contains a billi~lgcrror and the mount of
such billing error, and (3) setl] forth the reasons for the obligor's belief (to the extent
applicable) that the statement contains a billing error. . ." 15. U.S.C. $ 1666(a);see also
12 C.F.R.4 226.13(b)..
If the creditor receives this notice within 60 days of transmitting the statement of
account, two obligations are imposed. Within 30 days, i t must send a written
acknowledgment U~atit has received tl~enotice. And, within 90 days or two complete
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billing cyclcs, whichever is shorter, the creditor must investigate the m a m and either
make appropriate corrections in the obligor's account or send a written explanation of its
belief that thc original statement sent to the obligor was correct. The creditor must send
its explanation before making any attempt to collect thc disputcd amount. Koerner, 452
U.S. at 235-37.

After complying with these provisions in regards to an alleged billing enor, a
creditor has no further responsibility under section 1666 if the obligor continues to makc
substantially the same allegation with rcspect to such error. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a);
Koerner, 452 U.S. at 237. But a creditor that fails to comply with the section Forfeits its

right t~ collect the tirst fifly dollars of thc disputcd amount including finance charges. 15
U.S.C.

1666(e); Koerner. 452 U.S. al237. FuTthmore. pursuant to regulations issued

by ihe Fcdcral Reserve Board and known as Regulation Z, a creditor may not restrict or

close an account due to a failure to pay a disputed amount until its written explanation
has been sent. 15 U.S.C. 1666(d); Koermr, 452 U.S. at 237; 12 C.F.R. 3 226.13(d)(l).

The consumer necd not pay the amount during this period, the creditor may not threaten
directly or indirectly to make a bad credit report due to the failure to pay, and the amount

in dispute "may not be reportcd as delinquent to any third party" until the creditor has
fulfilled its statutory obligations and has given the consumer at least ten days to pay any
amount determined to be owed. 15 U.S.C. 6 1666a(a); Bernstein v. Sakr Ftlfh Avenue &
Co,, 208 F.Supp.2d 765,773 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(d)(2).

As Congress intended these protections to apply to alleged "billing errors", it
statutorily defined what a billing error is. A billing error is any of thc following:
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(1) A reflection on a statcment of an extension of credit which was not

made to the obligor or, if made, was not in the amount reflected on such
statement.

(2) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit for which the
obligor requests additional clarification including documentary evidcnce
thereof.
(3) A reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the

obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee in
accordance with the agreement made at the time of a transaction.

(4) The creditor's failure to reflect properly on a statement a payment
made by the obligor or a credit issued to the obligox,
Q A computation tmor or similar error of an accounting nature of thc

creditor on a statement.
(6) Failure to transmit the statement required under section 1637(b) of this
title to the last addresa of thc obligor which has becn disclosed to h e
creditor, unless that address was furnished less than twenty days before the
end of the billing cycle for which the statcrnent js required.

(7) Any other error describcd in regulations of the Board.
15 U.S.C.

9 lG66(b);seealso 12 C.F.R.§ 226.1,3(a).

MBNA Bank acknowledged in its response to Rcquest for Admission No. l that it
received the letters forwarded by Ms. Can01 and Mr. Capps in eatly ~anwry.' Tbis is

I

Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps submitted the same interrogatories, requests for admission,
and requests for production of documents, and the Bank responded tlxe same way to their
separate submissions.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 10

2 $1

PAGE 10

LEWIS COUNTY

j

PAGE

11
I

within the sixty day period required by 15 U.S.C. (j 16666 for credit card obligors who
wish to inquire as to an allegcd billing error and trigger the procedures required by the

Fair Credit Billing Act.. It is undisputed that the Bank never responded to the letters -the

Bank admits in its rcsponse to Request for Admission No. 2 that it never conducted an
investigation. Further, it is undisputed that the Bank engaged in subsequent attempts to
collect by filing an arbitration claim and in at least Mr. Capp's case by filing a request for
confirmation ofthe arbitration awatd. The Bank also listed the two accounts as closcd or
restricted and reported them as overduc to a credit bureau. The Bank admits in its
response to Requests for Admission Nos. 6 and 7 that it made an adverse credit report to
Experian regarding Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps and that it did not identify the accounts as
being in dispute.
The issue prescntcd is whether the letters comprised valid billing error notices. If
they did not thc Bank's subsequent actions were privileged. IFthey did the Bank has
violated the mandates of 15 U.S.C 3 I666 and the agency regulations which implement
it2
MBNA Bank contends that a billing dispute must relate to a specific payment or
extension of credit and it fkther contends that Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps have failed to
specifically identify the payment they are referencing in their letters to thc Bank. It cites

Griesz v. Iiosuehold Bankin support of its position. 8 F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D. 111. 1998).
The Bank says d1at the Fair Credit Billing Act was designcd to rectify errors in billing

2

Courts must give deference to agcncy interpretations of TILA and its implementing
regulations. Anderson Bras. Ford v. Vglencia, 452 U.S. 205,219 (1981). Federal
Reserve Board staff opinions construing the statute and Regulation Z must be dcfcrred to
udess "demonstrably irrational." FordMotor Credit v. Milhollin, 444 {J.S. 555,565
(1980).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER-I. 1.
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statements such as misstated charges or calculations in bills. It contcnds that thc letters
here have Failed to do so. In its opinion, ihe letters amount to a specious invocation of the
universally discredited "'money lent" theory of credit, in which a debtor may repay in
kind a crcditor who has made an extension of crcdit. By paying for an extension of credit
with a promissory note, the debtor payg the creditor with credit and thus any extension of
debt is retired. The Bank cites authority for the proposition that a debtor cannot use
provisions of the Tmth in Lending Act an "instrument of harassment and oppression"
against the lending industry. It a.ks me to recognize these letters for what the Bank
contends they really are: illegitimate attempts to frustrate creditors intheir atternpts to
collect debts lcgally owcd.
Botl~Mr. Carroll and Mr. Capps deny that their letters rely on the 'honey lent"
theory. But their representations shed no fusthcr light on what thc lcttcrs actually mcan.
The letters do in fact make reference to the understanding of Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps
that the Bank had agree to accept the "signed note(s) or other similar instwtnent(s) as
money, credit, or payment for previous account transactions." But the letters citc no
specific payment made, nor the time frame in which any payment or promise of payment
was made. Nor do they dispute any charge or extension of credit directly. It is difficult

to see what the letter is refening to if it is not referring to an allcged repayment of credit
in kind.
But the Bank undercu@its own position with its responses to the requests for
admission. In its response to Rcqucst for Admission No. 2 it admits that the lettcr
contained a reference to the sender's name and account number. Request for Admission

No. 3 then asked the Bank to admit that "the letter indicated that [sic] the p1aintilX"s belief

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 12
ei-

q 4A

<I

PAGE

12

05/24/2006 14:11

I

'.,

PAGE 13

LEWIS COUNTY ( .'',

20893797"3
:

'\

I

that a billing crror exists, the type of e m , the statement date and the amount of the
enor." MRNA Bank's response to this requcst was not to admit or deny but rather to
opine that "the letter speaks for itsclf."
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), a matter to which a requcst for
admiision is directed "is admitted unless, within 15 days after service ofthe request,
.the party.

..

. . scwcs . . .a writtcn answer or objection addressed to the matter. . . . If

objection is made, the reasons therefore shall be stated. The answer shall specifically
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot
truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the
requested admission.

. ."

The Bank neither admitted, denied, or objected to the request for admission even
though it was a legitimate request entitled to a response. It clearly comprised a 'kcquest
that relate[ed] to statements or opinions of fact or of the appljcation of law to fact"
I.C.R.P. 36(a). Rule 36 will allow requests as to a broad range of matters, including
opinions, conclusiovs, and ultimate facts as well as applications of law to fact. Ruge v.

Posey, 114 Idaho 890,891 n. I (2003)(noting that even a request to admit negligence,
fault, or liability may be permissible in certain ckcurnstances). This request addressed the
presence or absence in the letter of relevant facts which could establish whether the letter
met the statutory requirements for raising a valid billing dipute under 15 U.S.C. 1666.
The request was entitled to a rcsponse.
Recause a failure to deny or object amounts to admission, the requcst is deemed
admitted. With thc Idaho rule, as with the comparable federal rule, any matter admitted,
wl~etheradmitted affirmatively or by default, is concl~~sively
established. Quiring v.

-~
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Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,564 (1997)(citing American Auto. Ass'n v. AM Legal Clinic,
930 F.2d l 117, 1119 (5th Cir. 199I)('[alny matter admitted is conclusively establisl~ed");
scc al,voAsea, Inc. Y. Southern PaciJc Tramp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242,1245 (9th Cir. 1982)

("it is undisputed that failure to answer or object to a propcr request for admission is itsclf
an admission").
The Bank has not moved to witlidraw its admission, which aclrnowledges that the
statutory elements of a valid billing dispute were contained in the letter. In light of such
an admission, MBNA bank has not explained how it can bc entitled lo summary
judgment in its favor, especially when 1 must construe the statute strictly against the
creditor and liberally in favor of thc consumer. Viewing the evidencc in the lighl. most
favorable to the non-moving party, jt would appear that tile Bank has failed to establish
its right to a grant of summary judgment in its favor.

Of course the Bank in its Responsc to Admission No. 1 manages to deny the that
the lettcr constituted a valid billing noticc, thus contradicting the default admission made
later by its response to Request for Admission No. 3. In point of fact, the Bank appears
to want to have it both ways. ;It did not want to overtly deny the request and then be
forced to cxplain why &err: was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Then it
might not enjoy success with its motion for summary judgment. Nor did it want to admit
the request directly and appear to concede the case or explain why it m s still entitlcd to
judgment as a matter of law. But the purpose of requests for admission is precisely to
narrow the issues so that litigation may bc more narrowly defined and then resolved on
the merits.
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MRNA BElnk docs not havc the option to ignore the requirements and purposes of
the Idaho Rules of Cjvil Procedure in order to prcvail on a motion for s u m m q
judgment. I am disappointed that it thinks that it can.
Where 1 "dcterminen that an answer does not comply" with Rule 36,X "may order
either that tl~cmatter is admitted or that an amended answer be served." I.C.R.P. 36(a). I
conclude that an amended answer is rcquired.

ORDER
MBNA America Bank's motion for summary judgment as to thc claim by Ms.
Carroll is DENIED. Its motion for summary judgment on the claim by Mr. Capps is also
DENIED. The Bank will promptly amend its response to both Ms. Carroll and Mr.
Capps' Request for Admission Number 3 so as to comply with the requirements of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 36.

4

2
-day of May, 2006.

It i s so ordered this

V

John H.Bradbury
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAIJ,WG
&at a ante copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage
May, 2006, to the following:
-

-
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MBNA America Ban]<
C/O Wilson,McColl& Rasmussen
P.O.Box 1544

Boise, ID 83701
David Capps
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, 1D 83536

Miriam Carroll
HC-I1 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536

ROSE B. GEEXRING, Court Clerk

by:
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Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
Plaintiff, in propria persona
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

)

1

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV-06-37320

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF
AWARD LETTER

1

VS.

Defendant,
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
)
County of Idaho

I, MIRIAM G. CARROLL, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
1. I am the Defendant in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of
my Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Award Letter. I make
this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. Pg 1 of 3.
-

-
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2. That on or about the 15Ihday of March, 1980,1 entered into a consumer
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter
referred to as "MBNA") for the purpose of securing an open-ended
revolving credit card account number 4313-0331-1100-6016.

3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an
agreement to arbitrate disputes.

4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the
agreement to include an arbitration clause.
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA.
Dated this

27

day of June, 2006.

Cl -c+\\
Subscribed and sworn before me
Miriam G. Carroll

this 2

7

day of June, 2006

County
My Commission expires on

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. Pg 2 of 3.
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CERTIFCATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27 day of June, 2006, 1 mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER to the
attorney for the Plaintiff by Certified Mail #7003 0500 0005 3304 9348, with
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
William L. Bishop, Jr.
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111-2f3B
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle. WA 98101

.'.,:,CC--\
.
I
Miriam G. Carroll

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER. P 3 f 3.
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Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Defendant,

Case No. CV-06-37320
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF
AWARD LETTER

INTRODUCTION
MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) claims to
have amended the credit card agreement with the Defendant, Miriam G. Carroll
(hereinafter referred to as "Carroll") in or around the month of January of the year
2000. Carroll has not agreed to arbitrate this dispute, or any dispute with MBNA.
MBNA claims that the amendment to the credit card agreement was made
unilaterally, and that it has the authority to do so. This brief challenges the
contention that MBNA has a right to unilaterally modify the credit card agreement

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
LETTER. Pg 1 of 16.
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and demonstrates that Carroll's agreement was necessary to modify the credit
card agreement and MBNA has no evidence that her agreement was obtained
The alleged modification of the credit card agreement to include arbitration was
not properly formed and is ineffective and unenforceable.

II
ARGUMENT
There are two (2) arguments that MBNA uses to justify its alleged
authority to unilaterally amend the credit card agreement.

1

That in the original credit card agreement, the card holder agrees to
abide by all future rules and amendments, and,

2

That MBNA is authorized by Delaware statute Title 5 3 952 to
amend the credit card agreement to include arbitration.

While MBNA has not supplied a copy of the original agreement in support
of its argument, it has supplied the alleged current credit card agreement. That
agreement is titled: Credit Card Agreement Additional Terms and Conditions Selected Sections. That alleged agreement states:
"We May Suspend or Close Your Account. We may suspend or close
your account or otherwise terminate your right to use your account. We may do
this at any time and for any reason. Your obligations under this Agreement
continue even after we have done this. You must destroy all cards, access
checks, and other credit devices on the account when we request that you do
SO."

The alleged agreement also states:

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
.
LETTER. Pg 2 of 16.
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"You May Close Your Account. You may close your account by
notifying us in writing or by telephone and destroying all cards, access checks,
and other credit devices on the account. Your obligations under this Agreement
continue even after you have done this."
The definition of an illusory contract is when one party to the contract can
cancel the contract at any time, without notice, and the other party cannot. It is
clear from the above sections of the Credit Card Agreement that MBNA claims
the right to close the account at any time and for any reason, thus canceling its
obligations and in effect, the contract, without notice. The card holder, however,
must give notice and the card holder's obligations continue, where MBNA's
obligations do not. In addition, the alleged Agreement also states:

"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this agreement at
any time. We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this
Agreement. When we amend this Agreement, we wili comply with the applicable
notice requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If
an amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject
the change in the manner provided in such amendment, we may terminate your
right to receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition
of your rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other
higher charges or fees) wili apply to the total outstanding balance, including the
balance existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your
card with another card at any time."
MBNA claims the right to amend the alleged Agreement, but stops short of
claiming a unilateral right to amend. If MBNA can cancel its obligations, and thus
the contract without notice, and can unilaterally amend the contract, then it is
clearly an illusory contract and as such is totally unenforceable.
MBNA states that, "When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the
applicable notice requirements of federal and Delaware law." This brings us to
the second argument: Delaware statute Title 5 § 952. Delaware Statute Title 5 $

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
" . .
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952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d). Subsection (d) applies to "other than
an individual borrower" and does not apply in this case. Subsection (c) applies to
decreases or increases in the number or amount of installment payments, small
increases (less than %of 1 percent per annum, variable and fixed rate changes
to periodic interest rates, formulas, and methods of determining the outstanding
unpaid balance; none of which is germane to this case. What remains, and is
germane, is subsection (a) and (b). In order to more clearly understand
subsection (a), we will examine subsection (b) first.
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Subsubsections (1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases
the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943
or § 944 of this title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and §
944 deals specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with subsubsections (I), through (5) is provided as follows:

(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest
charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank
shall mail or deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe
the amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any
applicable information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following
provisions of this section.
(2) Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a
bank to a borrower under §943 or 5 944 of this title may become effective as
to a particular borrower if the borrower does not, within 15 days of the earlier
of the mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such
longer period as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the
bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The
notice from the bank shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send
notice of the borrower's election not to accept the amendment and shall
include a statement that, absent the furnishing of notice to the bank of
nonacceptance within the referenced 15 day (or longer) time period, the
amendment will become effective and apply to such borrower. As a condition
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
LETTER. Pg 4 of 16.

to the effectiveness of any notice that a borrower does not accept such
amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to it all credit
devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a notice
of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase
or obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment,
the amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may
become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment
would have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower
(or as of any later date selected by the bank).
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest
charged by a bank to a borrower under 3 943 or 3 944 of this title may, in lieu
of the procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become
effective as to a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date
specified in the written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after
the mailing or delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the
amendment becomes effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan;
provided, that the notice from the bank includes a statement that the
described usage after the referenced date will constitute the borrower's
acceptance of the amendment.
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to
use such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection,
shall be permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such
borrower's account under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of
periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this
title without giving effect to the amendment; provided however, that the bank
may convert the borrower's account to a closed end credit account as
governed by subchapter Ill of this chapter, on credit terms substantially
similar to those set forth in the then-existing agreement governing the
borrower's plan.
(5) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, no notice required
by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving
credit plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of
any date agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any
amendment that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either
orally or in writing. (End of statutory quote).
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement
that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a
borrower. The borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
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LETTER. Pg 5 of 16.
- .
! 1
3

-

....

' l

4

accept, or reject the amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with
recognition of the amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a
unilateral modification of previously settled terms, modified as agreed in the
contract. These are terms entirely consistent with the common law of contracts
(Restatement (second) of Contracts). Please take notice that everything
discussed so far specifically deals with increases in the rate or rates of periodic
interest, clearly established as a term in the original contract between the bank
and the borrower. Every condition is clearly identified as applying to subsection
(b), § 943 or § 944. No mention in subsection (b) is made of anything applying to
subsection (a). Sub-subsection (5) is noteworthy in that it states;
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing."
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of
Contracts) is recognized as being in force.
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows:
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise
provides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such
agreement in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of
the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the parties
or is integral to the relationship between the parties. Without limiting the
foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the addition of new
terms or by the deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating
to plan benefits or features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the
manner of calculating periodic interest or outstanding unpaid
indebtedness, variable schedules or formulas, interest charges, fees,
collateral requirements, methods for obtaining or repaying &tensions of
credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, the manner for amending the
terms of the agreement, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever. Unless the
agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise expressly provides,
any amendment may, on and after the date upon which it becomes

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
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effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then outstanding unpaid
indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan, including any such
indebtedness that arose prior to the effective date of the amendment. An
agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be amended pursuant to
this section regardless of whether the plan is active or inactive or whether
additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any amendment that
does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank
to a borrower under § 943 or 5 944 of this title may become effective as
determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the bank with any
applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.
$§ 1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as in effect
from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be
included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the
periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of
statutory quote).
In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and
the procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be
sent in the same envelope with the periodic statements. There is nothing in subsection (a) authorizing a unilateral amendment. Section 952(a) of the Delaware
statute is a restatement of the common law of contracts. The parties have the
ability to amend any contract or agreement in any respect, including the addition
of new terms, not originally contemplated by the parties. The statute confirms
the common law of contracts, and is not a statute in abrogation of the common
law. Parties have the power to amend their contract under the same power of
contract formation, and under the same constraints of contract formation.
In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held;
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties
and terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the
parties."

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
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The four required elements of contract formation are: (I) Agreement (includes
an offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4)
Legality. The agreement (offer and acceptance) is addressed as follows.
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to
use the notification scheme for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest
specific to subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection
(a), in an apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious
and express consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the card holder the option
of refusing the amendment by sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA
(opting out). No such provision is present in subsection (a) of $j952 of the
Delaware statute. MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card
as an act on the part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed
arbitration modification to the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed
arbitration clause, and agrees to the modification, the cardholder will continue to
use the card. If a cardholder is unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and
would not agree to it if they were aware of the proposed modification, the
cardholder would continue to use the card. The proposed act to indicate assent
is ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of the cardholder must be specific to
the proposed amendment. The Restatement (second) of Contracts, Section 18,
manifestation of mutual assent (c), states;
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in
some way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a
conscious will to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere
mechanical instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual
relations."
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"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the
assent is genuine."
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997). 702 A.2d 313, The New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that 131,
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract
cannot alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet
as to the proposed modification"

"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties'
conduct, it is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show
ambiguous course of dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that
original contract was still in force, and the other that it had been changed."
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration
clause to the cardholder agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot
be construed as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms.
The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendment itself,
but rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the
conscious recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common
Law of Contracts.
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the
Federal courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was
intended;
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer
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v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 26 (1986).
As other Federal courts have noted;
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, Inc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2000) rev'don othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001);
Mount Ararat Cemefery v. Cemefery Workers & Greens Attendants Union, 975
F.Supp. 445,446,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life
Assurance Co., 879 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 85
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant
Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 329 (4" Cir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, lnc. v. lnf4 Tool
Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4thCir. 1993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.
App. 4th779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether
parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through
application of state contract principles that govern the formation of any
contractual agreement. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920. 131 U Ed. 2d 985 (1995). "The policy favoring
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate."
Victoria v. Super. Cf., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833 (1985).
To apply the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists,
"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to
arbitrate." Hendrick v. Brown &Roof, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527, 538
(E.D.Va. 1999).
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Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001

WL 965063 (D.Mont.), the 91hFederal District Court in Montana held;
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the
parties' relationship that would be effective unless rejected by the card holder.
In other words, MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance. Myers
did not perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act.
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does
not intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,]
may be such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own
language or other conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a
I
sufficient acceptance binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not,
merely by saying that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance,
cause it to be such. The offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in
hand, to use a postage stamp, or to speak, under penalty of being bound
by a contract by not expressing a rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on
Contracts § 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall 2000), at 407-08.
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 40205. However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers'
acceptance is her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is
dismissed by Perillo and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up
its right to a jury trial in exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not
evidence that anything was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that
Myers agreed to arbitrate the dispute with MBNA."
MBNA generally argues that the card holder "agreed" to any changes it
makes in the future as part of the card holder agreement. Myers also addressed
this argument,
"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed" to arbitration when she agreed
to allow MBNA to amend the Aareement
were acceoted. there would be
.,
no reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to
include a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring
Myers to pay a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for
MBNA cards. Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the
parties at the outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision."
In conclusion, the court held,
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against
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Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement
to agree to MBNA's amendments."
In the case preceding this action, between the same parties and over the
same issue (CV-36747), Carroll has specifically requested evidence regarding
Carroll's knowledge and agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA, as
follows;
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have andlor will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the
card agreement; and the credit card account statements.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have andfor will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7.
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above.
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents.
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above.
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above.
The documents previously provided are "Credit CardAgreement
Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the agreement entered into by
Carroll and MBNA, and does not represent the agreement governing this
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
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account. The Additional Terms and Condifions contains no evidence whatsoever
that Carroll had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment, nor any
evidence that Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other documents
are monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Carroll had any
knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, nor any evidence that Carroll
agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented no evidence of a
meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to amend on the part of
Carroll, nor any evidence of Carroll's agreement to arbitrate.
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration
clause is a parol modification. in Scoff v. Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163,
The ldaho Supreme Court held that;
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter;
however, one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of
the other and minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed
modification, and fact of agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from
acts of one party in accordance with terms of change proposed by the
other."
Carroll was not aware of any contract modification regarding arbitration, there
was no conscious knowledge of a proposed arbitration clause, there was no
"meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its addition to the existing contract
between MBNA and Carroll (see attached affidavit). Assent may be implied from
acts, but the acts must be consistent with the nature of the change. Carroll has
not acted in a manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the contract. In
Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho 890, 693
P.2d 1092, the ldaho Supreme Court held that,
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
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"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds
and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties."
And in Hieman Aber & Goldlusf v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April 23, 1998,
The Delaware court held that,
[2j"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made
in the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the
minds unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered."
(See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips PefroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT
OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 540; and Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-11-064
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P.
LEXlS 2)
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA
and Carroll regarding arbitration
In Yellowpine Water User's Assh v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the
ldaho Supreme Court held;
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts
to add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual."
MBNA relies on Edelisf v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug.
09, 2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice.
In Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing
no evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a
lack of evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and
the actual interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did
not analyze the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not
analyze the statute, as verification of its position.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
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Carroll has examined the following cases to determine if the courts have
actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 § 952(a) and (b)):
Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1180278
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 418011
Jaimez v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921000
Stone v. Golden Wexler& Sarnese, P.C., 341 F.Supp.2d 189, 193
Kurz v. Chase Manhaftan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 915
Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249,1250+
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424,430,163 N.C.App. 207
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000)
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution.
Ill
CONCLUSION
Carroll asserts that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct and
asks this court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title 5, §
952(a) and (b)) as explained above. MBNA has provided no evidence of any
authority to unilaterally amend its Credit Card Agreement. Because there was,
and is, no meeting of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to
arbitrate disputes between Carroll and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or
circumstantial evidence demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding
arbitration. MBNA breached its contract with Carroll by proceeding to arbitration
without a valid agreement to do so. MBNA also violated Carroll's constitutionally
protected right to a trial by jury by proceeding to arbitration without a valid
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agreement to arbitrate. Carroll therefore prays that this court will deny MBNA's
motion to confirm the arbitration award letter. In conclusion, Carroll also prays
that this court will grant immediate relief by vacating the Award letter obtained
from the National Arbitration Forum (File Number FA0503000443990 in the
amount of $30,241.41 dated 08/03/2005), as it was obtained without an
agreement to arbitrate.

Dated this

hA

a?

day of June, 2006.

[ML-

Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a true and
correct copy of this OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER
and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
day of June, 2006, by First Class Certified Mail #7003
LETTER this
0500 0005 3304 9348 to the attorney for the Plaintiff at the following address:

97.

William L. Bishop, Jr.
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 9811I-=
2/86
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle. WA 98101

IL\,
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Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona
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Miriam G. Carroll
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208-935-7962
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ROSE E. GEHRING

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS,
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

)
)

Case No. CV-36747

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS

.

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR
EVlDENTlARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE

Combined with CV-37201

1
VS.

DAVID F. CAPPS,

i

Defendant,

)
)
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll
(hereinafter referred to as "Capps and Carroll") and lodge their brief for the

-

evidentiaty hearing on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

INTRODUCTION

MBNA America Bank (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) asserts that it
has the right to unilaterally amend the contracts with Capps and Carroll, and
pursuant to such right added an arbitration clause to the agreement during, or
shortly following the month of January, 2000. Capps and Carroll assert that the
contract cannot be amended unilaterally and that the proposed arbitration clause
has no agreement in fact, and is ineffective.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MBNA's claim of adding an arbitration clause stems from an interpretation of
Delaware Statute Title 5 § 952 (Banking - Part II, Banks and Trust Companies),
specifically; Amendment of agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the Delaware
statute"). That interpretation is hereb~hallenged~
Delaware Statute Title 5 Cj 952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d).
Subsection (d) applies to "other than an individual borrower" and does not apply
in this case. Subsection (c) applies to decreases or increases in the number or
amount of installment payments, small increases (less than %of 1 percent per
annum, variable and fixed rate changes to periodic interest rates, formulas, and
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO
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methods of determining the outstanding unpaid balance; none of which is
germane to this case. What remains, and is germane, is subsection (a) and (b).
In order to more clearly understand subsection (a), we will examine subsection
(b) first.
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Subsubsections (1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases
the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943
or § 944 of this title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and §
944 deals specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with subsubsections (I),
through (5) is provided as follows:
(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest
charged by a bank to a borrower under 3 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank
shall mail or deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe
the amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any
applicable information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following
provisions of this section.
(2) Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a
bank to a borrower under 5 943 or $944 of this title may become effective as
to a particular borrower if the borrower does not, within I 5 days of the earlier
of the mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such
longer period as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the
bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The
notice from the bank shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send
notice of the borrower's election not to accept the amendment and shall
include a statement that, absent the furnishina of notice to the bank of
nonacceptance within the referenced 15 day {or longer) time period, the
amendment will become effective and apply to such borrower. As a condition
to the effectiveness of any notice that a &;rower does not accept such
amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to it all credit
devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a notice
of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase
or obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment,
the amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may
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become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment
would have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower
(or as of any later date selected by the bank).
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest
charged by a bank to a borrower under 5 943 or § 944 of this title may, in lieu
of the procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become
effective as to a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date
specified in the written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after
the mailing or delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the
amendment becomes effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan;
provided, that the notice from the bank includes a statement that the
described usage after the referenced date will constitute the borrower's
acceptance of the amendment.
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to
use such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection,
shall be permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such
borrower's account under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of
periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or 5 944 of this
title without giving effect to the amendment; provided however, that the bank
may convert the borrower's account to a closed end credit account as
governed by subchapter Ill of this chapter, on credit terms substantially
similar to those set forth in the then-existing agreement governing the
borrower's plan.
(5) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, no notice required
by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving
credit plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of
any date agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any
amendment that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either
orally or in writing. (End of statutory quote).
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement
that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a
borrower. The borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to
accept, or reject the amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with
recognition of the amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a
modification of previously settled terms, modified as agreed in the contract.
Please take notice that everything discussed so far specifically deals with
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE Pg 4 of 18.

increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest, clearly established as a term in
the original contract between the bank and the borrower. Every condition is
clearly identified as applying to subsection (b), 3 943 or § 944. No mention in
subsection (b) is made of anything applying to subsection (a). Sub-subsection

(5) is noteworthy in that it states;
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing."
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of
Contracts) is recognized as being in force.
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows:
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise
provides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such
agreement in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of
the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the parties
or is integral to the relationship between the parties. Without limiting the
foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the addition of new
terms or by the deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating
to plan benefits or features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the
manner of calculating periodic interest or outstanding unpaid
indebtedness, variable schedules or formulas, interest charges, fees,
collateral requirements, methods for obtaining or repaying extensions of
credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, the manner for amending the
terms of the agreement, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever. Unless the
agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise expressly provides,
any amendment may, on and after the date upon which it becomes
effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then outstanding unpaid
indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan, including any such
indebtedness that arose orior to the effective date of the amendment. An
agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be amended pursuant to
this section regardless of whether the wlan is active or inactive or whether
additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any amendment that
does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank
to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title may become effective as
determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the bank with any
applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.
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§§ 1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as in effect
from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be
included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the
periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of
statutory quote).

In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and
the procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be
sent in the same envelope with the periodic statements. Nothing in subsection
(a) provides for, or authorizes, unilateral amendments to the agreement. The
agreement is a contract of adhesion; the bank constructs the contract and the
cardholder is left with the choice of accepting the contract as is, or refusing the
contract. The cardholder is not given the option of negotiating any terms of the
contract. As such, the bank is the only party in a position to amend the contract.
This does not equate to a unilateral right to amend. Each amendment must still
meet the basic requirements of contract formation, including mutual assent - a
"meeting of the minds" of both parties.
Section 952(a) of the Delaware statute is a restatement of the common law of
contracts. The parties have the ability to amend any contract or agreement in
any respect, including the addition of new terms, not originally contemplated by
the parties. The statute confirms the common law of contracts, and is not a
statute in abrogation of the common law. Parties have the power to amend their
contract under the same power of contract formation, and under the same
constraints of contract formation.
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In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held;
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties
and terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the
parties."
The four required elements of contract formation are: (1) Agreement (includes
an offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4)
Legality. The;agreem-erit(ofKei3nd acceptance) is addressed as follows.

..,

In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to use
the notification procedure for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest
specific to subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection
(a), in an apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious
and express consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the option of refusing the
amendment by sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA (opting out).
No such provision is present in subsection (a) of § 952 of the Delaware statute.
In addition, the proposed arbitration amendment was not solicited by Capps or
Carroll. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states in $69, "Acceptance by
Silence - ... (a) Acceptance by silence is exceptional.
Ordinarily an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of the
offeree to operate as acceptance. The usual requirement of notification is
stated in 9 54 on acceptance by performance and § 56 on acceptance by
promise. The mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the
offeree's freedom of action or inaction or impose on him any duty to
speak.
MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card as an act on
the part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed arbitration
modification to the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed arbitration
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clause, and agrees to the modification, the cardholder will continue to use the
card. If a cardholder is unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and would
not agree to it if they were aware of the proposed modification, the cardholder
would continue to use the card. The proposed act to indicate assent is
ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of the cardholder must be specific to the
proposed amendment. The Restatement (second) of Contracts, 318,
manifestation of mutual assent (c), states;
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in
some way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a
conscious will to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere
mechanical instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual
relations."
"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the
assent is genuine."
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997), 702 A.2d 313, The New
Hampshire Supreme Court heldthat [3],
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract
cannot alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet
as to the proposed modification"
and [41,
"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties'
conduct, it is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show
ambiguous course of dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that
original contract was still in force, and the other that it had been changed."
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration
clause to the credit card agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot be
construed as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms.
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The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendmentitself,
but rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the
conscious recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common
Law of Contracts.
MBNA also asserts that the cardholder has agreed to accept all changes in
the original agreement. The only form of the agreement supplied by MBNA in the
Plaintiffs request for the original contract is the "Credit Card Agreement Additional Terms and Conditions - Selected Sections" which states,
"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this Agreement at any
time. We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this
Agreement. When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the applicable
notice requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If
an amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject
the change in the manner providecfiTsuch amendKEi3:we
may terminate your
right to receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition
of your rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other
higher charges or fees) will apply to the total outstanding balance, including the
balance existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your
card with another card at any time."
There is no provision, or authorization, in this Agreement to unilaterally
amend the Agreement. The language is consistent with a contract of adhesion
where the cardholder cannot negotiate the terms of the contract. Any
amendment to the contract must still comply with the common law of contracts:
There must be a "meeting of the minds: both parties must agree as to the terms
of the contract." Without this "Meeting of the minds", there is no agreement.
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the
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Federal courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was
intended;
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 26 (1986).
As other Federal courts have noted;
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, Inc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,2000) rev'd on othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001);
Mount Ararat Cemetery v. Cemetery Workers & Greens Attendants Union, 975
F.Supp. 445,446,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life
Assurance Co., 879 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 85
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant
Food, Inc., I75 F.3d 325, 329 (4'h Cir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int? Tool
Supply, lnc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4'h Cir. 1993); Badie v. Bank ofAm., 67 Cal.
App. 4'h 779, 790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether
parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through
application of state contract principles that govern the formation of any
contractual agreement. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920. 131 U Ed. 2d 985 (1995). "The policy favoring
arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate."
Victoria V. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 739,222 Cal. Rptr. 1, 710 P.2d 833 (1985).
To apply the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses to the question of
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists,
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"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that
parties can be required to arbitrate only that which they have agreed to
arbitrate." Hendrick v. Brown & Roof, Inc., 50 F.Supp. 2d 527, 538
(E.D.Va. 1999).
Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001

WL 965063 (D.Mont.), the 9'h Federal District Court in Montana held;
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the
parties' relationship that would be effective unless rejected by the cardholder.
In other words, MBNA skipped offer and went straight to acceptance. Myers
did not perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act.
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does
not intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,]
may be such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own
language or other conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a
sufficient acceptance binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not,
merely by saying that the offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance,
cause it to be such. The offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in
hand, to use a postage stamp, or to speak, under penalty of being bound
by a contract by not expressing a rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on
Contracts 5 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall 2000), at 407-08.
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 40205. However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers'
acceptance is her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is
dismissed by Perillo and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up
its right to a jury trial in exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not
evidence that anything was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that
Myers agreed to arbitrate the dispute with MBNA."
MBNA generally argues that the cardholder "agreed" to any changes it
makes in the future as part of the cardholder agreement. Myers also addressed
this argument,
"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed" to arbitration when she agreed
to allow MBNA to amend the Agreement were accepted, there would be
no reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to
include a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring
Myers to pay a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for
MBNA cards. Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the
parties at the outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision."
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In conclusion, the court held,
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against
Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement
to agree to MBNA's amendments."
Capps and Carroll have specifically requested evidence regarding Capps'
and Carroll's knowledge and agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA,
as follows;
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have andlor will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the
card agreement; and the credit card account statements.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have andlor will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7.
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above.
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above.
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above.
The testimony of Greg Canapp, in answer to lnterrogatory No. 7, above, is
as follows:
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1. I am the Senior Personal Banking Officer at MBNA America Bank, N.A.
and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and
belief.
2. On or about February 20,1999, David Capps opened a credit card
account with MBNA America Bank, N.A.

3. A true and correct copy of the cardholder agreement governing the
account is attached hereto as Exhibit " A .
4. True and correct copies of the monthly statements associated with the

Capps account are attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
5. MBNA does not have record of having received a billing dispute letter from

Mr. Capps in reference to this account.

This is the full extent of Mr. Canapp's testimony. There is no attached Exhibit

"A". There is no attached Exhibit "B". There is nothing in Mr. Canapp's
testimony regarding Capps' knowledge of the alleged arbitration agreement, or
any information regarding any form of acceptance, or of a "meeting of the minds"
about arbitration at all. His testimony is totally silent on the subject. The affidavit
of Greg Canapp in regards to Carroll, is virtually identical with the exception of
the date of the agreement, and Carroll in place of Capps.
The documents, previously obtained during discovery by the plaintiffs, are
"Credit Card Agreemenf Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the
agreement entered into by Capps and Carroll with MBNA, and does not
represent the agreement governing this account. The Addifional Terms and
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Conditions contains no evidence whatsoever that Capps and Carroll had any
knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment, or any evidence that Capps
and Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other documents are
monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Capps and Carroll had
any knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, or any evidence that
Capps and Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented
no evidence of a meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to
amend on the part of Capps and Carroll, or any evidence of Capps' or Carroll's
agreement to arbitrate.
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration
clause is a parol modification. In Scott v. Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163,
The ldaho Supreme Court held that;
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter;
however, one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of
the other and minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed
modification, and fact of agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from
acts of one party in accordance with terms of change proposed by the
other."
Capps and Carroll were not aware of any proposed contract modification
regarding arbitration, there was no conscious knowledge of a proposed
arbitration clause, there was no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its
addition to the existing contcact between MBNA and Capps and Carroll (see
attached affidavits). Assent may be implied from acts, but the acts must be
consistent with the nature of the change. Capps and Carroll have not acted in a
manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the contract. In Gulf Chemical
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVlDENTlARY
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Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho 890, 693 P.2d 1092, the
ldaho Supreme Court held that,
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds
and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties."
And in Hieman Aber & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXlS 251, April 23, 1998,
The Delaware court held that,
[2]"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made
in the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the
minds unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered."
(See also Mesa Partners v. Phillips PetroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT
OF CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch.
LEXlS 540; and Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-11-064
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P.
LEXlS 2)
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA
and Capps and Carroll regarding arbitration.
In Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the
ldaho Supreme Court held;
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts
to add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual."
MBNA relies on Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug.
09, 2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice.
In Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing
no evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a
lack of evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and
the actual interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO
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not analyze the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not
analyze the statute, as verification of its position.
Capps and Carroll have examined the following cases to determine if the
courts have actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 5 952(a)
and (b)):
Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, lnc., 2001 WL 1180278
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 418011
Jaimez V. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921000
Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F.Supp.2d 189, 193
Kurr v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909,915
Edelisf v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1250+
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+
Sears Roebuckand Co. v. Avety, 593 S.E.2d 424,430, 163 N.C.App. 207
Goeisch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 W.D.N.C. 2000)
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution.
Capps and Carroll assert that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct
and asks this court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title
5, § 952(a) and (b)) as explained above. Because there was, and is, no meeting
of the minds regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to arbitrate disputes
between Capps and Carroll and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or
circumstantial evidence demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding
arbitration. Any statute which abrogates the common law must do so explicitly; it
cannot be vague or ambiguous. The Delaware statute does not explicitly
abrogate the common law, nor does the cardholder agreement explicitly abrogate
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the common law. Neither document provides for, or authorizes, the unilateral
amendment of the agreement.
Based on the common law of contracts, the Delaware statute and the
cardholder agreement, there is no right, authority or power, on the part of MBNA
to unilaterally amend the contract. Because this is a contract of adhesion, it is to
be strictly construed against MBNA, which constructed the contract. Capps and
Carroll therefore respectfully pray that this court will find that there are no
agreements to arbitrate between Capps and MBNA, and Carroll and MBNA, and
will subsequently vacate the following award letters from the National Arbitration
Forum:

Award letter against David F. Capps, dated 09/30/2005, in the amount of
$28,156.49, File Number: FA0506000498945.

Award letter against Miriam G. Carroll, dated 08/03/2005, in the amount of
$30,241.41, File Number: FA0503000443990.

Dated this @day

of July, 2006.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that on this zGay
of July, 2006, 1
mailed a true and correct copy of this PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVDENTIARY
HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to the opposing party by Certified
mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128, with proper postage affixed thereon at the
following address:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise. ID 83701
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David F. Capps
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
Plaintiff, in propria persona
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

1
)
)

VS.

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

1
)
)

Case No. CV-36747
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
)
County of Idaho
I, DAVID F. CAPPS, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT
TO ARBITRATE. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Pg. 1 of 3.
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2. That on or about the 2othday of February, 1999, 1 entered into a consumer
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter
referred to as "MBNA) for the purpose of securing an open-ended
revolving credit card account number 5490353603674374.
3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an
agreement to arbitrate disputes.
4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the
agreement to include an arbitration clause.
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA.
Dated this

~ S day
Sof July, 2006.

Subscrib$$and sworn before me
this 25 day of July, 2006

My Commission expires on

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITUTE Fg. 2 o'fq

CERTIFCATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day
of July, 2006, 1 mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to the
Defendant by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128with correct postage
affixed thereon addressed to:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Pg. 3 of 3.
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Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
Plaintiff, in propria persona
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-36747

)

vs .
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

)
)
)
)

1

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
FOR EVIDENTIARY
ON AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE

\

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:
)
County of Idaho
I, MIRIAM G. CARROLL, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my
Plaintiff's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate. I make
this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY NEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.
. . Pg 1 of 3.

2. That on or about the 1.5'~
day of March, 1980,1 entered into a consumer
contract with the defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter
referred to as "MBNA) for the purpose of securing an open-ended
revolving credit card account number 4313-0331-1100-6046.
3. That the original agreement between myself and MBNA did not contain an

agreement to arbitrate disputes.

4. That I have not been aware of any attempt from MBNA to alter the
agreement to include an arbitration clause.
5. That I have never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with MBNA.
Dated this

s
I---

2T+6day of July, 2006.

~ . ~ - 1 - -Subscribed
~ and sworn before me
this 257%day of July, 2006

Miriam G. Carroll

Notary Public, ~ t a t e bMaho
f
Residing in T,=!.
County

-6,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.Tg 2 of 3.
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CERTIFCATE OF MAILING
of July,
I, Miriam G. Carroll, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the @day
2006, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE to
the attorney for the Defendant by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 3128,
with correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise. ID 83701

u:-L- c.c-- \ \
Miriam G. Carroll

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE. Pg 3,of 3.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON03UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS
MIRIAM G. CARROLL

)
)

Plairitiffs.

)

1
vs .

1
1
1

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A..

)

case No. CV-05-36747

POST HEARING
MEMORANDUM
REBUTTAL

1
Defendant,

)

COMES NOW the Plaiptiffs, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll, and
submits the follow~ngPost Heanng Memorandum Rebuttal with respect to thrs
matter. As to the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statements 1 through
7, RE: Capps, the testimony of Michael Milties ~nequivocallyestablished that the
. .

proposed arbitration amend~nentwas not solicit&>d
., by Capps. Under $69 of the
:,

,

,. . ,

,

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Capps had,iio legal responsibility to respond
to an unsol~citedoffer, and his silence cannot be taken as assent to the offer In
addition, there was, and is, no "meeting of the minds" in regard to arbitration,

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM REBUTTAL Pg Iof 4 1 9

..... ........

04/24/2015

04:22 FAX

which is a requirement in botli Delaware and Id$b
, . for the formation of an
agreement, or the inodificationof an agreemen$

.

,

As l o the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statement number 8,
the testimony of Michael Milnes
. , clearly and undfillivocally established that Miriam
.,:, .
,, .
,

G. Carroll opened her accouiitin 1977. t~revious'admissioi?of MBNA's counsel
and an affidavit of Miriain G. Carroll have establisl?edthat the original cardholder
agreement between MBNA arid Carroll did not contain an arbitration clause.
Stateinent nuinber 8 is a patent lie before this court and is objected to in the
,:::I : .
.
,..:,.,
, ,,,.
strongest terms possible. Tlie Plaintiff demands sanctions against the Defendant
i

1:

,, ,

.::

t

and Defendant's counsel as the court deems bibper.
In testimony, Michael ~ ' i l h e sstated thaihirikm G. Carroll's account was
. ..'!..

.a

,:
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!:,

subsequently acquired, and that a welco~nepacK was mailed to her. It is a well
established principle of contract law that an assignment, or other related lneans
.. . ;
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.:.
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,:, . , ,:,,'{
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of acquiring contracts do not alter the ierms of the agreement other than to name
. ..I,
. .

.. , ; , :

the new owner of the agreement. No terms areadbed, deleted, or otherwise
:, . , .

changed by the assignment:.,.
:, ,

he testimony of ' ~ i. c h a eMilnes
l
clearly and
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unequivocally established that Miriam G . ~ a r r d ldid
i not solicit any amendment to
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The previous attempt by MBNA to amend the cardliolder agreement in
December of 1999 through January of 2000, w$~.ineffective,and the assigned
agreement did not contain an arbitration agreeinent. Any differences between
the existing agreement beforc! assignment, and :?liealleged agreement in the
"Welcome Pack" are still an unsolic~ledofter to arnend, to which Carroll had no
legal responsibility lo respond, and her silence cannot be taken as assent to any
new agreement
As to the Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum statements 9 through

13, RE: Carroll, these conditions are an ~~nsolicited
offer to arnend, to which
Carroll need not replay and her silence cannot be taken as assent, as outlined
above.
Delaware statute Title 5 §952(a) and the cardliolder agreement do allow
the cardholder agreement to be amencied Notliitig in the Delaware statute or
the cardholder agreement authorizes a unilateral right to arnend. Any
amendment still requires a "meeting of the m~nds"and without evidence of such,
IS

ineffective. MBNA has presented no evidence of a "meeting of the minds" in

testimony, affidavit or any other form Nothing 111Delaware statute Title 5
§952(a) authorizes an "opt-out" provtslon for new terms to an agreement, and the
attempted use of such an unauthorized scheme is ineffectual
The evidence presented at the hearing held August

loih, 2006 clearly

establishes that the offer l o amend presented by MBNA was unsolicited and
Capps and Carroll had no legal respons~bilityto'respond to the offer, and their
silence cannot be taken as assent Delaware and Idaho both require a "meeting
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of the minds" for contract formation or cof7tracf!&bdification, which is clearly
i

absent in these cases. The Plaintiff prays that this court will find that there was
no agreement to arbitrate this, or any, dispute between MBNA and Capps and
Carroll.
Datecl this

/ Yrnday of August. 2006.
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Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, i1.1propria pcllso17a

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David F. CBpps, hereby certify that I FAXED a true and correct copy of this
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM REBUTTAL io the attorney for the Defendant
at approxi~nately/:@@
$M PST on,tlle 17"' day of August, 2006.

Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-9264169
Defendant, in propria persona
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

1
1
1

Defendant,

)
)

VS.

case No. CV-2006-37320
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO CONFIRMATION
OF ARBITRATION AWARD

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter referred to as
"Carroll") and lodges her brief in support of her opposition to confirmation of
arbitration award and on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

INTRODUCTION

MBNA America Bank (hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) asserts that it has
the right to unilaterally amend the contracts with Carroll, and pursuant to such right
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added an arbitration clause to the agreement during, or shortly following the month
of January, 2000. Carroll asserts that the contract cannot be amended unilaterally
and that the proposed arbitration clause has no agreement in fact, and is ineffective.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MBNA's claim of adding an arbitration clause stems from an interpretation of
Delaware Statute Title 5 $952 (Banking -Part I!, Banks and Trust Companies),
specifically; Amendment of agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the Delaware
statute"). That interpretation is hereby challenged.
Delaware Statute Title 5 $952 is in four subsections, (a) through (d). Subsection
(d) applies to "other than an individual borrower" and does not apply in this case.
Subsection (c) applies to decreases or increases in the number or amount of
installment payments, small increases (less than 1/4 of 1 percent per annum, variable
and fixed rate changes to periodic interest rates, formulas, and methods of
determining the outstanding unpaid balance; none of which is germane to this case.
What remains, and is germane, is subsection (a) and (b). In order to more clearly
understand subsection (a), we will examine subsection (b) first.
Subsection (b) appears in five sub-subsections, (1) through (5). Sub-subsections
(1) through (3) deal specifically with "an amendment that increases the rate or rates
of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower under $ 943 or $ 944 of this
title." Section 943 deals specifically with periodic interest, and § 944 deals
specifically with variable rates of interest. Subsection (b) with sub-subsections (I),
through (5) is provided as follows:
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
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(b)(l) If an amendment increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by
a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this title, the bank shall mail or
deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date of the
amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice that shall describe the
amendment and shall also set forth the effective date thereof and any applicable
information required to be disclosed pursuant to the following provisions of this
section.
(2)Any amendment that increases the rate of periodic interest charged by a bank
to a borrower under $943 or $ 944 of this title may become effective as to a
particular borrower if the borrower does not, within 15 days of the earlier of the
mailing or delivery of the written notice of the amendment (or such longer period
as may be established by the bank), furnish written notice to the bank that the
borrower does not agree to accept such amendment. The notice from the bank
shall set forth the address to which a borrower may send notice of the borrower's
election not to accept the amendment and shall include a statement that, absent
the furnishing of notice to the bank of nonacceptance within the referenced 15
day (or longer) time period, the amendment will become effective and apply to
such borrower. As a condition to the effectiveness of any notice that a borrower
does not accept such amendment, the bank may require the borrower to return to
it all credit devices. If, after 15 days from the mailing or delivery by the bank of a
notice of an amendment (or such longer period as may have been established by
the bank as referenced above), a borrower uses a plan by making a purchase or
obtaining a loan, notwithstanding that the borrower has prior to such use
furnished the bank notice that the borrower does not accept an amendment, the
amendment may be deemed by the bank to have been accepted and may
become effective as to the borrower as of the date that such amendment would
have become effective but for the furnishing of notice by the borrower (or as of
any later date selected by the bank).
(3) Any amendment that increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged
by a bank to a borrower under fi 943 or § 944 of this title may, in lieu of the
procedure referenced in paragraph (2) of this subsection, become effective as to
a particular borrower if the borrower uses the plan after a date specified in the
written notice of the amendment that is at least 15 days after the mailing or
delivery of the notice (but that need not be the date the amendment becomes
effective) by making a purchase or obtaining a loan; provided, that the notice
from the bank includes a statement that the described usage after the referenced
date will constitute the borrower's acceptance of the amendment.
(4) Any borrower who furnishes timely notice electing not to accept an
amendment in accordance with the procedures referenced in paragraph (2) of
this subsection and who does not subsequently use the plan, or who fails to use
such borrower's plan as referenced in paragraph (3) of this subsection, shall be
permitted to pay the outstanding unpaid indebtedness in such borrower's account
under the plan in accordance with the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by
a bank to a borrower under $ 943 or $ 944 of this title without giving effect to the
amendment; provided however, that the bank may convert the borrower's
account to a closed end credit account as governed by subchapter Ill of this
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chapter, on credit terms substantially similar to those set forth in the then-existing
agreement governing the borrower's plan.
(5) Notwithstandingthe other provisions of this subsection, no notice required by
this subsection of an amendment of an agreement governing a revolving credit
plan shall be required, and any amendment may become effective as of any date
agreed upon between a bank and a borrower, with respect to any amendment
that is agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing.
(End of statutory quote).
Subsection (b) very carefully provides for the amendment of an agreement that
increases the rate or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower. The
borrower is given proper notice, and is given the opportunity to accept, or reject the
amendment, either expressly or by action consistent with recognition of the
amendment. The proscribed process is consistent with a modification of previously
settled terms, modified as agreed in the contract. Please take notice that everything
discussed so far specifically deals with increases in the rate or rates of periodic
interest, clearly established as a term in the original contract between the bank and
the borrower. Every condition is clearly identified as applying to subsection (b), §
943 or § 944. No mention in subsection (b) is made of anything applying to
subsection (a). Sub-subsection (5) is noteworthy in that it states;
"no notice required by this subsection of an amendment of an agreement
governing a revolving credit plan shall be required" when the amendment "is
agreed upon between the bank and the borrower, either orally or in writing."
This reaffirms the common law of contracts (Restatement (second) of Contracts)
is recognized as being in force.
We now turn our attention to subsection (a), which is provided as follows:
(a) Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise provides, a
bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agreement in any
respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of the amendment was
originally contemplated or addressed by the parties or is integral to the
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relationship between the parties. Without limiting the foregoing, such
amendment may change terms by the addition of new terms or by the
deletion or modification of existing terms, whether relating to plan benefits or
features, the rate or rates of periodic interest, the manner of calculating
periodic interest or outstanding unpaid indebtedness, variable schedules or
formulas, interest charges, fees, collateral requiremetats, methods for
obtaining or repaying extensions of credit, attorney's fees, plan termination,
the manner for amending the terms of the agreement, arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, or other matters of any kind
whatsoever. Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan
otherwise expressly provides, any amendment may, on and after the date
upon which it becomes effective as to a particular borrower, apply to all then
outstanding unpaid indebtedness in the borrower's account under the plan,
including any such indebtedness that arose prior to the effective date of the
amendment. An agreement governing a revolving credit plan may be
amended pursuant to this section regardless of whether the plan is active or
inactive or whether additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any
amendment that does not increase the rate or rates of periodic interest
charged by a bank to a borrower under Ej 943 or § 944 of this title may
become effective as determined by the bank, subject to compliance by the
bank with any applicable notice requirements under the Truth in Lending Act
1601 et seq.), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as
(15 U.S.C. !j§
in effect from time to time. Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank
may be included in the same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of
the periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower. (End of
statutory quote).
In subsection (a), the careful attention to recognition of the amendment and the
procedures for rejecting or accepting the amendment so clearly spelled out in
subsection (b), is absent. The only provision specified is that a notice may be sent
in the same envelope with the periodic statements. Nothing in subsection (a)
provides for, or authorizes, unilateral amendments to the agreement. The
agreement is a contract of adhesion; the bank constructs the contract and the
cardholder is left with the choice of accepting the contract as is, or refusing the
contract. The cardholder is not given the option of negotiating any terms of the
contract. As such, the bank is the only party in a position to amend the contract.
This does not equate to a unilateral right to amend. Each amendment must still
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
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meet the basic requirements of contract formation, including mutual assent a
"meeting of the minds" of both parties.
Section 952(a) of the Delaware statute is a restatement of the common law of
contracts. The parties have the ability to amend any contract or agreement in any
respect, including the addition of new terms, not originally contemplated by the
parties. The statute confirms the common law of contracts, and is not a statute in
abrogation of the common law. Parties have the power to amend their contract
under the same power of contract formation, and under the same constraints of
contract formation.

In Mandril v. Kasishke, 620 S.W.2d 238, the court held;
[8] "To modify contract, new or modifying agreement must possess essential
elements of contract; in particular, there must be meeting of minds of parties and
terms of original contract cannot be unilaterally remade by one of the parties."
The four required elements of contract formation are: (1) Agreement (includes an
offer and an acceptance), (2) Consideration, (3) Contractual capacity, and (4)
Legality. The agreement (offer and acceptance) is addressed as follows.
In a misinterpretation of Delaware statute Title 5 § 952, MBNA attempts to use the
notification procedure for increases in the rate or rates of periodic interest specific to
subsection (b) as a justification for adding new terms under subsection (a), in an
apparent attempt to bypass the requirement to obtain the conscious and express
consent of the cardholder. MBNA offers the option of refusing the amendment by
sending a written statement to that effect to MBNA (opting out). No such provision is
present in subsection (a) of 3 952 of the Delaware statute. In addition, the proposed
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arbitration amendment was not solicited by Carroll. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states in $69, "Acceptance by Silence - ... (a) Acceptance by silence is
exceptional.
Ordinarily an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of the offeree
to operate as acceptance. The usual requirement of notification is stated in $
54 on acceptance by performance and 5 56 on acceptance by promise. The
mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the offeree's freedom of
action or inaction or impose on him any duty to speak.
MBNA further attempts to use the continued use of the card as an act on the
part of the cardholder to indicate assent to the proposed arbitration modification to
the contract. If a cardholder is aware of the proposed arbitration clause, and agrees
to the modification, the cardholder will continue to use the card. If a cardholder is
unaware of the proposed arbitration clause, and would not agree to it if they were
aware of the proposed modification, the cardholder would continue to use the card.
The proposed act to indicate assent is ambiguous and thus ineffective. The act of
the cardholder must be specific to the proposed amendment. The Restatement
(second) of Contracts, $18, manifestation of mutual assent (c), states;
"A 'manifestation' of assent is not a mere appearance; the party must in some
way be responsible for the appearance. There must be conduct and a conscious will
to engage in that conduct. Thus, when a party is used as a mere mechanical
instrument, his apparent assent does not affect his contractual relations."
"This is true even though the other party reasonably believes that the assent
is genuine."
In Walker v Percy, 142 N.H. 345 (1997), 702 A.2d 313, The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that [3],
"It is a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to contract cannot
alter its terms without assent of the other party; parties' minds must meet as to the
proposed modification"
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"While agreement to modify contract may be inferred from parties' conduct, it
is not sufficient for party seeking to prove modification to show ambiguous course of
dealing from which one party might reasonably infer that original contract was still in
force, and the other that it had been changed."
For example, if a cardholder filed an arbitration action against MBNA, that
would be a clear act in recognition of the addition of the proposed arbitration clause
to the credit card agreement. Continued normal use of the card cannot be construed
as assent to a proposed amendment new to the contract terms.
The "notice" referred to in the Delaware statute is not the amendment itself, but
rather a notice of an offer to amend. Such an offer is dependant on the conscious
recognition and acceptance of the offeree as required in the Common Law of
Contracts.
MBNA also asserts that the cardholder has agreed to accept all changes in the
original agreement. The only form of the agreement supplied by MBNA in Carroll's
request for the original contract is the "Credit Card Agreement -Additional Terms
and Conditions - Selected Sections" which states,
"We May Amend This Agreement. We may amend this Agreement at any time.
We may amend it by adding, deleting, or changing provisions of this Agreement.
When we amend this Agreement, we will comply with the applicable notice
requirements of federal and Delaware law that are in effect at that time. If an
amendment gives you the opportunity to reject the change, and if you reject the
change in the manner provided in such amendment, we may terminate your right to
receive credit and may ask you to return all credit devices as a condition of your
rejection. The amended Agreement (including any higher-rate or other higher
charges or fees) will apply to the total outstanding balance, including the balance
existing before the amendment became effective. We may replace your card with
another card at any time."
There is no provision, or authorization, in this Agreement to unilaterally amend
the Agreement. The language is consistent with a contract of adhesion where the
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
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cardholder cannot negotiate the terms of the contract. Any amendment to the
contract must still comply with the common law of contracts: There must be a
"meeting of the minds: both parties must agree as to the terms of the contract."
Without this "Meeting of the minds", there is no agreement.
As this proposed Arbitration agreement follows from the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and involves interstate commerce, it is important to consider what the Federal
courts have said in this regard. It should be noted here that the FAA was intended;
"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at Enalish common law and had been ado~tedbv American courts, and to
place arbitracon agreements on the same footing i s other contracts." Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L. Ed.
2d 26 (1986).
As other Federal courts have noted;
"a party will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to arbitrate in the absence of any
agreement to do so." GTFM v. TKN Sales, lnc., 2000 WL 364871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7,2000) rev'don othergrounds, 257 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2001); Mount Ararat
Cemetery v. Cemetery Workers & Greens Atfendants Union, 975 F.Supp. 445,446,
447 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 879
F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) rev'don othergrounds, 85 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1996).
The FAA policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses does not come into
play in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. Carson v. Giant Food,
Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 329 (4thCir. 1999); Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int? Tool Supply,
lnc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4thCir. 1993); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th779,
790, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 280 (1998). The question of whether parties have
entered into an agreement to arbitrate is resolved through application of state
contract principles that govern the formation of any contractual agreement. See
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920.131 LI
Ed. 2d 985 (1995). "The policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for
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a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." Victoria v. Super. Cf.,40 Cal. 3d 734, 739, 222
Cal. Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833 (1985). To apply the policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration clauses to the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists,
"would permit the presumption to displace the fundamental rule that parties
can be reauired to arbitrate onlv that which thev have agreed to arbitrate."
Hendrick Brown & Roof, lnc.: 50 F.Supp. 2d 5 2 7 , 5 3 8 ( ~ . ~ . ~
1999).
a.

i.

Specific to the case at bar, as explained in Myers v. MBNA America, 2001 WL
965063 (D.Mont.), the 9'h Federal District Court in Montana held;
"MBNA proposed the Arbitration Section as a change in the terms of the parties'
relationshir, that would be effective unless rejected by the cardholder. In other
words, MBNA skipped offer and went straighi to acceptance. Myers did not
perform an act and did not forego the performance of an act.
It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does not
intend it to be so. The offeree's conduct, coupled with the silence[,] may be
such as to make the silence operative. The offeror's own language or other
conduct may be such as to make the offeree's silence a sufficient acceptance
binding upon the offeror. But an offeror can not, merely by saying that the
offeree's silence will be taken as an acceptance, cause it to be such. The
offeror cannot force the offeree to take pen in hand, to use a postage stamp,
or to speak, under penalty of being bound by a contract by not expressing a
rejection. Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 3.18 (1993 & Supp. Fall
2000), at 407-08.
Circumstances may indicate that the offeree accepts the offer. See id. At 402-05.
However, the only circumstance in this case that might indicate Myers' acceptance is
her failure to notify MBNA of her rejection. That circumstance is dismissed by Perillo
and by common sense. MBNA could argue that it gave up its right to a jury trial in
exchange for Myers' doing the same. However, this is not evidence that anything
was "bargained for." In sum, there is no indication that Myers agreed to arbitrate the
dispute with MBNA."
MBNA generally argues that the cardholder "agreed" to any changes it makes
in the future as part of the cardholder agreement. Myers also addressed this
argument,

"If MBNA's argument that Myers "agreed to arbitration when she agreed to
allow MBNA to amend the Agreement were accepted, there would be no
reason to stop at arbitration. MBNA could "amend" the Agreement to include
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a provision taking a security interest in Myers' home or requiring Myers to pay
a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for MBNA cards.
Such provisions were as much within the agreement of the parties at the
outset of their relationship as the arbitration provision."
In conclusion, the court held,
"Absent circumstantial evidence that Myers accepted MBNA's offer to
arbitrate their disputes, the Arbitration Section cannot be enforced against
Myers. Nor can her agreement to arbitrate be implied from her agreement to
agree to MBNA's amendments."
Carroll has specifically requested evidence regarding Carroll's knowledge and
agreement to the arbitration agreement from MBNA, as follows;
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the evidence you have and/or will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: Testimony of Greg Canapp; account records, including the card
agreement; and the credit card account statements.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the evidence you have and/or will use at
trial to prove the Plaintiff agreed to the alleged Arbitration Agreement.
ANSWER: See Answer to lnterrogatory No. 7.
Under Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
REQUEST NO. 5: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 7 above.
ANSWER: Documents have previously been provided with Defendant's
Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents.
REQUEST NO. 6: Please provide and make available for copying and
inspection all documents referred to in lnterrogatory No. 8 above.
ANSWER: See Answer to Request No. 5 above.
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The testimony of Greg Canapp, in answer to Interrogatory No. 7, above, is as
follows:

1. I am the Senior Personal Banking Officer at MBNA America Bank, N.A. and I
make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and belief.

2. On or about September I,1980, Miriam Carroll opened a credit card account
with MBNA America Bank, N.A.
3. A true and correct copy of the cardholder agreement governing the account is

attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
4. True and correct copies of the monthly statements associated with the Carroll

account are attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
5. MBNA does not have record of having received a billing dispute letter from
Ms. Carroll in reference to this account.

This is the full extent of Mr. Canapp's testimony. There is no attached Exhibit

"A". There is no attached Exhibit "B. There is nothing in Mr. Canapp's testimony
regarding Carroll's knowledge of the alleged arbitration agreement, or any
information regarding any form of acceptance, or of a "meeting of the minds" about
arbitration at all. His testimony is totally silent on the subject.
The documents, previously obtained during discovery by Carroll, are "Credit
Card Agreement Additional Terms and Conditions" which is not the agreement
entered into by Carroll with MBNA, and does not represent the agreement governing
this account. The Additional Terms and Conditions contains no evidence
whatsoever that Carroll had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration amendment,
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or any evidence that Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. The other
documents are monthly statements and likewise contain no evidence that Carroll
had any knowledge of the proposed arbitration agreement, or any evidence that
Carroll agreed to the arbitration amendment. MBNA has presented no evidence of a
meeting of the minds, conscious knowledge of the offer to amend on the part of
Carroll, or any evidence of Carroll's agreement to arbitrate
Other courts have held similarly. The alleged addition of the arbitration
clause is a parol modification. In Scott v, Castle, 104 ldaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163,
The ldaho Supreme Court held that;
"Parties to a written contract may modify its terms by subsequent oral
agreement or may contract further with respect to its subject matter; however,
one party to a contract cannot alter its terms without assent of the other and
minds of the parties must meet as to any proposed modification, and fact of
agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in accordance with its
existence and assent may be implied from acts of one party in accordance
with terms of change proposed by the other."
Carroll was not aware of any proposed contract modification regarding
arbitration, there was no conscious knowledge of a proposed arbitration clause,
there was no "meeting of the minds" regarding arbitration or its addition to the
existing contract between MBNA and Carroll (see attached affidavit). Assent may be
implied from acts, but the acts must be consistent with the nature of the change.
Carroll has not acted in a manner consistent with arbitration being a part of the
contract. In Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 ldaho
890, 693 P.2d 1092, the ldaho Supreme Court held that,
"No enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and
embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties."
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And in Hieman Aber & Goldlust v. Ingram, C.A. No. 96C-05-047, SUPERIOR
COURT OF DELAWARE, KENT, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 251, April 23,1998, The
Delaware court held that,
[2j"lt is of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made in
the form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds
unless the acceptance is of the identical thing offered."
(See also Mesa Partners V. Phillips PetroleumCo., Civil action No. 7871, COURT OF
CHANCERY OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 488 A.2d 107; 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS
540; and Martin Newark Dealership, lnc., v. Grube, C.A. No. 97-11-064 COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE, 1998 De1.C.P. LEXIS 2)
No such meeting of the minds and common understanding exists between MBNA
and Carroll regarding arbitration.
In Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349,670 P.2d 54, the
ldaho Supreme Court held;
"One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts to
add terms without the consent of all parties are ineffectual."
MBNA relies on Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, Del. Super., 2001 (Aug. 09,
2001), 790 A.2d 1249, in support of its ability to modify its contract by notice. In
Edelist, the plaintiff, Daniel Edelist, made only bare assertions [FN4], providing no
evidence, nor affidavit. The court properly ruled against Edelist, based on a lack of
evidence. Because there was no real controversy before the court, and the actual
interpretation of the statute was not challenged, the court rightfully did not analyze
the statute. MBNA uses the decision of the court, which did not analyze the statute,
as verification of its position.
Carroll has examined the following cases to determine if the courts have
actually analyzed or examined the Delaware statute (Title 5 § 952(a) and (b)):
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD
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Lloyd v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 27 Fed.Appx. 82
Pick v. Discover Financial Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1180278
Fields v. Howe, 2002 WL 418011
Jaimez v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 470587
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F.Supp.2d 632,635
Blanchard v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 2005 WL 1921000
Stone V. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 34 1 F.Supp.2d 189, 193
Kurr v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F.Supp.2d 457,459+
Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 909, 915
Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1250+
Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309+
Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424,430, 163 N.C.App. 207
Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574 (W.D.N.C. 2000)
In none of these cases has the text of the statute been examined or
compared to the interpretation of MBNA or any other bank or financial institution.
Carroll asserts that MBNA's interpretation of the statute is not correct and asks this
court to examine the Delaware statute in question (Delaware Title 5, § 952(a) and
(b)) as explained above. Because there was, and is, no meeting of the minds
regarding arbitration, there is no agreement to arbitrate disputes between Carroll
and MBNA. MBNA has presented no proof or circumstantial evidence
demonstrating a meeting of the minds regarding arbitration. Any statute which
abrogates the common law must do so explicitly; it cannot be vague or ambiguous.
The Delaware statute does not explicitly abrogate the common law, nor does the
cardholder agreement explicitly abrogate the common law. Neither document
provides for, or authorizes, the unilateral amendment of the agreement.
Based on the common law of contracts, the Delaware statute and the
cardholder agreement, there is no right, authority or power, on the part of MBNA to
unilaterally amend the contract. Because this is a contract of adhesion, it is to be
strictly construed against MRNA, which constructed the contract. Carroll therefore

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
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respectfully prays that this court will find that there is no agreement to arbitrate
between Carroll and MBNA, and will subsequently vacate the following award letter
from the National Arbitration Forum:

Award letter against Miriam G. Carroll, dated 08/03/2005, in the amount of
$30,241.41, File Number: FA0503000443990.

Dated this

b

't

%

day of September, 2006.

c-L--*

Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify that Imailed a true and correct copy of my
day
Brief in Support of Opposition to Confirmation of Arbitration Award this
of September, 2006, by Certified Mail #7005 1160 0002 7630 2985 to the attorney
for the Plaintiff at the following address:

*
s

William L. Bishop, Jr.
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle, WA 98101

Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

1
1

MIRIAM G. CARROL,
Plaintiff.

1

1

VS.

P W

CASE NO.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)

j
1
1
1

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant.

)

1
1
1

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-3bl7q'1

1

1
1
1
1
1

VS.

DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant.

This case comes before me on a motion by David Capps and Miriam Carroll for
injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration awards entered in favor of MBNA Bank
against them individually. The claims of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll, residents of Kamiah
who reside together, are similar and they were consolidated on May 11,2006.
FACTS
In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to MBNA Bank alleging a dispute
in their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a
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debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars'. The Bank did not reply to this letter, nor
did it conduct an investigation but rather made attempts to collect on the outstanding debt
by filing an arbitration claim. In addition, the Bank listed the two accounts as closed or
restricted and reported them as overdue to a credit bureau.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll each wrote a letter to MBNA Bank (M*. Capps in June
and Ms. Carroll in October) asking the Bank to observe prescribed procedures for
resolving billing disputes as required by federal regulations. The letters requested that
the Bank amend their respective credit reports to indicate that the account balance was in
dispute rather than overdue, to remove any reference to late payments, and to report a
balance on the account as of the day when the purported billing dispute was initiated, less
the late fees and intere
Subsequently, MBNA Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), requesting that the disputes be arbitrated. In
April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms Carroll moving to dismiss the claim filed
with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between Ms.
Carroll and MBNA Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement

'

Each letter stated the following "I am writing regardmg the above account, I believe that my most recent
statement ... is inaccurate I am disputing the above amount because I believe that yon failed to credit
my amount for prepayments you agreed to credit on the [December] statement ... It was my understanding
that when I entered into the agreement with yon that you would accept my signed notefs) or other similar
instrnment(s) as money, credit, or payment for previous account transactions, and then reflect those credits
m the [December] statement ... They do not appear in the statement and I am wondering why. The amount
of the credits on the prepayments of money or credit accepted by you should he the approximate amount
that I list above. I am making this billing inquiry because I am uncertain of all the dates of the prepaid
credits, charges and also because there may be additional credits that I am entitled to. Please provide me
with a written explanation why these credits are not showing ... I am requesting that you provide me with
an acknowledgement of this billing error and complete a full investigation by sending me a written
explanation report related to the subject matter of this hilling error ... I am also requesting additional
documentary evidence of mdehtedness of the account charges, which includes copies of the account
charges and entries that made yon arrive at the recent balance shown on my statement .. I am exercising
my right to withhold the disputed amount until you comply ...

.

.
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which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her
dispute with MBNA Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent letter was received by NAF from
Mr. Capps.
On August 3,2005 the NAF issued a decision after acknowledging receipt
of the April motion to dismiss and requesting submission of evidence from the parties to
the dispute. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to MBNA in the amount of $30,
241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made similar
findings in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against him to
MBNA in the amount of $28,156.49.
On September 30, 2005 Ms Carroll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On
November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against MBNA Bank
alleging the same causes of action and requesting the same relief.
On January 17,2006 MNBA filed a request to confirm its arbitration award
against Mr. Capps. The request was incorrectly filed in Lewis County and was
subsequently transferred to Idaho County. On March 29,2006 MNBA moved for
summary judgment in its favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and
Mr. Capps. On May 11,2006 the cases were consolidated. On May 24,2006 MBNA's
motion for summary judgment as to the claim by Ms. Carroll was denied, and the motion
for summary judgment as to the claim by Mr. Capps was also denied. I also ordered
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MNBA lo amend its response to both Ms. Carroll's and Mr. Capps' Request for
Admission Number 3 to comply Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36. MNBA complied
with the order.
ISSUES
1. Mr. Caps and Ms. Carroll content that there was no enforceable arbitration clause
contained in the credit agreement between the parties at the time the dispute arose.
2. MBNA Bank alleges that there was in fact a valid arbitration agreement between the
parties at the time the dispute arose.
DISCUSSION
Enforceability of Credit Card Arbitration Agreements
Federal policy liberally favors arbitration agreements and requires courts to
rigorously enforce them. ShearsodAm. Exp., Inc v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,226
(1987); Dean Witter Renyolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221 (1985); Marsh v First

USA Bank, 103 F.Supp.2d 909,914 (N.D. Tex. 2000). Under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. $ 1 et seq., written arbitration agreements in transactions involving
interstate commerce are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" according to their terms as
long as they are otherwise valid under general principles of contract law. 9 U.S.C. $2;

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Bud. OfTrustees, 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989); Jaimez v.
MBNA America Bank, 2006 WL 470587 *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 27,2006); Marsh, 103
F.Supp.2d at 914. Federal law prohibits courts from subjecting arbitration provisions to
special scrutiny. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
The FAA was intended by Congress to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,510 (1974); Marsh,
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103 F.Supp.2d at 914. Consequently, while the scope of an arbitration agreement is an
issue for judicial resolution, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers

ofAmerica, 475 U.S. 643,650 (1986); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 24-25 (1983). Idaho has adopted the same public policy in enacting
the Uniform Arbitration Act, which provides by similar language for the enforceability of
valid arbitration agreements. LC. § 7.901 et seq.; International Assoc. of Firefighters,

LocalNo. 672, 136 Idaho 162, 167-68 (2001) (recognizing that arbitration is a favored
remedy in Idaho and that doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration).
Of course, courts may not force parties to arbitrate disputes if the parties have not
entered into a valid agreement to do so. Maestle v. Best Buy Co., 2005 WL 1907282
(Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug. 11,2005). "Arbitration . . . is a way to resolve disputes-but
only those disputes-that

the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration." First Options

of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,943 (1995). Consequently, whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate is determined by state contract law. Id. at 944; Kurz v. Chase

Manhattan Bank, 3 19 F.Supp.2d 457,461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Furthermore, under the FAA
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements." Doctor's Assocs., Inc, v. Casarotto, 5 17
U.S. 681, 687 (1996). Again, courts look to state law to resolve these issues. Jaimez,
2006 WL 470587 at *3.
In the case at hand the original agreement included an express provision providing
for future amendment. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2. The original contract also
included a choice of law provision stating that Delaware law would govern the rights and

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

-'

164

obligations under the contract. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2. Neither Ms. Carroll nor
Mr. Capps are contesting that Delaware law applies; indeed, they affirmatively

state that

it does. See Plaintiffs Post Hearing Memorandrun Rebuttal and Plaintifrs Brief for
Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate.
Therefore, Delaware law governs whether the parties agreed to arbitrate or
whether there are any contract defenses to the validity of any agreement to do so. The
right of a credit card company to amend agreements to provide for arbitration is statutory.
5 Delaware Code 3 952(a), entitled "Amendment of Agreement," provides that unless the
original credit card agreement provides to the contrary, that a bank "may at any time and
from time to time amend such agreement in any respect," including modifying the
agreement to allow terms in regards to "arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, or other matters of any kind whatsoever." The later amendment need not
have been "originally contemplated by the parties or addressed by the parties" in the
original contract agreement or be "integral to the relationship between the parties." Id.
Section 952(b) details what unilateral amendment procedures may be followed in
cases where the rate of interest charged is to be changed. Where the rate is to be
changed, the bank must "deliver to the borrower, at least 15 days before the effective date
of the amendment, a clear and conspicuous written notice, that shall describe the
amendment and that shall set forth the effective date . . . ." 5 Del. C. 3 952(b)(l). If
proper notice is mailed, the amendment will become effective "if the borrower does not,
within fifteen days of the earlier of the mailing or delivery of the written notice . . .
furnish written notice to the bank that the borrower does not agree to accept such
amendment." 5 Del. C. 3 952(b)(2). If the bank's notice states that usage of the card
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after the effective date will constitute acceptance of the amendment, such usage will
render the amendment effective. 5 Del. C. 5 952(b)(3). In sum, where the rate is to be
changed, notice with an option to opt-out suffices, and failure to object in writing or
continued use of the card will operate to render an amendment effective.
As to amendments which do not involve changing the rate of interest charged,
including an amendment regarding arbitration, section 952(a) states that such
amendments "may be deemed effective as determined by the bank," subject to
compliance by the bank with any of the notice requirements of the Truth in Lending Act
or its implementing regulations. Notice of such an amendment may be sent in the same
envelope with the monthly billing statement or in the same envelope with other materials
sent to the borrower. Id.
In the case where there is clear statutory authority allowing unilateral amendment,
courts have not hesitated to give effect to the mandate of the FAA that arbitration
agreements must be enforced. Both Delaware courts and courts applying Delaware law
have recognized that the right to unilaterally amend a credit card agreement by notice and
an opportunity to opt out in writing has been provided for by the Delaware legislature and
is to be given effect. Jaimez, 2006 WL 470587 at *3-4; Blanchard v. MBNA America

Bank, 2005 WL 1921000 (W.D. N. C.) (unreported) Kurz, 319 F.Supp.2d 457; Fields v
Howe, 2002 WL 41801 1 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F.Supp.2d 909
(N.D. Texas 2000); Joseph, 775 N.E.2d 550; Edelist, 790 A.2d 1249; Pick v. Discover

Fin. Serv ,2001 WL 1180278 (D.Del. 2001).
The court in Edelist put it plainly: "Delaware statutory law . . .permits MBNA to
unilaterally amend agreements by notice and an opt-out provision. . . . MBNA, therefore,
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followed the statutory scheme for amending credit card agreements. By doing so and by
Edelist's failure to opt out, his credit card agreement was properly amended. . . . In short,
Delaware's statutory scheme permitting unilateral amendment with opt-out availability is
an acceptable means of amending a credit card agreement " 790 A.2d at 1257-59; see
also Marsh, 103 F.Supp.2d at 915-19 (where cardholder did not opt out and continued to
use the card, he was both statutorily and contractually bound).
Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps concede that acceptance can be implied by conduct.
The original credit card agreement in this case contained a choice of law clause under
which the parties agreed that Delaware law would govern any issues arising concerning
the contract. Under choice of law principles articulated in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws $145 and accepted by the Idaho Supreme Court, Idaho courts give
effect to such choice of law provisions unless that chosen forum has no significant
relation to the parties or unless the law chosen violates some fundamental public policy
of Idaho. Seubert Excavalors, Znc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 126 Idaho 648,65 1,889
P.2d 82, 85 (1995) (citing Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,400,700 P.2d 19,22
(1985)). Neither ofthose two conditions is met in this case. Thus Delaware law governs
the resolution of the dispute. Under Delaware law the arbitration agreement is valid and
enforceable. There is evidence of mailed notice in regards to the arbitration clause (see
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2) and the Plaintiffs in this case admit that no opt-out letter was
mailed. Therefore, the decision of the arbitrator is valid and enforceable.
Order
1. The arbitration award in favor of MBNA against Ms. Carrol in the sum of
$30,24 1.41 is CONFIRMED.

-
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2. The arbitration award in favor of MBNA against Mr. Capps in the sum of

$28,156.49 is CONFIRMED

It is so ordered this &day

of September, 2006.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoi
AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this &ay
following:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
of September, 2006, to the

MBNA America Bank
C/OWilson, McColl & Rasmussen
P.O.Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
David Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536

Miriam Carroll
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah. ID 83536
Clerk of the District Court
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Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs

1

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,

)
)
)
)

Defendant,

Case No. CV-36747
AMENDED
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
or in the alternative

)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

)

Plaintiff,

)

1
vs.

AMENDED
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
A JUDGMENT

)
)

DAVID F. CAPPS,

1

Defendant,

COMES NOW Miriam G. Carroll, and David F. Capps, and moves this
court under Rule I 1(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for a Motion for

AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
i

,
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Reconsideration, or in the alternative, under Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure for a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment for the following
reasons:
1 . The Delaware choice of law provision is not valid.

2. MBNA's claim to be owed money by Capps and Carroll is fraudulent.
3. MBNA obtained the award letters without proper lurisdiction.

4. The National Arbitration Forum has displayed a bias in favor of the party

granted the arbitration award.
5. The arbitration with the National Arbitration Forum was unconscionable.
6. The arbitration clause was employed as a "stealth" amendment, without

effective notice.
7. The cardholder agreement was created with an illusory promise, making
the entire contract illusory and unenforceable.

8. The cardholder agreement was constructed to be deceptive, acting as a
snare to the cardholder.

I.
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS NOT VALID.
The Delaware choice of law provision in the alleged cardholder agreement
is not allowed under Delaware law. The Delaware State Code, Title 6 Commerce and Trade, Subtitle II, Other laws Relating to Commerce and Trade,
Chapter 27. Contracts, Subchapter I, General Provisions, 5 2708. Choice of law
states:
(a) The parties to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement or other

AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

P g 2 o f 19

undertaking shall be governed by or construed under the laws of this
State, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of
this State shall govern, in whole or in part, any or all of their rights,
remedies, liabilities, powers and duties if the parties, either as provided by
law or in the manner specified in such writing are, (i) subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be
served with legal process. The foregoing shall conclusively be presumed
to be a significant, material and reasonable relationship with this State and
shall be enforced whether or not there are other relationships with this
State.
(b) ...
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other
undertaking, (i) to the extent provided to the contrary in 5 1-301(c) of this
Title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000. (emphasis added).
As clearly stated in the Delaware Code, the Delaware choice of law provision
in the alleged cardholder agreement does not apply to contracts or agreements
of less than $100,000. Since the amount of the alleged cardholder agreement is
significantly less than $100,000, the Delaware choice of law provision is not valid.
MBNA has come into the State of ldaho, solicited business, and in doing so
has subjected itself to the laws and jurisdiction of the State of ldaho. In addition,
any contract or agreement, or any modification to such contract or agreement,
made within the State of ldaho, must be properly formed under the laws of ldaho
before it comes into existence whether it contains a choice of law provision or
not. If a valid choice of law provision exists within the contract, or agreement, it
does not gain authority until the contract, or agreement, is properly formed under
ldaho law. Only then does the choice of law provision begin to operate. Contract
formation, or contract modification, which takes place within the State of ldaho.
between an ldaho resident and a foreign corporation who has entered the state
to solicit business, must conform to the laws of contract formation in the state of
Idaho. If the contract, or agreement, is not properly formed under the laws of the

AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
- 1

$12

P g 3 o f 19

State of ldaho, then the contract, or agreement, does not exist and any choice of
law provision, which would otherwise be valid within the contract, does not come
into existence either. The arbitration clause in the alleged cardholder agreement
was not properly formed under ldaho law. There was no "meeting of the minds",
there was no common understanding, and the arbitration clause was entered
unilaterally, which is not allowed in the State of ldaho
Even if the choice of law provision were valid, which it is not, Delaware also
requires a "meeting of the minds" or mutual manifestation of assent for the
formation, or modification, of a contract or agreement
A contract involves an agreement or meeting of the minds, and every
contract to be binding and unimpeachable must have been entered into by
parties with minds of sufficient soundness for the purpose. Poole v. Newark
Trust Co., 8 A.2d 10, 40 Del. 163, Del Super. 1939.

Manifestation of assent must be overt and intentional
Overt manifestation of assent - not subjective intent - controls formation of a
contract, the only intent of parties to a contract which is essential is an intent
to say the words or do the act which constitute the manifestation of assent;
the intent~onto accept is unimportant except as manifested. Where an offeror
requests an act in return for his promise and the act is performed, the act
performed becomes the requisite overt manifestation of assent if the act is
done intentionally. Industrial America, Inc., v. Fulton Industries, Inc., 285
A.2d 412, Del Super. 1971.
Any amendment to a contract, whether written or oral, relies on the presence
of mutual assent and consideration. Continental Ins. Co., v. Rutledge & Co.,
lnc., 750 A.2d 1219, re-argument denied 2000, WL 268297, Del. Ch. 2000.
For any contract modification, there must be conscious knowledge of the
modification and knowing consent of the modification
When contract is made, no modification can be brought about without consent
of both parties and without consideration. Defendants are thus forced into the
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position of arguing that plaintiffs did agree to the modification because (1)
they did not notify defendants of a refusal to accept it, ... The cases appear to
be practically unanimous in holding that the first reason given is insufficient to
show consent to a modification; DeCecchis v. Evers, 174 A.2d 463, 54 Del.
99, Del Super. 1961. See also: Unruth v. Taylor, 18 Del. 42, 43 A. 515;
Josloff v. Falbourn, 32 Del. 433, 125 A. 349; Brasch v. Sloan's Moving &
Storage Co., 237 Mo. App. 597, 176 S.W. 2d 58; Colgin v. Security Storage &
Van Co., 208 La. 173, 23 So. 2d 36; French v. Bekins Moving & Sforage Co.,
118 Colo. 424, 195 P 2d 968. Cf. 1 Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.) 279.

There was no meeting of the minds between MBNA and Capps or Carroll on
arbitration. There was, and is, no intention on the part of Capps or Carroll to
arbitrate this or any dispute with MBNA, nor was any manifestation intentionally
performed by either Capps or Carroll to indicate assent to this, or any, arbitration
with MBNA
In the State of Idaho:
Generally, silence and inaction, or mere silence or failure to reject offer
when it is made, does not constitute acceptance of offer, absent specific
exceptions to rule which may be used to create contract. Vogf v. Madden,
713 P.2d 442, 110 ldaho 6, ldaho App. 1985.
Silence or failure to reject an offer usually is not evidence of intent to
accept the offer, except if offeror has stated or given offeree reason to
understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and offeree
in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer. Eimco Div.
Envirotech Corp., v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 672, 109 ldaho 762,
ldaho App. 1985.
Capps and Carroll were not aware of the offer to amend regarding
arbitration by MBNA, as evidenced in their previous affidavits, and their silence
and inaction cannot be taken as assent to the alleged arbitration clause. There
was, and is, no intention on the part of Capps and Carroll to agree to any form of
arbitration with MBNA, and the silence and inaction on the part of Capps and
Carroll in regard to the arbitration clause was not done with any intent toward
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assent, or any intentional manifestation of assent or mutual understanding
regarding arbitration. As such, no agreement to arbitrate exists between MBNA
and Capps or Carroll.

2.
MBNA'S CLAIM TO BE OWED MONEY BY CAPPS AND CARROLL IS
FRAUDULENT
Capps and Carroll could not have discovered the fraud evidence and have
become aware of the evidence only by providence. MBNA stated it had
extended credit to Capps and Carroll and was entitled to receive repayment
under Title 12 USC § 24. Paragraph 7 of this statute authorizes a national
bank to loan its money, not its credit. In First National Bank of Tallapoosa v.
Monroe, 135 Ga. 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911), the court, after citing the above
statute, said, "[Tlhe provisions referred to do not give power to a national
bank to guarantee the payment of the obligations of others solely for their
benefit, nor is such power incidental to the business of banking. A bank can
lend its money but not its credit." In Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens National
Bankof Union, 135 S.C. 202; 130 S.E. 758, (1927), it was said, "It has been
settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal law, being
limited in its power and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing the
debt of another. All such contracts being entered into by its officers are ultra
vires and not binding upon the corporation." In First National Bank of
Monfgomery v. Jerome Daly, (1968 Minn. Case; jury reached its verdict Dec.
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7, 1968, cite not found.) prohibits banks from creating money and credit upon
their own books by means of bookkeeping entries. We believe this is what
MBNA has done in regard to our accounts.
The title cited by MBNA (12 USC 24) authorizes the lending of money for
security. No authorization is present in this statute for extending or loaning
credit. MBNA may have monetized our accounts at the discount window of
the Federal Reserve, in which case its claim that we owe the bank money is
also fraudulent
3.

MBNA OBTAINED THE AWARD LETTERS WITHOUT PROPER
JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional issue would not have been discovered by Capps and
Carroll, and it is only by providence that it has come to their attention. Capps
and Carroll objected to the arbitration on the grounds that they did not agree to
arbitrate this, or any, dispute with MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter
"MBNA), see EXHIBIT 1 and 2. Because of the objections of Capps and Carroll,
the arbitrators did not have subject matter jurisdiction and proceeded without
proper jurisdiction or authority. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna,
126 S.Ct. 1204, 1208 n. 1 (2006) (rule that arbitrators may decide validity of
contract does not apply to question of whether an agreement was formed in the
first instance). In MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Boata, 94 Conn.App. 559, 893
A.2d 479, the court held,
"Because the arbitrator's jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the
parties, a party who contests the making of a contract containing an
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arbitration provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue
of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; only a court can make that
decision", "In any given case, whether a particular dispute is arbitratable is
a question for the court, and deference need not be given to the
arbitrator's decision", ..."The arbitration provision in an agreement is, in
effect, a separate and distinct agreement", MBNA America Bank, N.A., v.
Boafa, (supra).
MBNA failed to go to Federal District Court to obtain an order to compel
arbitration. Without that court order, MBNA and the arbitrator did not have
authority or jurisdiction to proceed. In MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Credit, No.
94,380 (April 28, 2006), 132 P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006), (See EXHIBIT 3), the court
held,
"An agreement to arbitrate bestows such jurisdiction. When the existence of
the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court before the
arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402." "All we have in the
record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently timely objection to the
arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no
copy of this objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral
argument before this court that his client 'probably' has a copy of the
objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to demonstrate that the
objection was somehow ineffective to trigger its responsibility to seek court
intervention to compel arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the
absence of such a demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice
but to accept Credit's version of events. Under both federal and state law,
Credit's objection to the arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to
litigate the issue of the agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5402. Neither MBNA, as the party asserting existence of an arbitration
agreement, nor the arbitrator was simply free to go forward with the arbitration
as though Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so.
If there is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in
dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate." MBNA America Bank, N.A., v.
Credit, (supra).
Capps and Carroll timely asserted their objection to the arbitrator, a copy
of which is attached as EXHIBIT 1 and 2.
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THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM HAS DISPLAYED A BIAS IN
FAVOR OF THE PARTY GRANTED THE ARBITRATION AWARD
The National Arbitration Forum [NAF] has a demonstrated bias in favor of
corporate claimants. In an affidavit by Michael Geist (see EXHIBIT 3), a law
professor at the University of Ottawa, where he holds the Canada Research
Chair in lnternet and E-commerce Law, the results of his published academic
research on arbitration providers was provided to the court in McQuillan v. Check

'N Go of North Carolina, Michael Geist studied the arbitration process used in
the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP") of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). The information
revealed in his study about the practices of the NAF is most enlightening. His
original study examined 3,094 decisions from 1999 through July, 2001. He also
did a follow-up study in which he updated his findings to include all UDRP
decisions through February 18, 2002, for a total of 4,332 cases.
The NAF uses two main forms of arbitration, single panel and threemember panel. In NAF cases where a three member panel was used (in which
both participants choose the arbitrators), the complainant won only 49% of the
time. However, despite claims of impartial random case allocation as well as a
large roster of panelists, the majority of NAF single panel cases were actually
assigned to little more than a handful of panelists. Of the 1,379 NAF cases
decided by a single NAF-assigned arbitrator through February 18, 2002, 778 of
them - 56.4% - were decided by only six arbitrators. In cases decided by the six
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arbitrators most frequently assigned by the NAF, the complainant won 95.1% of
the time. The award letters obtained by MBNA against Capps and Carroll from
the NAF were decided by single panel arbitrators assigned by the NAF
In a deposition of Edward C. Anderson (see EXHIBIT 4) employed by the
NAF, in Toppings v. Merifech Mortgage Services, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 149 (W. Va.
2002) in response to the question, "How are arbitrators paid?" Mr. Anderson
states that, "They get all or a portion of the fees that are paid by the parties." Mr.
Anderson also stated, "If they don't handle any cases that come through our
system, we don't pay them anything." Because cases are assigned by the NAF
to specific arbitrators, there is a financial incentive to the arbitrators to decide
cases in favor of the claimant, especially with a corporate claimant as large as
MBNA, who is a repeat client of the NAF. The NAF has a history of steering
cases to arbitrators who decide cases in favor of large corporate ciients, making
the entire process biased against the consumer. This bias is particularly present
in single panel cases assigned by the NAF, consistent with the cases of Capps
and Carroll.
Michael Geist found,
"By assigning the majority of cases to the subset of arbitrators who ruled
most consistently for its clients, the complainants, the NAF exerted a great
deal of influence over case outcome. When combined with the fact that
outcome was the most decisive factor among complainants choosing
arbitration providers, and evidence that the NAF aggressively marketed its
services to potential complainants by promoting complainant wins, this
data supports the conclusion that the NAF used its control over the
selection of arbitrators in single panel cases to achieve outcomes that
would enable it to attract the business of future UDRP complainants."
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The same practice was used with large corporate clients in soliciting their
business as demonstrated in letters sent by the NAF to potential clients.
Representative of these letters is the Brown letter (see EXHIBIT 5). This letter
states "All arbitration is not the same." If arbitration was fair and independent,
why wouldn't all arbitration be the same? The NAF also promises to protect its
clients from class-actions and jury trails. The letter states that the NAF will make
a positive impact on the client's bottom line. The NAF makes good on its
promise to corporate clients through biased and unfair practices
Numerous people have complained about the bias of the NAF. The
following affidavit is representative of those complaints:
Gregory Duhl had a dispute with Suburban Moving and Storage
("Suburban"), an agent of United Van Lines, for damages to his property arising
from his move from Chicago to Pennsylvania. In his affidavit (see EXHIBIT 6) he
states,
"My experience with the NAF was deeply troubling. In a variety of ways, I
found that the NAF implemented (or refused to follow) its rules in ways
that favored Suburban and disfavored me, the consumer.
At each step of the arbitration process, for example, the NAF allowed
Suburban to violate procedural rules. I followed the procedures set forth
in the NAF's rules, and asked the NAF to require Suburban to comply with
the NAF's rules. Repeatedly, however, the NAF refused to consider my
motions.
After some time, I found the NAF's procedural bias against me to be so
pervasive and blatant that it no longer made sense to go forward. As a
result, I was forced to abandon my claim, and settle the matter with
Suburban for far less than it was worth.
I am a professor of business law, and I presume that I am likely more
sophisticated than the average consumer. I am concerned that if the
NAF's system favored the corporate defendant over the consumer in my
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case to such a degree that I was not able to overcome this kind of
procedural unfairness by invoking the rules, it is unlikely that the average
consumer would have much of a chance in cases before the NAF.
Without going through an exhaustive discussion of the entire matter, I will
describe now a few instances of the NAF's abusive conduct in my case.
As one illustration of how the NAF was lax with its rules with respect to
Suburban, the NAF accepted a late submission from Suburban without
following NAF's own procedures for late submissions. I knew that the
submission was late because of the date and time on the FAX stamp.
In addition, the NAF did not require Suburban to follow the rules of the
American Moving and Storage Association (AMSA), as my contract with
Suburban required the NAF to do. Under the AMSA rules, for example,
Suburban was required to submit three copies of its response to my claim
The NAF permitted Suburban to ignore this requirement, among others,
despite my objections
I learned that there were several instances of ex parte communications
between the NAF and Suburban. When I demanded to know what
information had been exchanged between Suburban and the NAF, the
NAF refused to communicate with me about the contents of the ex parte
communications.

As another illustration of the NAF's favoritism, the NAF directed me that I
had to hand-write the case number on each page of a 150-page
document. The NAF also directed me that I must spend my own money to
copy and mail hard copies to the NAF and Suburban. The NAF had a
different system rn place for Suburban, however, and Suburban was
permitted to subm~tits documents without numbers and via fax. I
objected, without success, that the NAF should requlre Suburban to follow
the same rules that I was required to follow.
On at least four separate occasions, I filed motions with the NAF objecting
to procedural irregularities. Each time, I followed the NAF rules, which,
according to the AMSA rules, applied when the AMSA rules were silent.
Pursuant to the NAF rules, my motions were filed with the Director of
Arbitration. With each motion, as the NAF rules required, I enclosed the
$25 filing fee. In each case, however, an NAF program administrator
refused to even accept my motions, and the NAF clerk refused to permit
me to be heard, notwithstanding the NAF rules that authorize these
motions. The clerk said to me that "We don't hear motions like this,"
referring to motions that challenge procedural irregularities of the NAF
itself.
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The NAF agreed to allow Suburban to pursue in arbitration issues that
were beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
Finally, the NAF told me that all of my correspondence with them
regarding the procedural irregularities in the document submission
process would be turned over to the arbitrator assigned to hear the case.
I objected to this, because it was not relevant to my loss claim and 1 was
concerned it would prejudice the arbitrator against me. I decided to move
the NAF to dismiss my claim without prejudice, which it did. I then settled
the claim for about $2750.
In my opinion, it was impossible for me to get a fair result through
arbitration before the NAF. The procedural unfairness of the process
made arbitration an unworkable option for me."

THE ARBITRATION WITH THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM WAS
UNCONSCIONABLE
Because of the biased and continued business relationship with MBNA,
via Wolpoff & Abramson, the forced selection of the NAF is unconscionable. The
NAF steers the majority of the collection cases to a small number of arbitrators
who consistently decide these cases in favor of its corporate clients. To require
consumers, who have no idea of the massive and lucrative business provided to
the NAF by its corporate clients, and the biased system of case allocation and
rule enforcement practiced by the NAF, to abide by that system is to deprive the
consumer of any chance of a fair and impartial hearing of their case. Such bias,
which is hidden from the consumer by both the NAF and its corporate clients in
their arbitration provisions, is unconscionable and unenforceable.
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6.

THE ARBITRATION PROVISION WAS EMPLOYED BY MBNA AS A
"STEALTH" AMENDMENT, WITHOUT EFFECTIVE NOTICE
The addition of the arbitration provision was the result of a number of
related events. In Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Cal. 2002) also 319
F.3d 1126, discovery revealed that AT&T had commissioned a survey to
determine the percentage of people who actually looked at the contents of the
"bill stuffers" which they received. The results of the survey revealed that 12% of
the people actually looked at the contents of the "bill stuffe~s"which accompanied
their monthly statements. MBNA commissioned a similar survey with similar
results. The Delaware legislature was then lobbied to add a section (now Title 5
5952) to the state statutes allowing notice of amendments to the cardholder
agreement to be sent in the same envelope as the monthly statement as a "bill
stuffer", with full knowledge that 88% of their customers would never see the
notice. This clearly constitutes deception and ineffective notice
Any program designed to not inform seven out of eight customers and
then use the "notice" to enforce amendments of which the cardholder has no
practical knowledge is done in a "stealth" manner, deceiving the cardholder, and
is unenforceable due to the lack of proper notice. In Lea Tai Textile Co., v.
Manning Fabrics, Inc., (S.D.N.Y.) 41 1 F.Supp. 1404, the court held, "If a party
wishes to bind another to arbitrate, that purpose must be accomplished in such a
way that each party fully and clearly comprehends that an agreement to arbitrate
exists." By employing the "stealth" tactics noted above, MBNA has deliberately
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sought to obscure the nature of the arbitration amendment, leaving seven out of
eight cardholders, including Capps and Carroll, without any meaningful
comprehension that an agreement to arbitrate may exist.

THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT WAS CREATED WITH AN ILLUSORY
PROMISE, MAKING THE ENTIRE CONTRACT ILLUSORY AND
UNENFORCABLE

In the cardholder agreement MBNA states, "We may suspend or close
your account or otherwise terminate your right to use your account. We may do
this at any time and for any reason." MBNA also states, "You may close your
account by notifying us in writing or by telephone, and destroying all cards,
access checks or other credit devices on the account." Please note that there is
a notice req'uirement for the cardholder, but not MBNA. The lack of a notice
requirement means that MBNA's promise cannot be enforced, as they may
cancel their obligation at any time without notice. This is an illusory promise and
constitutes no consideration at all. As such, the agreement is never actually
formed, and is illusory. An agreement which is not actually formed, is illusory,
and cannot be enforced.
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8.

THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT WAS CONSTRUCTED TO BE
DECEPTIVE, ACTING AS A SNARE TO THE CARDHOLDER
The cardholder agreement, when examined in parts, stretches the
envelope of the law, creating questionable practices which courts viewing the
part exclusive of the whole, generally excuse and reform. The illusory promise
detailed above is a typical example. In Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d
10 (1984), American Express exercised its option to close Gray's account without

notice. Gray was publicly embarrassed when he presented his American
Express card to pay for a wedding anniversary dinner which he and his wife had
consumed. The court ordered American Express to honor the transaction, as
American Express had not given any prior notice to Gray that his account had
been closed. The court noted that "Indeed, the interpretation of the language
urged by American Express would subsume the entire contract and make the
underlying contractual relationship illusory." The court thus reformed the contract
with Gray to require prior notification to the cardholder before closing the
account.
When the agreement is examined as a whole, many provisions of the
agreement fall into the same type ofcategory. The "stealth" amendments, the
illusory promise, the implied ability to unilaterally amend the agreement, the
practice of changing interest rates upon 15 day notice all create an ever shifting
and changing agreement at the whim of MBNA. The cardholder is lulled into
believing that the agreement is basically stable, when in fact it is not. MBNA's
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promise to do anything cannot be depended on, and any belief that there is an
enforceable agreement on the part of the cardholder is an illusion. The
agreement, when taken as a whole is designed to deceive the cardholder and lull
him or her into a false sense of security. The cardholder is deceived and the
agreement acts as a snare to the cardholder when the cardholder is required to
adhere to rules while MBNA exempts itself from any and all rules through its
illusory promise.
MBNA's premise that it can unilaterally amend its agreement at any time
to include any term it wishes deprives the cardholder of any meaningful
dependence of what was bargained for when the account was opened. Any, or
all, of the cardholder's rights may be amended away, and new rights of the
creditor may be inserted at will. None of these conditions were bargained for by
the cardholder. The premise that MBNA can unilaterally amend its cardholder
agreement alone renders the contract illusory and unenforceable. The
cardholders end up with nothing they bargained for and an agreement which is
used to deceive and deprive them of their basic rights and dignity.

CONCLUSION

Capps and Carroll believed that the choice of law provision in the
cardholder agreement was valid during the evidentiary hearing on the existence
of an agreementto arbitrate. Capps and Carroll have since discovered that the
choice of law provision is not valid and pray that this court will reverse its
decision based on Idaho law rather than Delaware law, which now clearly does
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not apply. Capps and Carroll also believed they would have an opportunity to
challenge the validity of the arbitration separate from the issue of there being an
agreement.to arbitrate in the evidentiary hearing, and were surprised that the
court confirmed the arbitration awards concurrent with its decision on the
arbitration agreement. Capps and Carroll beg the court's indulgence in their
presentation of these additional challenges to the account and the arbitration
award letters and pray that the court will consider the above issues in its
reconsideration. Capps and Carroll also pray that this court will determine that
MBNA fraudulently represented the account and the arbitration process to which
Capps and Carroll were subjected was procedurally flawed, biased,
unconscionable, illusory, andlor unenforceable.

Dated this /Q@

C
,.,'(.jf

day of October, 2006

.Lt(DI(

Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that on this f'fl
day of October,
2006, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of my Motion for Reconsideration to the
attorney for the Defendant I Plaintiff by certified mail # 7V'aS )/&0 mQZ 76s3029
at the following address:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-I IBOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

MIRIAM G CARROLL,
Plarntrff,
vs
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

VS.

DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant,

County of ldaho:

Case No CV-36747
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

State of Idaho:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
) ss:
)

Miriam G. Carroll, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
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1. I am the Plaintiff in the above matter. I make this Affidavit in support of my

Motion for Reconsideration. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal
knowledge.
2. In Michigan before moving to Idaho, I was a real estate broker with my

own company. All during those 30 years I helped many people obtain
mortgages. Without fail the banks very carefully qualified the buyers to be
sure that they could afford to repay the loan. This is how I know that
credit card bank's primary purpose is not t o loan money to earn
interest. They mail checks i n huge numbers to every cardholder o n
their list with enticing letters urging the cardholder t o use the checks

for whatever luxury their heart desires. The credit card company does
not know or care how deeply in debt the cardholder may already be. The
purpose of offering all this easy money to the cardholder is obviously to
cause the type of thing that has happened to us - to force the cardholder
to lose his or her property through court action or bankruptcy. The banks
already control the wealth of the world, now they also have power over the
people.
3. When Dave and I moved to ldaho we couldn't find a way to earn a living
for a long time, so we borrowed oncredit cards for living expenses.
4.

ina all^ we found an income of $1,000 to $1,500 per month which we can
live on if we are very careful and forego all unnecessary items. But this
was not enough to repay the money we had borrowed on credit cards.
Because I could not conceive of not paying a bill, I borrowed on credit
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cards to make the monthly payments under the belief that our income
would increase to the point where we could pay the bills. Thus the biggest
percentage of what we now owe was given back to the credit card
companies as monthly payments. I continued to pay all bills on time until
there was nothing left to borrow
5. We never bought consumer items. This money was borrowed strictly to

make credit card payments.

6. 1 started using credit cards when they first came out and the companies
were still doing business honestly. I remember one company
representative telling me on the phone, "As long as the payment reaches
us within ten days of the due date we're happy".,
7. 1 did not realize that over time the credit card companies were no longer
honest but were, in fact, breaking the law every day and using their power
to force unsuspecting consumers into bankruptcy or into losing their
property.

8. Here are some of the things that credit card companies have done to me:
A. After mailing a bill to me in' Idaho every month which I paid, they mailed
the bill for three months to a house I lived in 20 years ago (four houses
ago) and used that as an excuse to raise my interest from 4.99% for the
life of the loan to 27.99%. While looking at law books in Moscow I found
another case where the credit card company did the same thing to
someone else.
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B. I've had numerous late charges when the payment was not actually
late from MBNA and others which was then used to increase the interest
rate which in turn increased the monthly payment by as much as a few
hundred dollars making it impossible to pay.

C . I took part in a class action suit in which the bank had made the rule
that payments must be received on or before the due date by 7:00 a.m.
effectively giving a late charge to everyone whose payment arrived on the
due date.
D. I took out a cash advance which, when they added interest went over
limit. I paid the over limit fee for five months before I noticed it. They are
theexperts; they knew exactly what they were doing. I was too trusting.
9. At my age (68), it is too late for me to start over. Anyway I have not

had enough energy since having cancer to work full time. The doctors
said I'd never be well and I guess they were right. Dave cannot work full
time since having stage three cerebral Lyme disease. He has never fully
recovered. It doesn't seem fair to take what little financial security we
have away from us and give it to a multi-billion dollar bank that
breaks the law and takes advantage of people every day.
10. 1 have been told by two people, one of them a lawyer's wife that pro

se litigants have no chance of winning in court no matter how strong their
case. I would hate to think that is true. My father was a circuit court judge
in Macomb County, Michigan for many years and he said in his day pro se
litigants were treated equally in court.
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11. I am enclosing an article from Consumer Reports magazine that
explains how this industry operates
Dated this ( O f 2 , day of October, 2006.

Subscribed and sworn before me
this ( 0 t h day of October,
2006.

<Miriam G. Carroll
Plaintiff, in propria persona

County of Idaho.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

(w

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION by Certified Mail # 7 s / / 6 Q0082 763Q SO
with the correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

b;bi-w,
6.
C--\\
Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona
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They really are out to get you

Ruth Owem' tmubles beganwhen she
stopped using her Discover card. The
Cleveland woman. who was on Sodal
Security disability, had just passed her
$1,9W balSnceUmit
Over the next six years, she made
$3,492 inpapmnts but never Mucedher
debt. Discover charged fees and fkmce
that used up alt her payments
and ballooned her balance to $5,564. Io
2W3, the card company sued Owens,
asserting that she breached the card
cornact by faiting to make . .
nanath?y payments 'After paying my
s~oaWy
uUEti~sthere is no money left'
Owens pleaded in court papea 'If my
situation was different, I would pay.'
Cleveland muoictpal cow judge pobert
%Q&
Ulat wen^ had paid
anwghdeihingtbatshehadbeenprey
to *the pIainWs unreasoWle, uuconscionableand unjustbusinesspmclices.'
0trapped in the jamof uedttcard debt has becoma alanninghl easy

temstrates for years, so a temptingly low just over 1.5 &n
in 2004. Cner'W-car&
1.9 percentA.FR can morph into doublefees and finance charges are m1a8morc
digit territory at the whim of the creditdif6cult to Rpay for m e s with othe~
card company. Qz it can dimb beyond 30
moneypmblem~saymedicafW I s orajol
percent when a consumer does nothing loss. 'It is the risiag cost of the lriastic it
~ugethansignupforanewcardinquire @that is tipping hundreds of tlie~usmd!
about a car loan, or make a single late of families over the edge,. says IQiizabett
payment to any aeditot
Warren a Earvard law pmfer~.~
'or ant
A s f o r f e e s . ~ g o f % Y o u c a n r e - b a ~ k t u p ttlpen
c~
c e h r e a S f 9 ~ h r r ~ o y e r t h e l i Nessa Feddis, senior federal ~counse
pay@ late, or paying less than the mi&
at the Amerfcan Bankers Associ,xtion,i!
mum. for balance mnsfets and a s h ad- not totaIIysympathetic?t isn'tjastmed.
vances. and foreign m c y hmsacUom
ical exp+?nsesthat can cause the trouble:
CteditcardrihaveNnedintointo~tbing1ess
she says. ?tS that nice handbkg theq
that kind of s p e n d i . Penalty
t t I i m ~ - S i z e d p r s a ; d o r y ~ ocharged,
~
See Gxktopher Dcdd,DCom, dmhg a fees are needed, she ad&, as"dceterrents
to bad behavior"
c m g m s b n a l h e in2005.
~
The effects o n A m M finances are
In 2003 those deterrents, alcrilg with
showing. Average card debt per house- fees far Cash advances, exsee&d the
hold with at least one credit card topped aftertax profits of the entire austtit-card
$9,3M) in 20aLThet's more than triple the
industry just two years earliter. Card
average in 1990.Consumer bankruptcies issuers have been experiencing record
have skyrocketed from 287,463 in 1980, profits since 2000 and saw ttwm tap
thedawn of C a r d - W t r y dezqvktion to $!XI billion in 2004.Awave of mez~ershw
e11$ue& cMlSO~datingmifl&)i$'han&
of a f e w p l a y e r s w b 6 s e t ~ ia::leave-it
t
terms for mnsnmers.Prior to 1978the top
Xi issuers represented 50.perw.a~
dzhe
credit-card market but by mid-2005 OD@
five companies.American Exprest, Bank
of America. Citigmup, JPMorgan Chase
and MBNA controBed 65 peke:rt of the
'market. 'The impending hamiage of
MBNA and Bank of AmericawIB.i'uruler
&TOW
the cirde of big playe:~:;.con-.
nuners can expect to be squee2edbeven
W e r by rim r@es and fee%'~ m e d
Roben D.ldambg, professor of finance
at RochesterInstitute of Technofogy and
author of-C;edit ~ a r d ~ a ! ~ ~ n :
Don't think you are off the hotagr if you
are among the 45 percent of cardk~olders
who paybalasces in fo.ll each mo~zth.As
interest rates rise,card issuers are reekirg

spring by Consumer Action. a San
Francisco-based advocacy gmup, about 6
percemofcardissuetsalsohaveso-called
W I M ?delsult
~
@ides The companies
monitor your ctedit report and kick up
your rates if they believe your behavior
With other creditozs sfgaals that you've
become agreatpr creditrisk.
Pediaing &t scores and late payments Oa any accoupts reported to credit

ways to eke out income fromyou as well.
Warren notes,'This is not a case of a
few piranhas naimmhrgamidst a sea of
bib: benign &FhB e deregulation of this
mdustcyhas made tiIe watem treacherOus
fcr an consumers~
Bere are the most slgnifrcant dangers, along with advice on
howtominimkethem.

I

4neau6wemthemostcummonuniv~

RATES lWAT ARICtl'T REAL

Mom than one rate Unwarg cons m c a n easilywimlup with an interestratethat%imySopranoumnlbcharge
Takearecentsolidtationfor a ChaseVw
Platinum c d I ~giant
I type,~ttnunpeted
a Opercentfixed~ c t o rper-y
centage rate on purchases and balance
transfers for up to 15 months and a 7.99
percent fixedrate thereaik.
Sounds good,but a fixed rate means
only thatthe mdit-wd companyhas to
give at least Pidays' w&en nonot befm
it chwgesInsmaller print on an accompanyrOg page you l a We reserve Ute
right to change the terms (including the

:
E

I

~

APRs)at any time for any re~!L*
The 35 percent ts8p. Most card issuers impose a penalty rate if you pay
your bill late or exceed your carU's a&
limit C w t W &it ~ ~ e r s g e24.23
s pacent
But according m a survey conducted last

CardWeb.com, a leading source of data on the credit-card industry,
malvzed10.200 card offersto identify those with the lowest cosl in a
grwp that provided the best terms based on CR's criteria. None of
the 10 cards has a universal defauik clause, two-cycle billing. w bal.J .;>.:. '.
atiCt.Wnsferfw.alolf whlch.canjack u~flnirnc~cfiargea~ll
qrds

,

default t r i g g e ~bnt
~ , about 24 percent of
card issuers said that Bimgly inq&ing
about a carloan or xnus$age mulcte@er
such a rate hike; 33 percent said getting
a new credit card could do so. Tracey
Milk, a s p o m m a u for the American
Bankers Association, defends default
rates, saying that they are "part of riskbased pridng. which means that you
em the interest rate yau receivee
Penaltgratesamich C-Action's
S u N ~ f O U l l dhad already NMaS bigh a8
35 percent last spring, may then be applied not just to new charges but also to
eKistfng b-es.
Consumer aerPoLsts
argue that U s nnfair ta apply
to balmces mtmactivel~-1 M w ot m
other h r n t b a t i s alIowedto lnmXSe
the price of a product once it i%
pue~
chased." says '&a& PIunkett le@Mke
director of the Consumer Federation of
Amerlca. Chase, Citibank andimNA are

~~

have a orace perlod of at least 25 days and have no annual fees. The
Information is current as of Aug. 1. 2005. An "I"indicates that the
card has a fixedrate; "v:' a variable rate. Rates are the loweti6ff&d
to customers who meet issuers' credit-score standards.
. The:''ii-to
,
. :' .,~.' .....,
APR" takes effectat the end of the pCOmOtlot!al perlod.

1

I

.-'f?l

'

2

?

il

among catd Issuers that have armminced
their intention to give cardholders advance notice of penalty rate hikes and
&ow them to *opt o u r of paying the
higherrates on existing balances
And one rate hike can lead to another
Thars wbat happened to Ann Craig.who
ran her credit-card balances dose to the
limits to make ends meet after her husband's South Carolina consulting business went intoa post-9/11dump.Though
Craig says she always made on-time
monulty payments, the noose Wtened
whenherFSmt U S A ~ t r a r d ~ h e r
9.99par~ithttw?Strate to 22.99 parent
in one month. Tn the wake of that inmase.she says rates on her other cards
shat up above 20 percent. She doesn't
think that she can get awiit at lower
rates, so right now she is sluck ?eople
whoarelrfiugreally~tomanage
their &bts are being outrageowpenaljzed+' she says.
lblanw-tansOer~Zb~m~)
customem away from n,@ors,
&issuersafk.rteaserrate~aslowasOpercent
farln~ctoryperiodsthat mightlast as
long as 15 months. If you can transfer a
balance on a high-rate Uudto one wlth a Wrd of issuersin ConsumerAction's slylow rate, such offers can be useful took vey set a cutoff rime on the due date,
raagisg from noon local time to 9 p.m
But they come at a higb cost Any payments youmake typic~Uyare appuedfkst Eastern time Genepayments
to the lowest rate balance. So while the procwed after that are rmrded as late.
We've he& fmm consumem who
adit-card company uses your payment
to quickly pay off that 0 percent trmfer haw been reconled as late for payments
they've mailed over a week in advance
balance you are piling up intenst on purof
the due date. so they suspect issuers
chasesat, say. 18pemnt.
TbMcgadIljust tmnsferbalancesand are deliberately delaying processing
not make any purchases? Not so fast. payments simply to generate late-fee
Some card Issuers have attached strings revenue,' says Joe Ridout of Consumer
to their offem For example at one point Adion, which is among advocacy groups
Pmvidb required tbat customers taJte lobbying to require card companies to
cashadvances to earn the 0 percent rate. follow the practice of the IRS and accept
a postmarked date as proof of o n a e
payments'This daim.that card bsuers
FEES AND MORE PEES
For Wd%nessSince 19%, when a are holding QZI to payments in order to get
court rulingeJimbted caps on card fees. fees is not Mushypractice and it doesn't
make basiness sew?,"says Milts of the
the average fee for maldng a late payABA. She adds that consumers who susthe top 10 &suers now charging $39.
pect their issuerof such tacticscan choose
Mom than half of caixlhoIde~sp ~ late
y
among 6,000 other cards.
e
a and it's geiting
over the JfmIt. Batha thm
fees at least once a y
For
easier than ever to trigger them. Card rejecting charges that exceed your credit
issuers are systematically maiUng state- limit, issuers today often
ments closer to the due date. @viq~eun; through but then charge a
t o m a less lumaraund time. At least a which averages amund $3
14
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hoUm are hit with penalty r>ttesan
dtberfee, Bmnce cbarges alme can sut
ject them to overlimit fees mcr~ithaRf
month. creating a neverending spiful t
debt Other fees to watch: For balm<
transfers,you pay 2 percent to 3 pezcet
of the amount W@rn?d,
with a cap I
$50 to $75 for each w f e r ]ww mak
Andf9rcashadvances.youpay :Cpem?~
to 4percent of the amount you tske
TRICKY BILLING

The minimum-payment Itrap. Ovl
the year$ card issuers have lo&reredtl
requhdminimumpayment fmnt tbe pn
vious standan3 of 5 percent of 0iu:btandiz
balances to 2 pement Consuntc?~migl
not realize fhat by payiag the minimu
&#re
barely m&ng a dent in j~rinapr
If fees and penalty interest ratta m %
getwlahey couldendup wing awze tha
they ever & w e d
Indeed. in a North Carobna ban1
NPW PIOClast yea^ C6q)ital01
itemized how much of the doIIaram0~
it said it- owed by 18cardhc~ldersrq
resented prinapal rather than h a n ~
charge6 It turned out that on w?rege,n
terest and fees consisted of tioore thz
half of total amnuntsowed
Concern about the effect af reduct
minimum payments promptrtl feder
regulators to Issue guidelines this ye<
calling for card issuers to increase the
mjnimumpayment r ~ m e r t 1enoq
s
to cover finance charges and8tn.s durh
the bilbgcyclc andrrducesol~~ep&ic
of p w p a l tea
Issuers have until the end of 2006
phase in higher minimums, L~utson
already have changed their formula
Citiiank now req-s
mfnirnums
cover 1percent of ghe balance plua la
fees aDdfipance chargeswhil>e,at pre
time. Bank of America mquinEv a mia
mum equal to fees and Bqance chaxgk
plus $10 per month.
Inen QayonaCardcrtmpant
have been graduaUyxd=h 1;mcepts
ods,the time during which triusactipr
don't w e interesCAndmore ,rad mol
cards come packwedwith a airchanis
called double-cycleinterest wzdch aUm
you to avoid credit-card c b w p s only
souham paidthe 1asttwOb~laIKeSiIIftI
hnotberta3stcalki~frimn

cently adoptedbyAmeriQn ~ ! i w o r k s
liket6is.You get a bill with a $l,CWWance
onNm land~inyourchecksothatitarlives by the due date say 25 days later. On
Nav. 2, howwer, you charge $500. Before
Amexs changeyou paid w financecharge
on the $500.NowAmex cLwges interest on
the*p
until it receivgyour$l,CW.
Li7TI.E HELP
Whew can consumers turn

for relief? Not necessarily to
the courts. About 45% of
credit-card companies force
customers to submit disputes
to arbitration instead.
Regulaa313rn'tWrnbe

thebanla atways have tbe optionofswitchingtoanotbern@atorybaiyiftheydon't
like OCC poliaes"Mier&n&says
State attorneysgeneral. who have long
been m s s i v e infighting a b w e carbindustrypraaicffwerepushedasidelast
yearwbmthe OCC imposed rules assertingthat it had sole legal authority to enact
and enforce consumer prutfxtion regulations for national banki and their state-

standards of consumer protection ac,lbe
national level.'
Some of those consumer cops .we
pressing ahead despite the OCC's attempt to preempt. In December 2004,
~ e s o t a ' s attorney general, BKike
Hatch, a e d a suit against Capital One,
saying it Used false, deceptive, and misleading Tv a&.direct-mail solicitatians.
and customerservice tele~honesaislts
.. . *
t 0 . w k e t fledit cards with
rat& .mt

The MAJORlTYof
card issuers are
overseen by an agency
funded by the industry.

dustrghasan~musual~ofswayover licensed Operating subsidiaries 'Simply
put. the OCC rules will eliminate 50 cops
its reguhto~~,
says Ed Miof U.S.
EublisInlemtRwarch GroupCardissuas born the beat" testified Roy Cooper,
North Camlina's attorney general, before
can choose to be cluvterrd as state banks,
whicharespxvkdbytheFederal.R~ a congressional committee last year.
said OCC &ah in their efforts
o r t h e F e d e r a l D e p m i t ~ C o ~ ~ ~ wCooper
to
to entice federal thrift?and state banks
benationath/-mthem&
t a e o f s c e o f W C o m p b o D e r 0 f U l e ~ to become OCC regulated, behave like
basketball coaches hyingto remit play(OCC) or the Oitice ofThdftSnpmWb
ers. As a selling point they tout rules
The o w w b b b g majority of issues$
nourareaemwnbytheOCCwhweapaa- aimed at preempting any role for states
in consumer protection Kevin Mukri an
tions are fundedby the card i n d m i W
OCC spokffmarzsaysthat such a charge
"lbe OCC has a mnch greater incentive to
bea~wmmoda~tocmiissuembec~& is xridiculons.' He add$ -We have hjgh

-

snpposedlywouldn't rise. ii4like those of their com]ye?titom' who were portrayed. in
TV ads as plunderingbarbarians. Yet a clause in the card
agreement allowed Capital
One to change interrst rates fmany ma- son. The case is still peading. and when
asked for comm&ntcapitol One said it
believes it hascompliedfuliywiththe1 . a ~
For now thegreatest power that mnsumers have is in their awn hands.
MchieMiUs,wllose awlit-cardratervas
raisedtoa nosebleed leveL has filedcnmplaints about card-industry tactics with
federal regulators. 'As a atizen." 3d:iUs
says; 'the only power I have is towithdraw my business bom these companies
and encourage friends,family, and bu.siness partners to do the same."
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IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
M i a m G. Carroll
C/OHC-I 1 Box 366
Kamiah, ID, 83536
208-935-7962

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO
ARBITRATION
RESPONDENT,

I\/IBNAAmerica Bank, N.A.
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two Irvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850
1-800-830-2793

Forum File Number: FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number: 0135832603
Account Number: 43 13-0331- 1100-6016
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-2487

I

CLAIMANT.

I, Miriam G. Carroll, Respondent, hereby declare and state:
1.

That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of

arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration.

2.

I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause,

thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms;

3.

That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the

National Arbitration forum (Hereinafter "Forum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all;
4.

That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any

way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding;

Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 2
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5.

That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by

proceeding on the claim;
6.

That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action

whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
I, Miriam G. Carroll, declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under
penalty of perjury.
Signed by Miriam G. Carroll

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed
on the 4th day of April, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1 160-0006-1161-2494 to
the following party:
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two Irvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850

Dated this 4th day of April, 2005.
Respectfully submitted and signed by
Miriam G. Carroll,

Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 2
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IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
David F. Capps
C/OHC-11 BOX366
Karniah, ID 83536

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO
ARBITRATION

208-935-7962

RESPONDENT,
MBNA America Bank, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abrarnsoa, L.L.P.
Two Irvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rochilie, MD 20850

I

Forum File Number: FA0506000498945
Account Number: 5490-3536-0367-4374
Cert. Mail: 7004-1160-0006-1461-3323

240-386-3900

CLAIMANT.

1

I, David F. Capps, Respondent, hereby declare and state:
1.

That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of'

arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration.

2.

The agreement attached to the Claim filed with the National Arbitration Forum is not the

agreement I entered into with Claimant and does not represent the original agreement.

3.

I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause,

thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms;

4.

That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the

National Arbitration fonun (Hereinafter 'Torum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all;

Motion to Dismiss Page 1 of 3

5.

That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any

way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding;
6.

That the National Arbitration Forurn would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by

proceeding on the claim;

7.

That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action

whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack ofjurisdiction.

I, David F. Capps declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under penalty
of perjury.
Signed by David F. Capps

Motion to Dismiss Page 2 of 3
- .

-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed
on the 8th day of July, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1160-0006-1461-3316 to
the following party:
Paralegal D e p m e n t
Wolvoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Twd Inrington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd., 5" Floor
Rockville, MD 20850

Dated this 8th day of July, 2005.
Respectfully submitted and signed by

Motion to Dismiss Page 3 of 3

NORTH CAROLINA
NEW HANOVER COUNTY

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

ADRIANA MCQUILLAN, and
WALTER JAMES FAUST, on behalf
of themselves and all other persons similarly
situated,

1
1
1
1
1

Plaintiffk,

)

1

V.

AOC-CV-752

)

CHECK 'N GO OF NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., CNG FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
JARED A. DAVIS and A. DAVID DAVIS,
Defendants.

1

1
1
1
1

JAMES P. TORRENCE, SR., and BEN HUBERT )
CLINE, on behalf of themsetves and all other
)
persons similarly situated,
1
)

1
1

Plaintiffs,

1

v.
NATIONWIDE BUDGET FINANCE, QC
HOLDINGS, INC., QC FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and DON EARLY,
Defendants.

05-CVS-0447

1
1
)
)

1
1

DECLARATION OF MICHAEL GEIST
MICHAEL GEIST provides this declaration.
I.

My name is Michael Geist. I am over the age of twenty-one years, have never

been convicted of a felony, have personal knowledge of the facts statcd horein, and am competent

which was published at 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 903-38 (2002). A true and
correct copy of this article is attached as Exhibit A.
6.

I subsequently conducted a follow-up study in which i updated my findings to

include all UDRP decisions through February 18,2002, for a total of 4,332 cases. I published the
key findings of this follow-up study in a second article, FundanzentulZy Fair.coill? Aiz Update 0 1 1
Bias Allegantioizs nlzd tlie ICANN UDRP. A true and conect copy of this article is attached as

Exhibit B.
7.

As explained in more detail below, based on my research and analysis, I

concluded that the NAF disproportionately assigned arbitrators who issued pro-complainatlt
rulings, and thus exerted influence over the outcomes of arbitrations in the UDRP system in
order to market itself favorably to complainants, who have the exclusive power to choose
whether the NAF or a different provider will earn their business.
8.

My study was premised on the belief that complainants rationally selected

arbitration providers that they perceived as most likely to rule in their favor. This assumption
was based on the fact that, after the establishment of the UDRP,the two accredited arbitration
providers with the most favorable outcomes for complainants-the NAF and WIPO-were
increasingly selected by complainants. (The success of these two complainant-friendly
providers eventually contributed to the bankruptcy of the Ieast compIainant-friendly provider,
eliesolution.) In my study, I set out to determine whether-and

if so, how-arbitration

providers curried favor with poteiltial complainants.
9.

First, I analyzed the potential factors influencing complainant selection of

arbitration provider, including differences among filing fee costs, pa~~clist
rosters, language

Most troublillg was data that suggested that, despite claims of impartial random case allocatio~i
as well as a large roster of panelists, the majority of NAF single panel cases were actually
assigned to little more than a handful of panelists. Of the 1,379 NAF cases decided by a single
NAF-assigned arbitrator through February 18,2002,778 of them-56.4%-were

decided by

only six arbitrators. (In comparison, the six busiest single panelists at the two other providers
accounted for approximately 17% of those providers' single panel caseloads.)
13.

In cases decided by the six arbitrators most frequently assigned by the NAF, the

complainant won 95.1% of the time. This win rate was significantly higher than virtually any
other point of comparison, including overall complainant winning percentage and complainant
winning percentage by provider.
14.

During my research, I was on the NAF's media distribution list. Unlike the WlPO

and eResolution, the NAF regularly distributed press releases heralding recent decisions. From
May through August 2001, for example, 1 received several press releases, all but one of wl~ich
promoted a complainant win.
15.

By assigning the majority of cases to the subset of ahitratots who ruled most

consistently for its clients, the complainants, the NAF exerted a great deal of influence over case
outcorne. When combined with the fact that outcome was the most decisive factor among
complainants choosing arbitration providers, and evidence that the NAF aggressively marketed
its services to potential complainants by promoting complainant wins, this data supports the
conclusion that the NAF used its control over the selection of arbitrators in single panel cases to
achieve outcomes that would enable it to attract the business of fihire UDRP complainants.

PJ THIE.UMl%DSTATES DXSTRICT COURT
PO61 TBE SOUTHERN VYSTRZCT OH WSST VXRGJNiA
MARGARET TOPPINGS and
ROGER D. TQPPTNGS,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NOS: 2:OO-1055
00-C-146
MERITECB MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
a corporation, and division of
SAXON MORTGAGE, INC., a corporation,
PILATINUM CAPITAL GROUP, a
corporation, CHASE MANHA'L'TAN SANK
(formerly CHASE BANK OF TEXAS, NA),
and SALMONS AGENCY, INC., a West
Virginia corporation,
Detendants.

....................................

IN THE UNWED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THJE 410UTltnaluY DISTRICT 0s WIGST VIRGINIA

JAMES R. MILLER AND KATHY 6.
MILLER, hdividualb and on behalf
of all others similarly sttuated,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTYON NO. 2:00-0335

V8.

I
I

EQUIFIRST CORPORATION OF WV, a
coruaration: KEYCORP FINANCE, INC.
a ~ b i aXCEYBorn EQUITY SERV~CJCEB;
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES CO, INC.,
a corpuratllon, COMMUNITY HOME MORTGAGE,
LLC dlblal COMMUNITY MORT, GROUP$ and
COMMUNITY BANK OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Defendants,

BILLANTI & ASSOCIATES
COURT
REPORTERS
t 088 R I ~ E W O N
DRIVE
T

Ewvrrw, WV

25071

7

304-965-7444

I
I

IN W E 7JlWTED &%'ATE%
DY8TRlCT COURT FOR TEE SOUTHEKN

DISTRICT OR WEST VIREGIOKLA

......................

The telephonic discovery deposition o f EDWARD C.
ANDEBSON was taken by the Plaintiff pursuant do the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure by Margaret E, Billanti, Certified Court Reporter and

Notary Pubfic on the 16th day of July, 2001, eommenefng at 2:00 p.m.,
a t the offices of Mountain State Justice, 922 Qnarricr Street, Suite 525,

Charleston, Kanawha County, West Virginia, pursuant to notice.

SILLANTI & ASSOCIATES
Caunr REWRTBRS
1035 RIOG~~EMONI
DRIVC
ELWI~W,
WV 25071

APPEARANCES
QNBEHALF OF TBE.PLAIlWl'BYSt

DANIEL HSDGES, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE
922 Quarrier Strcct
Charleston, West Vlrginla 25301

ON BEXALF OF TBE D ~ ~ i W S Z
TFlE CRASE MANHATTAN BAN&MORTGAGE
SERVYCEB. INC.. ANT) SAXON MORTGAGEI INC.:

BRUCE M. JACOBS, ATTORNEY-A'#'-bAW
MARCEY ABER, IXGAL ASSISTANT
s p a w , THOMAS a BATTLE
Bpilmeu Center
300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
CBarleston, West Virginia 25321
(304) 340-3863

ON BEHALF OF TEE DEPENI)AI$&
f2OMMUMTY BANK OP NUKTHEBN VIRGXNI4
KAXA L, CWNNlNGHAM, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
SrnPTOIG A N D JOxnuSON, PLLC
Bank One Center, Seventh Floor
Charleston, West Virginia 25326-1588
(304) 353-8189

ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL ABIDXTRATION FORUM[
MICHAEL C, MCCAR'FHY* ESQUIRE
MASLON, EDELMAN, BORMAN & BRAND, LLP
3300 Welln h r g o Center

90 South 7th Street
Minneapolis, Minnesota, 55402
(612) 672-8200

EUINATIOS

PLAINTEPFS*lWlm&S&

Edward C. Anderson

7
(Hedges)

a one page
document entitled "NATIONAL
ARBITRATION FORUM"
Exhiblt No. 1;

..............89/90

Errata SheetISignatme Page

Reporter's Certifi~ate...,....,,~.,......91/92
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'VNC3sV YL(WI'NH s'&

2

Bqullaw; is that correct?
A I don't b w that. He worked st

3

Eguilaw.

bthbr kllcndere;

7

anre~t'?

MR M C P A R W : Objeution.

Vague ls to

I

8 tb3.
BY MR. HEWES.

Y

Q Durlng the early '90s: is tbat

!I0
11

vw

thai are sought by me
partim.
13
Q You sald "dlor a portion!' h
14 what oases would they not bp paid atl of tbs few?
15
A A V*
of W S .
Obviously, in
16 order to run tho aWstrative sygtm, the Forum

THE W ' ~ E S SI:don't know what cascrs

18 E~uilawwived, what oases *NAP
19 whom, when, whca NAE was owned

has to recaive ~ o m of
t the fees.
O So on &. a*
thy would trcciw
19 80 or 90 percebt of what's paid in?
w
MR.MCCARTRY Objeet lo lhc foxm of tb
IR

txmes:

20

BY MR.

Q How many employees does t+M haw?
A Twty-five os twentysix, I

21 qmtion.
22
BY MR. HEWE&

Page 17

I betjeve.

2
3
4

Q W e are they located?
A R w i l l c , Nlinnesm.
Q All of them?

s

A Yes.
Q How msly srbitrntork do you haw?
A l think them are about six hundred

7

14

I

2

3

Stab?
A I believe them are h u t five
h~ndmdond fifty.

13
14

Q How m y do work Isihtiummm
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September 23, 1996
Richard E. Shephard
Asst. Gen'l Counsel
Saxon Mortgage. Inc.
4880 Cox Rd.
Glen Allen, VA 23060

.-.

NATIONAL

Dear Richard:
Thanks for your call last week. It was good talking to you.

RBITRATIOE
FORUM

Following on our conversation, i am enclosing the National Arbitration Forum's
1996 Arbitration Overview for your review.
By adding arbitration language to yqur contracts, the National Arbitration Forum's
national system of arbitration lets you minimize lawsuits, and the threat of lender
liability jury verdicts.

We have successfUlly handled more than 20,000 creditor-debtor and other cases
nationwide. You will probably be most interested in the Gammaro case that is
enclosed sinceit involves the National Arbitration Forum in a mortgage transaction.
After you have had a chance to review these materials, I will give you a call. In the
meantime, if you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me.

-

Sincerely,

&-

Curtis D. Brown, Esq.
Director of Development
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ARBITRATION
NATIONAL
FORUM

-

h r i w ~ iMN
~.
Atlanta GA

ARBITRATOW FOLLOW TIE LAW'-~redictable decisions
based on legal standards.
AWARDS LIMITED -Awards may not exceed claim for which
fee paid
. . ..
UNIFORM NATIONAL SYS'IEM Same rules, same
procedures every case, everywhqe.

-

-

-

P~OFESSIONALS Ddsions are made legal professional, not
jurom or volunteers.

-

COST CONTROL The cost of arbitration is far lower
fhan any lawsuit.
\k'&ingwn. D.C.

-

LIMITED DISCOVERY Very little, if any, discovery and
p r e - h e h g maneuvering.

PRXVAllE

- Arbitration proceedings are completely private.

-

NO SPURlOUS CLAW;IS Arbitration procedures discourage
lawsuit extortion.

-

LOSER PAYS Prevailing party may be awarded costs.

NORTH CAROLINA
NEW HANOVER COUNTY

IN TI33 GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

ADRIANA MCQurLLAN, and
WALTER JAMES FAUST, on behalf
of themselves and all other persons similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,

CHECK'N GO OF NORTH CAROLINA,..
INC.;CNG FINANC.IALCORPORATION,
JARED A. DAVIS and A. DAVID DAVIS,
Defendants.

i
1

JAMES P. TORRENCE, SR., and BEN HUBERT )
CLINE, on behalf of themselves and all other
1
persons similarly situated,
1
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

05-cvs-0447

v.

NATIONWIDE BUDGET FINANCE, QC
HOLDINGS, INC., QC FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., FINANCIAL SERVICES OF
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., and DON EARLY,
Defendants.

1
)
)
)
)

DECLARATION OF GREGORY DUHL

GREGORY DUHL provides this declaration.
1.

My name is Gregory Duhl. I am over the age of twenty-one years, have never

been convicted of a felony, have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and am competent
to testify to them. The facts stated herein are true and correct.

2.

I understand that this declaration will be used by the plaintiffs in this case in

support of their effort to challenge the binding mandatory arbitration clause used by a lender. I
am not familiar with the allegations or issues in that case, however, and I have no opinion about
the merits of the matter. I have not reviewed the arbitration clause at issue, and have no opinion
as to its enforceability. I also have no financial interest in this case. I provide this declaration

only to describe my own experiences with the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF").
3.

In 2003, I had a dispute against Suburban Moving & Storage Company

("Suburban"), an agent of United Van Lines, for damages to my property arising from my move
from Chicago to Pennsylvania. In keeping with my contact with Suburban, I pursued my claim
by filing a case with the NAF. When I agreed to arbitrate with the NAF, I was not familiar with
them, and had no basis for suspecting them of any bias.
4.

My experience with the NAF was deeply troubling. In a variety of ways, I found

that the NAF implemented (or refused to follow) its ruies in ways that favored Suburban and
disfavored me, the consumer.

5.

At each step of the arbitration process, for example, the NAF allowed Suburban to

violate procedural rules. I followed the procedures set forth in the NAF's rules, and asked the
NAF to require Suburban to comply with the NAF's rules. Repeatedly, however, the NAF
refused to consider my motions.
6.

After some time, I found the NAF's procedural bias against me to be so pervasive

and blatant that it no longer made sense to go forward. As a result, I was forced to abandon my
claim, and I settled the matter with Subuiban for far less than it was worth.
7.

I am a professor of business law, and I presume that I am likely more

sophisticated than the average consumer. I am concerned that if the NAF's system favored the
corporate defendant over the consumer in my case to such a degree fhat I was not able to

'

overcome this kind of procedural unfairness by invoking the rules, it is unlikely that the average
consumer would have much of a chance in cases brought before the NAF.
8.

Without going through an exhaustive discussion of the entire matter, I will

describe now a few instances of the NAF's abusive conduct in my case.
9.

As one illustration of how the NAF was lax with its rules with respect to

Suburban, the NAF accepted a late submission fiom Suburban without following the NAF's own
procedures for late submissions. I knew that the submission was late because of the date and
time on the fax stamp.
10.

In addition, the NAF did not require Suburban to follow the rules of the American

Moving & Storage Association (AMSA), as my contract with Suburban required the NAF to do.
Under the AMSA rules, for example, Suburban was required to submit three copies of its
response to my claim. The NAF permitted Suburban to ignore this requirement, among others,
despite my objections.
11.

I learned that there were several instances of ex parte communication between the

NAF and Suburban. When I demanded to know what information had been exchanged Eetween
Suburban and the NAF, the NAF refused to communicate with me about the contents of the ex
parte communications.
12.

As another illustration of the NAF's favoritism, the NAF directed me that I had to

hand-write the case number on each page of a 150-page document. The NAF also directed me
that I must spend my own money to copy and mail hard copies to the NAF and Suburban. The

NAF had a different system in place for Suburban, however, and Suburban was permitted to
submit its documents without numbers and via fax. I objected, without success, that the NAF
should require Suburban to follow the same rules that I was required to follow.
13.

On at least four separate occasions, I filed motions with the NAF objecting to

procedural irregularities. Each time, I followed the NAF rules, which, according to the AMSA
rules, applied when the AMSA rules were silent. Pursuant to the NAF rules, my motions were
filed with the Director of Arbitration. With each motion, as the NAF rules required, I enclosed
the $25 filing fee. In each case, however, an NAF program administrator refused to even accept
my motions, and the NAF clerk refused to permit me to be heard, notwithstanding the NAF rules
that authorized these motions. The clerk said to me that "We don't hear motions like this,"
referring to motions that challenged procedural irregularities of the NAF itself.
14.

The NAF agreed to allow Suburban to pursue in arbitration issues that were

beyond the scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate.
15.

Finally, the NAF told me that all of my correspondence with them regarding the

procedural irregularities in the document submission process would be turned over to the
arbitrator assigned to hear the case. I objected to this, because it was not relevant to my loss
claim and I was concerned it would prejudice the arbitrator against me. I decided to move the
NAF to dismiss my claim without prejudice, which it did. I then settled the claim for about
$2750.
16.

In my opinion, it was impossible for me to get a fair result through arbitration

before the NAF. The procedural unfairness of the process made arbitration an unworkable option
for me.

I, Gregory Duhl, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of North
Carolina that the foregoing affidavit consisting of 16paragraphs is true and correct.
SjlJ 3-

,2005
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Gregory Duhl
Subscribed and sworn to:
This 2 day of

LAO M

Notary Public

2005.
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Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169
PlaintiffIDefendant,

NOV 06 2006

1

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

Case No. CV-2005-36747
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UAT
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

).

1
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs .
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

Case No. CV-36747

POST-HEARING
MEMORAMDUM

I

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

)

1
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.
DAVID F. CAPPS,

1

Defendant,

)
)

COMES NOW Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps, respectfully
submitting this POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM for the Court's consideration.
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WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS
The alleged arbitration clause which MBNA America Bank, N.A
(hereinafter referred to as "MBNA) attempted to add to their cardholder
agreement has significance beyond the context of contractual additions or
modifications. The alleged arbitration clause also waives a constitutionally
protected right, specifically the Seventh Amendment right to a Trial by Jury
Judicial decisions regarding waiver of substantive rights clearly establish
that such waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Arbitration
agreements in medical clinic practice are routinely signed by the patient, and yet,
as the Supreme Court of Nevada held in Obstetrics and Gynecologisfs Wixted,
Flanagan and Robinson v.Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259,
"The contents of both affidavits are perfectly consistent with the conclusion
that the agreement was never explained to respondent. On these facts
the district court may well have found that respondent did not give an
informed consent to the agreement and that no meeting of the minds
occurred."
The court decided that the arbitration clause, even though signed by the patient,
was not valid due to the lack of a clear understanding of the arbitration provision
where there was no "meeting of the minds"
In a similar case, Broemmer V. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840
P.2d 1013, the Supreme Court of Arizona also held that the signed arbitration
agreement was not valid by stating,
"The facts in the instant case present an even stronger argument in favor
of holding the agreement unenforceable that do the facts in Pepper. In
both cases, plaintiffs stated that they did not recall signing the agreement
to arbitrate or having it explained to them."
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"Clearly, there was no conspicuous or explicit waiver of the fundamental
right to a jury trial or any evidence that such rights were knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived."
Even in the dissenting opinion, the justices clearly stated,
"The dissent is concerned that our decision today sends a 'mixed
message.' It is, however, our intent to send a clear message. That
message is: Contracts of adhesion will not be enforced unless they are
conscionable and within the reasonable expectations of the parties. This
is a well-established principle of contract law; today we merely apply it to
the undisputed facts of the case before us."
In Hooters of America, lnc., v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held,
"The agreement to arbitrate was subject to rescission by defendant
employee because plaintiff employer had breached its duty to establish
fair rules governing the arbitration proceedings by establishing completely
one-sided and biased rules which could not be called arbitration."
"The rules established by defendant were entirely one-sided and were
calculated to produce a biased proceeding and result. The court noted
especially the fact that plaintiff employer was entitled to select not just its
own arbitrator, but the entire panel from which the employee's arbitrator
would be chosen and from which the third, neutral, arbitrator would be
selected. The court said that the adoption of biased rules was a breach of
the implied duty of good faith in exercising the power to establish
arbitration rules."
"Contractual discretion is presumptively bridled by the law of contracts by the covenant of good faith implied in every contract." "Good faith
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party. Bad faith includes the
evasion of the spirit of the bargain and an abuse of a power to specify
terms."
In Hooters, the employee had signed the arbitration agreement on two separate
occasions. But because of bias in the arbitration procedure, the employee was
allowed to rescind the arbitration agreement.
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Capps and Carroll have not signed an agreement to arbitrate, have no
conscious knowledge of an agreement to arbitrate, have not volunteered
knowingly, and have not intelligently given assent to any kind of agreement to
arbitrate. MBNA has sent the alleged notice of arbitration in such a manner so
as to obscure the existence of an agreement to arbitrate from the vast majority of
its cardholders. This leaves the bulk of MBNA cardholders without voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of their constitutionally protected Seventh
Amendment rights. Without that higher level of consent, the alleged arbitration
agreement is not valid.
In addition, Capps and Carroll had no expectation that MBNA would
attempt to remove their constitutionally protected rights by a unilateral
amendment to the cardholder agreement. Such a move on the part of MBNA is
clearly in bad faith to the original agreement between the parties, making the
attempted arbitration agreement invalid. Businesses seeking to require
employees or customers to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment or
conducting business obtain the signature of the individual on an arbitration
agreement. Instead, MBNA has opted to include its notice as a bill stuffer,
knowing that a large majority of cardholders would never see the notice. In this
day of sophisticated communications, and with the resources of MBNA, there is
no excuse for this deceptive and ineffective approach.
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF), a private corporation, selected by
MBNA for all disputes, is biased in favor of MBNA, making any determination by
the NAF invalid. While the NAF has placed itself in a position to replace the court
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and jury system, it has not held itself to any meaningful standard of fairness,
justice or accountability. In a case in the United states District Court, Natalie
Baron sought discovery on the alleged bias of the NAF. The NAF refused to
comply with the requests, even when ordered to do so by the district court,
claiming, among other things, that the NAF was a quasi-government entity which
was immune from the discovery process. How can a private corporation which
lied to the district court and refused to honor a court order be depended on to
render an unbiased and fair decision? The Amicus Brief of Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice in Natalie Baron's case concerning NAF bias is provided for your
convenience.
The waiver of constitutionally protected rights is a serious matter which
stands far and above the normal constraints of contractual notice. Without a
clear and demonstrable "meeting of the minds", the waiver of a person's seventh
amendment right to a trial by jury cannot be validated. The evidence presented
by MBNA falls far short of the basic requirements for a waiver of this protected
right. No evidence has been presented of a "meeting of the minds" on
arbitration. None exists. Without that evidence, the waiver cannot be voluntary,
knowing or intelligent, and the alleged arbitration provision cannot be valid.

Dated this /

3

day of November, 2005.
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Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
this POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM to the attorney for the Defendanuplaintiff
MBNA this _IYr2 day of November, 2006, by Certified Mail
# 7QQS
jf&? ~ Q 7630
Z
1&S$i at the following address.
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise. ID 83701
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Trial Lawyers for Public Justice ("TLPJ") is a national public interest law firm that
specializes in precedent setting and socially significant civil litigation and is dedicated to
pursuing justice for the victims of corporate and governmental abuses.
The American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP) is a non-profit organization with
approximately 32 million members aged 50 and older. As the largest membership
organization serving older Americans, AARP is greatly concerned about unfair and
deceptive practices in the financial services and credit markets. AARP thus supports
laws and public policies to protect consumers' rights and to preserve the means for
them to seek legal redress when they are hBrmed in the marketplace.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA) is a national voluntary bar
association of approximately 50,000 attorneys practicing in every state, including the
State of Florida. ATLA members primarily represent plaintiffs in personal injury, civil
rights, consumer rights and employment discrimination cases. ATLA believes that a
neutral decision maker, whether it is the court or an arbitrator, is essential to the
protection of these rights.
The National Association of Consumer Advocates ("NACA) is a non-profit corporation
whose members are private and public sector attorneys, legal services attorneys, and

law professors and students whose primary practice involves the protection and
representation of consumers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In light of the fact that the parties to this appeal have already extensively briefed the
facts, this amicus brief will only touch upon a few salient facts that inform the argument
set out below.
Plaintiff Natalie Baron filed this case as a putative class action under the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA) against Best Buy Co. ("Best Buy"), Beneficial National Bank USA,
Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co. and Virginia Surety Company, Inc. ("the insurers").
The defendants moved to compel arbitration, alleging that Baron had agreed to submit
all claims that she might have against the defendants to mandatory arbitration before
the National Arbitration Forum ("NAP). Defendants' motion was supported by an
affidavit from NAF's Curtis Brown, Vice President and General Counsel.
Baron sought discovery from NAF, requesting documents relating to the factual
underpinnings of Brown's affidavit and to potential bias by NAF. NAF refused to answer
Baron's discovery requests, and refused to comply with Baron's subpoena alleging,
among other things, that it was a quasi-governmental entity that was "immune" from the
discovery process. NAF petitioned the U.S. District Court in Minnesota to quash Baron's
subpoena. A Magistrate Judge in that court denied NAF's motion and ordered it to
produce the requested information. NAF still refused to answer Baron's discovery
queries, and appealed the Magistrate's ruling to the District Court in Minnesota. That
court also ordered NAF to comply with the subpoena. Because the District Court in this
case had already taken the motion to compel arbitration under advisement, however,
NAF never responded to discovery requests.
Despite this refusal, Baron placed some evidence relating to NAF's neutrality before the
trial court. This evidence included a letter dated January 14, 1999, from Brown to a
prospective financial industry client to solicit business ("the Brown letter"). This letter
states in the first sentence that "A number of courts around the country have held that a
properly-drafted arbitration clause in credit applications and agreements eliminates
class actions and ensures that credit-related lawsuits will be directed to arbitration, not a
jury trial." (emphasis in original). The Brown Letter promises that NAF arbitration
make a positive impact on the bottom line." (emphasis in original).

"a

Baron also placed into evidence a 1999 deposition of Clinton Walker, General Counsel
of First USA Bank, reflecting upon NAF's relationship with that bank. The deposition
reveals, at 98-99, that lawyers at First USA communicate with NAF "from time to time";
and at 102-103, that First USA has initiated more than 40,000 arbitrations against
consumers with NAF in collection matters, but that fewer than 10 consumers have
initiated arbitrations against First USA with NAF. First USA has paid NAF at least $2
million in fees. Id. at 108.

The U.S. District Court hearing this case decided that it could resolve the defendants'
motion to compel arbitration without waiting for the NAF to respond to Baron's discovery
requests. The District Court denied the motion to compel arbitration, citing (among other
things), concerns with the neutrality of the NAF, and holding that Best Buy's arbitration
clause is unconscionable.
In our capacity as amici, we attach as Exhibits to this brief several similar letters,
excerpts from depositions and other materials that have surfaced in other lawsuits
around the country that provide further support for the District Court's concerns about
NAF's neutrality. Amici suggest that this material is illustrative of the sort of information
that might have been developed if discovery had not been resisted and delayed in this
case.
Exhibit 1 hereto is an attachment to the Brown Letter that was not in the record below.
This attachment, on NAF letterhead, compares NAF with the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"). Among the differences noted is that NAF limits awards to the
amount of the claim, that NAF only permits consolidation with the agreement of all
parties, that it is easier to get a default under NAF's rules than with the AAA's rules, and
that NAF's Uniform Rules give less power to individual arbitrators than do AAA's rules.
Exhibit 2 hereto is a letter dated April 16, 1998, from Roger Haydock, Director of
Arbitration at NAF, to Alan Kaplinskyl ("the Haydock Letter"). The Haydock Letter
warns that the "class action bar" is threatening to bring lawsuits involving the Y2K issue,
and states that the "only thing" (emphasis in original) that will "prevent" such suits is the
adoption of an NAF arbitration clause "in every contract, note and security agreement."
In an attachment to the Haydock Letter, NAF lists numerous officials of lenders and
lawyers who specialize in defending lenders as "lnformation Resources" whom new
prospective clients should contact for endorsements. One of these "Resources" is
Kaplinsky, who is counsel on the amicus brief filed in support of defendants in this case
by the American Bankers Association, the American Financial Services Association and
the Consumer Bankers Association ("The Bankers' Amicus B r i e f ' ) . Another "Resource"
is Christopher Lipsett of the law firm of Wilmer'Cutler & Pickering. Lipsett is counsel on
the amicus brief filed in support of defendants in this case by Thomas Lambros and
William Sessions. Taken together, ail of the amicus briefs in support of defendants in
this case are either written by paid counsel for the NAF itself or for persons who serve
as "lnformation Resources" for NAF. No consumer advocates or consumer attorneys
are listed as an "lnformation Resource."
This attachment to the Haydock Letter also states that NAF provides arbitration services
for nearly 20 lenders, including Banc One, Beneficial Financial Bank, First North
American National Bank, and TMI Financial.
Another attachment to the Haydock Letter urges companies to reduce their "collection
costs" by hiring the NAF and "[slaving the money you've been spending on court costs,
attorney fees, and discovery."

Exhibit 4 hereto is a letter dated October 20, 1997 from Edward Anderson of NAF to a
prospective client (hereafter "The Anderson LetterU).3Documents taken from the 1994
Bankruptcy Petition of NAF's corporate parent, Equilaw, Inc., Exhibit 5 hereto, indicate
that Mr. Anderson was then a Director, officer, and major shareholder of Equilaw. (He
then owned 4,500 of the 10,000 total shares in Equilaw.) A deposition of Mr. Anderson
taken in1994 indicates that prior to coming to NAF, he was Assistant General Counsel
to ITT Consumer Financial Corporation.4Anderson Deposition Excerpt, Exh. 6, at 12.
Mr. Anderson first learned of Equilaw and NAF when ITT was considering hiring these
companies to provide arbitration services for it. Id. at 19. ITT did, in fact, hire NAF and
Equilaw. Id. at 44.
The Anderson Letter states that "major American companies are moving all of their
contracts to an arbitration basis as fast as possible. There is no reason for your clients
to be exposed to the costs and risks of the jury system." It goes on to state "Every
award is limited to the amount claimed!" (emphasis in original). Attached to the
Anderson Letteris a "Legal Memorandum" from "Forum Counsel" on the subject of
"Arbitration & Class Actions in Financing." The memo advises that "In the court system,
financing transactions are always at risk for Class Action treatment. . . ." It further
advises that "Most often, the claims of class action plaintiffs' lawyers are based on
printed or computer-generated documents or standard procedure manuals, which leave
little room to argue against 'commonality' and 'typicality."'
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SUMMARY

OF

ARGUMENT

I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT NAF IS LIKELY TO BE BIASED IN
FAVOR OF CORPORATIONS IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, SUCH AS
DEFENDANTS.
A. NAF HAS MADE INAPPROPRIATE PROMISES TO COMPANIES IN THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY.

NAF has evidenced a likely bias in favor of financial services companies by engaging in
inappropriate ex parte contacts soliciting business from financial institutions. Instead of
communicating with these companies as a truly neutral decision maker, NAF's
solicitations to financial services companies and their defense counsel communicate a
strong sympathy for those companies. NAF's solicitations suggest that consumer
lawsuits are a battle between the companies and their customers, and that NAF will be
taking the companies' side in "improving their bottom line" in that battle. The letters
described above establish that NAF officials solicit new business by promising
prospective business clients and their counsel that its procedures will favor their
interests relative to those of their consumers in adjudicating any future dispute.
1. The "No Class Action" Promise.

As set forth above, the Brown Letter promises in its first sentence that NAF will
"eliminate" class actions. The Haydock Letter promises that the NAF will "prevent" Y2K
class actions. The attachment to the Anderson Letter coaches businesses in how to
avoid class actions by hiring NAF.
Why does NAF keep hammering this theme? Why does the Brown Letter put the "no
class action" promise in the first sentence, underscored, emphasizing its importance?
The answer is simple: NAF is promising would-be banking clients that it will protect
them from significant potential liabilities by "preventing" (the language of the Anderson
Letter) consumers with small claims from having any meaningful means of relief. NAF is
effectively promising lenders that its procedures will insulate them from a broad
category of potential liabilities.
The well-recognized realrty is that it is not economically feasible for consumers to
pursue relatively small claims on an indiv~dualbasis against a large bank. Very few, if
any, consumer attorneys are financially able to pursue individual claims for modest
sums (such as the TlLA claim at issue here) against large, powerful companies such as
defendants. And, when a consumer's individual claims are small, it is economically
infeasible for them to hire an attorney to represent their interests on a billable hour
basis.
Consumer attorneys are, however, often able and willing to pursue such claims on a
class action basis. When similar claims are aggregated, the amount in controversy
becomes sufficiently large to enable consumers to locate counsel who will represent
them and defend their interests. Indeed, there have been several cases across the

nation in recent years where charge card companies were held accountable for
widespread wrongdoing through consumer class actions.
If plaintiffs are denied a class action remedy, then they will likely be denied any
meaningful remedy for most wrongs that defendants might commit against them
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor.
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the arbitration clause here does not offer consumers just another forum for
resolving disputes; rather it immunizes defendants from meaningful legal accountability.
It is impossible to imagine a state or federal court sending out a letter to consumer
attorneys noting that class actions often lead to big recoveries, and then guaranteeing
that it would certify any case as a class action (even if individual issues predominated
over common issues in the consumers' cases) if only the consumer attorneys would
bring their cases in and pay fees to that court. The result would be public outrage,
banner media headlines, ethical inquiries and possibly even impeachment. The NAF
has essentially done just this, however, with the one difference that it has made its
promises of preferential treatment to the likely defendants of class actions.
2. Other Promises of Preferential Treatment.

The Brown and Anderson Letters prominently promote NAF's rule limiting awards to the
amount of the original claim as a principle advantage to the companies of choosing the
NAF as arbitrator. The strong suggestion is that this provision favors the companies
being solicited and disfavors their consumers. Under this rule, no matter what
information the plaintiff develops in discovery, his or her claim is capped at the initial
demand. The nature of financial services litigation, however, is that the full extent of a
company's wrongdoing (and thus the damages that would be appropriate to award the
plaintiff) often cannot be known until the plaintiff has had an opportunity to pursue
reasonable discovery. Complex fraud schemes, for example, can generally only be
identified after layers of deceit and obfuscation are peeled away and the true facts are
made known. NAF's rule capping awards at the amount of the original claim is
particularly pernicious because NAF's rules pressure consumers to reduce the amount
of their claim at the outset of a case. NAF's rule achieves this end by tying its fee
schedule to the amount of the claim and increasing the fees levied rapidly as the
amount of the claim increases.
An attachment to the Haydock Letter also urges potential financial services clients to
hire the NAF to "sav[e] the money you've been spending on . . . discovery." Why does
NAF promise lenders that it will restrict discovery? Because NAF (and the lenders)
know that most plaintiffs in significant banking litigation cannot prove their cases without

access to full and fair discovery. Consumers have the burden of proof, but few
borrowers with valid legal claims have independent access to a lender's documents
Sharp limits on discovery will mean that many consumers will have little chance to
effectively pursue their claims.
Finally, as noted above, the Brown Letter promises that NAF arbitrators will not decide
cases on "equity," unlike "some other arbitration providers." The plaintiff in this case has
asserted equitable claims as well as claims at law for damages, however, as she is
entitled to do under TILA. NAF's promise not to consider equity appears to undermine a
fundamental purpose of many consumer lawsuits and most consumer statutes to use
the tools of equitable relief to require wrongdoers to correct their illegal practices.

3. NAF'S Solicitations Make General Promises to Business Clients of Preferential
Treatment.
Several of NAF's solicitations suggest that it is likely to favor lenders in their disputes
with their consumers. The Anderson Letter, for example, urges would-be clients not to
expose themselves "to the costs and risks of the jury system." The attachment to that
letter offers free legal advice on how lenders can defeat class actions where common
questions predominate and the class representatives' claims are typical. The approach
of the Anderson Letter is not that of an entity committed to even-handed judging of
disputes, but instead that of a for-profit vendor soliciting lucrative work by advising
lenders how it can help them reduce their liabilities (avoid the "risks of the jury system").
This suggestion is of a piece with the Brown Letter's promise to improve a client's
"bottom line."
The Haydock Letter similarly characterizes the prospect of Y2K lawsuits as a battle
between "the class action bar" and lenders. The letter suggests that NAF takes the
lenders' side in that battle, urging defense counsel for lenders to use the NAF as a
means of foiling "the class action bar."5
B. NAF HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH LENDERS.
It may be true, as defendants' amici argue, that all for-profit arbitrators compete for
business. Nonetheless, it is clear here that NAF is particularly dependent upon one
group of businesses the financial services companies and that it's fervor for that
business has led it to make inappropriate promises to those businesses.
The attachment to the Haydock Letter boasts that NAF provides arbitration services for
numerous lenders and financial institutions, and it relies upon lenders and their defense
counsel for referrals t o new clients. NAF knows that there are numerous other providers
of arbitration services (indeed, the Brown Letter reflects its competition with AAA). NAF
also knows that if its arbitrators were to rule for consumers too often by the standards of
the financial sewices industries and its defense lawyers, or enter awards for consumers
that were too large by those standards, these companies would cancel their lucrative
contracts with and refuse to further endorse NAF. A few pro-consumer rulings, and NAF

could go from its current multi-million dollar business tight back to the bankruptcy court
where it languished in 1994.
Nor do NAF's relationships with persons self-identified as defense counsel for lenders
appear to be mere coincidence. In the letters described above, NAF appears to reflect
the published attitudes of its sponsor and "information Resource" Alan Kaplinsky. In an
article entitled "Excuse me, but who's the predator: Banks can use arbitration clauses
as a defense," Bus. Law. 24 (MayIJune 1998), attached as Exhibit 7 hereto, Kaplinsky
wrote that "Consumers have been ganging up on banks. But now the institutions have
found a way to defend themselves." Id. at 24. The article makes clear that mandatory
arbitration is this "defense" for financial institutions against consumer claims, and notes
that "Arbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action lawsuits. . . ." Id. 24-26. See also
Kaplinsky, "Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer Financial Services
Companies," Consumer Financial Services L. Report (1997) (Exhibit 8 hereto) ("[iln an
attempt to eliminate the risks inherent in litigation and discourage future lawsuits, many
consumer financial services companies have implemented arbitration programs."
(emphasis added) Consumers looking for truly neutral, independent decisionmakers
might well ask if Kaplinsky would recommend NAF to clients such as First USA, write
briefs (as here) for banking trade associations "applauding" NAF and lend his name to
NAF promotion as an "Information Resource," if he did not feel that NAF would serve
his twice-published objective of serving as a "defense" for lenders against consumer
lawsuits.
The facts set forth above relating to NAF's relationship with ITT Consumer Financial
("ITT") also suggest that NAF views its role as one to help defend lenders rather than to
neutrally judge consumer disputes. Shortly after ITT hired NAF to handle its disputes,
Anderson left his job of defending ITT against consumer suits and became one of NAF's
three principal officers and a 45% shareholder. Despite his prior role with ITT and his
prominence within NAF, however, NAF continued to handle ITT disputes, albeit in a
manner which suggests that it was not remarkably attentive to matters of conflict of
interest.5 Similarly, Anderson testified that he saw no problem in having an arbitration
company in which he owned 45% of the stock hear disputes involving another company
of which he was president. Exhibit 6 at 58. NAF's friendly handling of ITT cases is
further illustrated by Patterson v. ITT ConsumerFinancial Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563
(1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176 (1994). In that case, a California court refused to
enforce ITT's arbitration clause where it found that NAF's rules would have required the
consumer plaintiffs to travel from California to Minnesota to have their claims heard, and
would require a consumer with a dispute over a $2,000 loan to pay a minimum fee of
$850. The court noted that "the procedure seems designed to discourage borrowers
from responding at all."
Taken as a whole, these facts are not suggestive of a scrupulous attention to
independence, neutrality, or the appearance of propriety.
C. NAF'S CONDUCT IN THIS LITIGATION FURTHER SUGGESTS A
PREDISPOSITION TOWARDS THESE DEFENDANTS.

NAF's cooperation with the defendants in this case further illustrates its close
relationship with the financial services industry. While NAF refused to answer any of the
plaintiff's discovery requests in this case, asserting sweeping and novel privileges
(including a supposed "quasi-governmental entity" privilege),' at the same time it was
communicating ex parte with defense counsel to provide them with an affidavit
supporting their position. NAF's notion that it can testify for defendants but not answer
any questions about its testimony suggests not only a favoritism towards the
defendants, but also a disregard for rudimentary due process that can only be described
as troubling in a body that seeks to displace the civil justice system
Imagine an analogous setting, if defendants had filed a motion asking the chief judge of
a court to order a judge recused. Then, imagine, in this hypothetical, the trial judge and
the plaintiff's counsel talking and working together to create a coordinated response
opposing that motion. No one would doubt that such ex parte cooperation would be
improper. Yet the NAF which seeks to put itself in the place of the American civil justice
system has apparently engaged in just such contacts here.

D. THE ISSUE OF NAF LIKELY BIAS IS NOT MOOTED BY THE ASSERTED
INDEPENDENCE OF ITS ARBITRATORS.
Several of the defendants (and their amic) argue that it does not matter whether the
director and officials running the NAF are biased. Even if the principals of the NAF are
substantially biased in favor of financial services companies, these parties argue, it is of
no moment because the actual arbitrators are independent and neutral.
These remarkable arguments have no merit. The facts set forth above suggest that at
least three of NAF's principals and highest ranking officers (Anderson, Haydock, and
Brown) have effectively expressed a likely favoritism towards NAF's corporate clients
and against their customers. The record here demonstrates that these persons will have
ample ability to act upon those impulses.
For one thing, NAF's Director of Arbitration selects the arbitrator to hear a given dispute,
a power wh~chcontains enormous potential for abuse. Suppose that the local rules of
some court allowed plaintiff's counsel (but not defense counsel) to exercise the sole
power to select which judge of that court (or more appropriately, which member of that
court's bar) would hear a given case. Would anyone imagine that these defendants and
their banker amici would term such a procedure "neutral?" Of course not. In fact, the
case law discussed below establishes that any system allowing a biased party the sole
power to select an arbitrator is not fair or neutral, and cannot be allowed.
In addition to the power to select the arbitrator, the current version of the NAF rules (as
reviewed on NAF's website on January 20, 2000) extend all sorts of other crucial
powers to NAF's director and staff, refuting the claim that NAF bias "does not matter."
The Rules give the Director the ability to grant extensions (9.D), hear motions (18), alter
fees for intervention and hearings (19.B, 19.C), select arbitrators (21), decide requests
to disqualify arbitrators (23), set the length of hearings (26), issue orders, including at

his own initiative (38), request involuntary dismissal of a claim (41), waive fees (45),
request sanctions (46), interpret the code (48.A), and change the code (48.F).
II.WHERE THERE IS EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT A PARTICULAR
ARBITRATION SERVICE PROVIDER IS LIKELY TO BE BIASED IN FAVOR OF ONE
PARTY TO A DISPUTE, A CLAUSE REQUIRING THAT THE DISPUTE BE HANDLED
BY THAT PROVIDER IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNENFORCEABLE.
A. UNCONSCIONABLE ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE'UNENFORCEABLE.

The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is to "place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991). The FAA provides that a written arbitration provision covering a
contract involving commerce "shall be valid . . .save upon any grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2. Accordingly, the FAA provides
that arbitration agreements may be challenged and invalidated on any generally
applicable contract principle. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that state
contract law defenses such as unconscionability are available to a party challenging an
arbitration agreement. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996). Also, courts, not arbitrators, decide the validity of an arbitration provision.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
The proposition that courts shall not enforce arbitration clauses that are unconscionable
under a state's general law of contracts is not controversial, and courts regularly refuse
to enforce such arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165
(Cal. 1990); Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. App. 1999); lwen v. U.S. West
Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999); Williams v.Aefna Finance Co., 700 N.E.2d 859
(Ohio 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1357 (1999); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah
1996); Arnold v. United Companies Lending Co., 51 1 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1998).
Appellants and their amici argue that the District Court did not articulate sufficient
evidence to support its finding that the contract here was unconscionable. The District
Court's failure to explicitly identify various pieces of evidence is of little moment,
however, as "reversal is inappropriate if the ruling of the district court can be affirmed on
any grounds, regardless of whether those grounds were used by the district court."
Matter of Locklin, 101 F.3d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. A CLAUSE SENDING A DISPUTE TO A BIASED ARBITRATION SERVICE
PROVIDER IS UNCONSCIONABLE.

It is clear that arbitration clauses that require arbitration by non-neutral arbitrators are
unconscionable, and hence unenforceable.8 In Graham, for example, the California
Supreme Court concluded that "a contractual party may not act in the capacity of
arbitrator and a contractual provision which designates him to serve in that capacity is to
be denied enforcement on grounds of unconscionability." Graham, 623 P.2d at 177.
This is so because "irrespective of any proof of actual bias or prejudice, the law

presumes that a party to a dispute cannot have that disinterestedness and impartiality
necessary to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity regarding that controversy." Id. at
175 (citation omitted). Similarly, the court went on, a person cannot serve as arbitrator
if, even though he is not a party to the contract, his "interests are so allied with those of
[a] party [to the contract] that, for all practical purposes, he is subject to the same
disabilities which prevent the party himself from serving." Id. at 177. Concluding that the
designated arbitrator was in a position where it could not be expected to arbitrate with
the required degree of "disinterestedness and impartiality," the court declined to enforce
the arbitration provision before it. Id. at 178.
The California Supreme Court is by no means alone in refusing to compel arbitration in
settings where the arbitrators' neutrality were compromised.' In Hooters of America, lnc.
v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit refused to compel arbitration
in a case where an employer's arbitration rules were "crafted to ensure a biased
decisionmaker." Id. at 938. Noting that the employer had complete control over the
selection of two of the three arbitrators on a panel, to the point where even managers of
the employer could be on the list of arbitrators, the court noted that "the selection of an
impartial decisionmaker would be a surprising result." Id. at 939. Accordingly, the court
(which in general expressed fervent admiration for arbitration) held that the employer
had created "a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration," and thus held
that the employer had breached its contractual obligation to provide an impartial arbitral
forum. See also Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I , 743 F.2d 1187 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (arbitrator not independent where she or he was
to be picked by and paid by union); Cheng-Canindan v. Renaissance HotelAssocs., 57
Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied, 1997 Cal. LEXlS 817 (1997) (procedure
was so dominated by an employer that it did not even qualify as arbitration and would
not be compelled); Ditto v. Re/Max PreferredProperties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1993) (where only one party had a voice in selection of arbitrator, clause would not
be enforced); in re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1957) (not
enforcing an arbitration agreement between a real estate broker and his employer
because it appointed the employer's Board of Directors as arbitrator. This contravened
the "well-recognized principle of 'natural justice' that a man may not be a judge in his
own cause."); Board of Educ. v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439,443 (W. Va.
1977) (finding exclusive control over selection of arbitrators by one party inherently
inequitable). In these cases, courts presumed bias from connections between one party
and the arbitrators, but this case is even clearer, as the arbitrator has effective promised
certain results to one party.
C. THE QUESTION OF UNCONSClONABlLlTY IS TO BE DETERMINED BEFORE
AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS ENFORCED.2

As set forth above, unconscionable arbitration clauses are not enforced. The proper and
common practice is for a court to determine the unconscionability of the arbitration
clause at the time it is challenged, which is typically before the parties submit to
arbitration.

Defendants and their amici argue that this Court should hold that the neutrality of an
arbitrator may not be considered before the parties are forced to arbitrati0n.u E.g.
Insurers' Brief at 30-21, Bankers' Brief at 15. They support this proposition by drawing
upon a number of cases where a party seeks to have one arbitrator removed (so
another might take their place), a situation totally unlike this one, or cases taken from
the context of claims under 3 10 of the FAA, which provides that arbitration awards may
be vacated where the arbitrator displayed "evident partiality," or with cases from other
settings where the parties did not dispute the presence of an enforceable agreement.u
Since § 10 provides for judicial review of decisions that arbitrators have rendered, it is
not surprising that some courts identified by defendants and their amici have refused to
entertain § 10 challenges to an award until after the award has been entered. This fact
has nothing to do with the situation here, however, where a District Court refused to
enforce an arbitration clause that it deemed unconscionable, and where the District
Court questioned the neutrality of the arbitrator.
Where the existence of an enforceable agreement is challenged, courts have no trouble
prospectively refusing to enforce arbitration clauses where there are grounds to suspect
the neutrality of the arbitrator. In Hoofers, for example, the Fourth Circuit had no trouble
refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that (among other things) allowed one party
excessive control over the selection of the arbitrator Under the theory of defendants
and their amici, the Fourth Circuit erred, and should have waited until the arbitrators
selected by Hooters (even if they had been Hooters' managers) had ruled against the
waitress before considering whether those arbitrators might be biased in some way.

Ill. IF THIS COURT DOES NOT AGREE THAT THE ABOVE EVIDENCE
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES NAF'S BIAS, AND DOES NOT DENY THE MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION ON SOME OTHER BASIS, IT SHOULD REMAND FOR
FURTHER DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF BIAS.
As noted above, the plaintiff in this case sought discovery directed at questions of NAPS
bias. There was nothing remarkable about these requests, as courts have recognized
the right of plaintiffs to take discovery relating to factual issues posed by motions to
compel arbitration. See Berger v. Canfor Fitzgerald Securities, 942 F. Supp. 963
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); and Wrightson v. ITTFinancial Sews., 617 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1994).
Unfortunately, NAF stonewalled plaintiff's discovery requests, producing not one page of
documents and even refusing to identify its arbitrators. (Imagine the uproar if this Court
were to insist that the identity of its judges must be kept secret). NAF delayed its
responses until the discovery requests were moot.
The delay tactics succeeded only because the District Court determined that these
answers were unnecessary the motion to compel arbitration could be denied on the
basis of the existing record. If the District Court erred in that judgment, Baron and the
other class members should be glven an opportunity to complete their discovery. NAF
should not be permitted to benefit from its stonewalling.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs are entitled to have their claims heard by an impartial decisionmaker. NAF has
made plain that it does not fit that description. The District Court's concerns about NAF's
neutrality, and the unconscionability of defendants' arbitration clause, were well
founded.
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ENDNOTES

1 Kaplinsky is the "Partner-in-charge" of the Consumer Financial Services Group with
the law firm Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll. According to this firm's website, its
"Consumer Financial Services Group has developed one of the pre-eminent and largest
consumer financial services litigation . . . defense practices in the country, defending
banks and other financial institutions throughout the United States in class actions and
other complex litigation." He apparently has supported NAPS business for some time.
According to the 1998 deposition testimony of Clinton Walker, General Counsel of First
USA Bank, Kaplinsky was the person who convinced First USA to hire NAF as its
arbitration service provider. Walker Deposition, Exhibit 3 hereto, at 220-21.
2 The Bankers' Amicus Brief states at 13 that "[iln the experience of Amici, the NAF is a
nationally respected independent administrator of arbitrations"; "applaud[s]" NAF's
services and expresses "confiden[ceINin NAF's abilities.
3 The addressee of the letter was deleted when it was received by counsel for amici.
4 The Haydock Letter lists Randy Decker of ITT Consumer Financial as another of
NAF's "Information Resources."

5 NAF's amicus brief in this case boasts at 5-7 that a host of technology companies
have hired it to resolve disputes related to the Y2K issue. These statements take on a
very different tilt when viewed in the light of the Haydock Letter. Imagine a group of
similarly situated claimants with a legally sound, valid claim against a financial institution
arising from some negligence or error related to the Y2K issue. What confidence could
they have that NAF would fairly hear their claim, if they learned that NAF officials have
been telling defense counsel for lenders that NAF will guard lenders against the
consumer "class action bar" and will "prevent" the lenders from facing significant
liabilities in this setting?
6 We refer to two documents from the bankruptcy of Equilaw (NAF's corporate parent
as of 1994). In Exhibit 9 hereto, an Equilaw official proposes an arbitrator for an ITT
Commercial Finance Corp. case despite the fact that the arbitrator's law firm
represented three other ITT corporations. In Exhibit 10 hereto, this Equilaw official
proposed an arbitrator for another ITT case, even though the arbitrator then represented
in an "unrelated" case the law firm representing ITT in that case.
7 NAF's resistence of discovery is only part of its secretive ways. Rule 4 of the NAF
Code provides "Arbitration proceedings are confidential, unless the Parties agree
otherwise." This rule also provides that "A Party who improperly discloses confidential
information shall be subject to sanctions," which can include dismissal of a claim or
being required to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. NAF's rules also provide that no
person may attend a "Participatory Hearing Proceeding" who is not a party or their
attorneys or representatives, thus excluding the public and media from these hearings
no matter how important the subject matter may be to the public interest. As a result of
this secrecy, there is little realistic check against potential NAF abuses of discretion.
NAF could rule for banks in every single case it arbitrates (and thus give them a strong

incentive to continue to patronize NAF), but so long as the banks exercised their
unlimited right to confidentiality under NAF's rules, this fact would forever remain
"confidential" from consumers and the public.
8 In light of the fact that constitutional due process entitles parties to unbiased decisionmakers, see Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471,485-86 (1972), it should come as absolutely no surprise that courts would
find unconscionable arbitration clauses that designate arbitrators who are biased. In
fact, courts have not hesitated to impose prophylactic measures to assure arbitrator
neutrality, including the requirement that arbitrators disclose in advance any possible
conflicts to the parties. See Sanko S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Cook Industries, Inc., 495 F.2d
1260, 1264 (2d Cir. 1973); Barcon Assoc., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d
214, 220 (N.J. 1981).
Insisting that arbitrators be neutral is consistent with, and implicit in, the cases cited by
appellant and their amicifor the proposition that arbitration is favored, for the U.S.
Supreme Court has conditioned its preference for arbitration on the requirement that
arbitration offers remedies that are equal to those available in court. See Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 26 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.") See also Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 105 F.3d
1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmerrequires, at an
absolute minimum, that parties raising claims under Title VII be. provided with "a neutral
forum.") Surely the same is true for consumers with TlLA claims. Where (as here) the
neutrality of an arbitration service provider is likely compromised, arbitration is not just
another forum.
9 Amici do not concede the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement where
the terms were communicated to the consumer after the transaction was concluded.
10 No doubt it has struck defendants and their industry amicithat very few consumer
plaintiffs would be sufficiently resilient and financially well grounded to take their cases
all the way through a pointless proceeding before a biased arbitrator, only then to bring
a court challenge under § 10 of the FAA.
11 The cases cited by defendants are generally distinguishable from this setting. In
Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., I10 F.3d 892 (2d Cir. 1997), for example, plaintiffs
challenged a particular arbitrator. After holding that § 10 "does not provide for pre-award
removal of an arbitrator," the court acknowledged that "an agreement to arbitrate before
a particular arbitrator may not be disturbed, unless the agreement is subject to attack
under general contract principles 'as exist at law or in equity."' Id. at 895 (citation
omitted, emphasis supplied). See also Foles v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp.,
56 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff did "not dispute either that the arbitration
agreement is valid, or that his claims fall within it"); Diemaco v. Colt's Mfg. Co., Inc., 11
F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Conn. 1998) (party merely sought to have the "party-

designated arbitrator [removed] on the grounds that he is biased," but did not challenge
the arbitration agreement itself.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

David F. Capps and
Miriam G. Carroll,
Plaintiff ,

MBNA America Bank, N.A.
Defendant.

Case No. CV 05-36747
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Thursday, the 25th day of January
2007, at the hour of 12:00 p.m., is hereby set as the time for Oral
argument on the issue of whether or not 5 Delaware Code Section 956
should not apply to this dispute.

It provides a revolving credit

plan between a bank and an individual borrower shall be governed by
the laws of this state.

Argument is to be heard before the

Honorable John Bradbury, District Judge, in the District Courtroom
of the Idaho County Courthouse, Grangeville, Idaho. The court will
place the call.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Dated this 11th day of January 2007.

ROSE E .] GEHRING, CLERK
BY:

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk, do hereby certify that I
mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the following persons on
January 11, 2007:

David Capps
Miriam Carroll
HC 11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

ROSE I$. GEHRING, CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS
MIRIAM G. CARROLL
Plaintiff,

)

1

Case No. CV-05-36747

)

1

vs.

)
)
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON
APPLICABILITY OF
5 DEL. CODE 5 956

1

COMES NOW the plaintiffs, David F. Capps, and Miriam G. Carroll
(hereinafter "Capps and Carroll"), and submit their PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON
APPLICABILITY OF 5 DEL. CODE § 956 to this dispute as follows:

1.
BACKGROUND
Capps and Carroll have argued from the beginning of this case that the
Laws of the State of Idaho should apply, and not the Laws of the State of
Delaware. That MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "MBNA) has entered
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into the State of ldaho, solicited business in the State of ldaho, and thus
subjected itself to the Laws of the State of ldaho. The defendant, MBNA has
argued that the Laws of the State of Delaware should apply to this dispute and
not the Laws of the State of ldaho. Capps and Carroll have raised Delaware
Statute 6 Del. Code § 2708 which prohibits a Delaware choice of law provision in
contracts less than $100,000, leaving the agreements between MBNA and
Capps and Carroll without a valid choice of law provision. The court has
requested this hearing to take oral argument on the issue of whether or not 5
Delaware Code Section 956 should not apply to this dispute. Capps and Carroll
respectfully submit their brief in preparation for that hearing, and in support of
oral arguments to be presented.

28 IDAHO CODE 41-201
Title 28, Commercial Transactions, Chapter 41, General Provisions and
Definitions, Part 1, Section 102, Purposes - Rules of Construction of the ldaho
Credit Code provides that
"(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purpose and policies." That "(2) The underlying purposes and
policies of this act are:" . .. "(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices
by some suppliers of credit, having due regard for the interests of
legitimate and scrupulous creditors;"
The State of ldaho thus has a public policy of protecting its residents against
unfair practices by some suppliers of credit. Pursuant to that public policy and
the purpose of this act, Code § 28-41-106 states:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may not waive or
agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act."
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The scope and jurisdiction of the ldaho Credit Code is stated in 28-41-201
as follows:
"28-41-201. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this section, this act applies to sales and loans made in this
state and to modifications, including refinancings, consolidations, and
deferrals, made in this state, of sales and loans, wherever made. For
purposes of this act a sale, loan, or modification of a sale or loan is made
in this state if: ... (b) A consumer who is a resident of this state enters into
the transaction with a creditor who has solicited or advertised in this state
by any means including, but not limited to, mail, brochure, telephone, print,
radio, television, internet or any other electronic means."
Capps and Carroll were residents of the State of ldaho during the time
MBNA claims to have modified the cardholder agreement. MBWA has
participated in advertising by mail and television in this state, at the very least,
thus subjecting MBNA, under 28-41-201, to the Laws of the State of Idaho. 2841-201(8) states:
"(8) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the following
agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated
credit sales, regulated loads, or modifications thereof, to which this act
applies:
(a) That the law of another state shall apply;
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another
state; and
(c) That fixes venue."
Subsection (7) provides that this act does not apply if the buyer or debtor
is not a resident of the state of ldaho and the parties then agree that the law of
his residence applies. 28-41-201 provides that a modification to an agreement
with a resident of the State of ldaho will be controlled by the Laws of the State of
Idaho, and that any statement that the laws of another state apply, even if by
agreement or consent, are invalid. The venue shall be the State of ldaho
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The ldaho Credit Code (28-41-202) excludes the extension of credit to
government or governmental agencies or instrumentalities, the sale of insurance,
or transactions under public utility or common carrier tariffs if the U.S. regulates
the service, and licensed pawnbrokers. None of these exclusions apply to
MBNA
The laws of the State of ldaho apply and this court has jurisdiction under:
"28-41-203. JURISDICTION. The courts of this state may exercise
jurisdiction over any creditor with respect to any conduct of the creditor
subject to this act or with respect to any claim arising from a transaction
subject to this act."
Section 28-41-204 states:
"28-41-204. APPLICABILITY. This act shall apply only to credit
transactions for a consumer purpose, except for the following parts,
chapters and sections, which shall apply to credit transactions for any and
all purposes:
(1) Part 1, chapter 41, title 28, ldaho Code;
(2) ..."
Part 1, chapter 41, title 28, ldaho Code (28-41-107) provides that the act
applies to all creditors extending credit as a regular business which includes
MBNA. This act applies both because the transactions were for a consumer
purpose and because it applies to all credit transactions of creditors extending
credit as a regular business

THE DELAWARE STATUTES
If Delaware law applied, which it clearly does not, the two statutes in
question, 5 Del. Code 956 and 6 Del Code 2708 appear to be in conflict with
each other. 5 Del. Code 956 is specific in that it applies to revolving credit plans.
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6 Del. Code 2708 is specific in that it applies to contracts under a specific dollar
amount. So the rule of resolving such conflicts where the specific has
precedence over the general may be difficult to apply. On the other hand, newer
statutes have precedence over older statutes. 5 Del. Code 956 was enacted
during the 134'h General Assembly of the Delaware Legislature (1987 - 1988). 6
Del. Code 2708 was enacted during the 137'~General Assembly of the Delaware
Legislature (1993 - 1994), approximately six years after 5 Del Code 956. Under
the cannon of conflicts, 6 Del Code 2708 would have precedence over 5 Del.
Code 956.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The State of ldaho has a public policy of protecting the residents of ldaho
from the unfair business practices of some creditors by bringing the transactions
and modifications to these agreements under the laws of this state. MBNA's
approach of mailing out a notice of amendment to its agreement in its periodic
statement, knowing that 7 out of 8 consumers would not see the notice, and then
claiming that MBNA had a unilateral right to amend its cardholder agreement, is
just the kind of unfair practice that the ldaho Credit Code was created to combat.
ldaho courts do not recognize a unilateral right to amend any agreement for good
cause. This court should render its decision in this case based on ldaho law and
the rulings of the ldaho State Supreme Court, and not the laws of the State of
Delaware
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Dated this /$71Fday

of January, 2007.

Miriam G. Carroll, Plaintiff, in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David F. Capps, hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
my PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF 5 DEL. CODE 956 to the
the defendant by certified mail # 30QT (I 0082 7630 3J?%9
day of January. 2007, at the following a d d r f z :
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Attorney at Law
Wilson & McColl
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF 5 DEL. CODE § 956

-

6)

dJ

u Au
R

Pg. 6 of 6.

IDAHO COUNN DISTRICT COURT
FILED
AT~ o ~ c ~ o c K

6

P

David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

FEB &D 2007
URT

DEPW

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2005-36747
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY
OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE
IDAHO CREDIT CODE

1

v.
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2006-37320

1
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Defendant,

)
)

1
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COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter "Capps
and Carroll"), and submit their BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE
LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE and related matters as follows:

INTRODUCTION
This case is under reconsideration of the court's decision rendered on an
evidentiary hearing on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The court's
decision was based on Delaware law and MBNA America Bank's (hereinafter
"MBNA) unilateral amendment to its cardholder agreement. Subsequent to the
court's decision, the applicability of Delaware law was challenged by Capps and
Carroll citing 6 Del. Code § 2708. During a joint hearing held on January 25th,
2007 on the above cases, Capps and Carroll presented an additional challenge
to the Delaware choice of law provision based on the ldaho Credit Code. The
court requested additional briefing on the issue of 1) Idaho's ability to apply
Delaware law, and 2) to the applicability of the ldaho Credit Code to the facts in
these cases.
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the
MBNA cardholder agreement. The question is two-fold: 1) is the Delaware
choice of law provision valid under Delaware law, and 2) is the Delaware choiceof-law provision valid under ldaho law. The court posed the first question in its
notice of hearing on January 25th,2007 where it asked if 5 Del. Code § 956
should apply to this case. The answer is no. 6 Del. Code S2708, passed by the
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Delaware legislature 5 to 6 years after 5 Del. Code 3 956, prohibits contracts less
than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision, Thus, the
Delaware choice-of-law provision is not valid under Delaware law. More
importantly, the second question is answered by 28 ldaho Code 3 41-201(8)(a)
where the law of any other state is invalid under the ldaho Credit Code, and 28
ldaho Code $41-201(8)(b), which invalidates the buyer or debtor's consent to the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus the Delaware choice-of-law provision is also
invalid under ldaho law. The invalidation of the buyer or debtor's consent to the
jurisdiction of another state is reinforced in $ 28-41-106 which states:

"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may not waive or
agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act."
MBNA argues that "The ldaho Supreme Court in Ward v. PureGro Co.
expressly authorized contractual choice-of-law provisions similar to that
contained in the original credit card agreement between MBNA and the
Defendants." See Ward v. PureGro Co., 128 ldaho 366, 913 P.2d 582 (1996).
The choice-of-law provisions may be similar, but the contracts are not. The
contract in Ward v. PureGro was a "commercial" or "business" based contract,
primarily for a service (it was actually a settlement agreement reached as a result
of a business contract for services rendered). This type of contract is not
regulated by the State of ldaho, and does not fall under the ldaho Credit Code.
Thus the California choice-of-law provision was valid and enforceable. The
contract with MBNA is not a "business" contract, but a "consumer" contract which
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is clearly and strictly regulated by the State of ldaho under the ldaho Credit
Code.
The contract with MBNA falls under the ldaho Credit Code for the
following reasons:
1. "28-41-204. APPLICABILITY. This act shall apply only to credit
transactions for a consumer purpose, except for the following parts,
chapters and sections, which shall apply to credit transactions for any and
all purposes:
(1) Part 1, Chapter 41, Title 28, ldaho Code;
(2) ..."
2. "28-41-107. EFFECT OF ACT ON POWERS OF ORGANIZATIONS.
(1) This act prescribes maximum charges for all creditors, except those
excluded under section 28-41-202, ldaho Code, extendina credit as a
reqular business, including regulated credit sales, subsection (34)
[subsection (35)] of section 28-41-301, ldaho Code, and regulated loans,
subsection (37) [subsection (38)] of section 28-41-301, ldaho Code, and
displaces existing limitations on the powers of these creditors based on
maximum charges, except in insurance matters as prescribed by rule or
regulation of the department of insurance."
3. "28-41-201. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION. (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this section, this act applies to sales and loans made in this
state and to modifications, including refinancing, consolidations, and
deferrals, made in this state, of sales and loans, wherever made. For
purposes of this act a sale, loan, or modification of a sale or loan is made
in this state if: ... (b) A consumer who is a resident of this state enters into
the transaction with a creditor who has solicited or advertised in this state
by any means including, but not limited to, mail, brochure, telephone, print,
radio, television, internet or any other electronic means." (emphasis
added).
MBNA extends credit as a regular business, advertises through television and
mail in the State of ldaho, makes regulated loans and regulated credit sales to
residents of the State of ldaho such as Capps and Carroll who were (and still
are) residents of the State of ldaho at the time MBNA attempted to amend its
cardholder agreement to include arbitration. The ldaho Credit Code clearly
applies in this case.
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
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MBNA argues that cases such as Johnson v. Chase Manhaftan Bank USA,
N.A. 784 N.Y.S2d 921,2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 133, Edelisf v. MBNA America
Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001), Pick v. Discover Financial services, lnc., 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777,2001 WL 1180278 (D Del 2001), and Joseph v. MBNA
America Bank, N.A., 148 Ohio App. 3d 4090,775 N.E.2d 550 (2002) provide the
precedence for this court to base its decision on Delaware law and MBNA's claim
of the right to unilaterally amend its cardholder agreement. As established
above, both Delaware law and ldaho law invalidate the Delaware choice-of-law
provision in MBNA's agreement. ldaho law controls based on the ldaho Credit
Code, specifically:
"28-41-201(8) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the
followinq aareements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to
regulated credit sales, requlated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this
act applies:
(a) That the law of another state shall apply;
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another state;
and
(c) That fixes venue." (emphasis added).

CREDITORS REGULATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The ldaho Credit Code'provides that:
"28-41-102. PURPOSES - RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. (1) This act
shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purpose
and policies." That "(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act
are:" ... "(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices by some suppliers
of credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous
creditors;" (emphasis added).
MBNA argues that "The ldaho Credit Code was thereby not intended to be
applied universally to all creditors who transact business with ldaho residents.
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The ldaho credit Code is arguably intended to supplement the rights and
protections of ldaho debtors in situations where creditors are not those already
strictly regulated by the Federal Government." The implication is that regulated
lenders should be excluded from the ldaho Credit Code, yet regulated lenders
are specifically included under the ldaho Credit Code in 28-41-301(37), as are all
of their transactions in 28-41-301(36).
MBNA's argument closely parallels the argument of AT&T in Ting v.
AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Cal. 2002) in the U.S. District Court and the
appeal in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (gthCir. 2003). AT&T argued that it was
not subject to the California consumer protection laws because it was regulated
under the Federal Communications Act. This argument was soundly rejected by
the court. Contract related complaints are the purview of the state, not the
Federal Government. Contracts are not regulated by the Federal Government
but by the individual states. The State has both the power and the responsibility
to protect its residents.
Other states have been protecting their residents from the unfair business
practices of MBNA. In an April 28'h, 2006 decision, MBNA America Bank, N.A. v.
Lorefta K Credit (No. 94,380), attached as EXHIBIT A, the Kansas Supreme
Court struck down an arbitration award after MBNA failed to provide any proof of
an agreement to arbitrate. The Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] Title 9 U.S.C. § 13
requires that any motion or request for confirmation of an arbitration award
include the arbitration agreement. Specifically:
"9 U.S.C. § 13. Papers filed with order on motions; judgment; docketing;
force and effect; enforcement.
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
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The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an
award shall, at the time such order is filed with the clerk for the entry of
judgment thereon, also file the following papers with the clerk:
(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional
arbitrator or umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any,
within which to make the award.
(b) The award.
(c) Each notice, affidavit or other paper used upon an application to
confirm, modify, or correct the award and a copy of each order of the
court upon such an application." (emphasis added).
The agreement was not present in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Credit when
MBNA filed for confirmation, and was a major factor in the court's rejection of the
arbitration award. This is a condition which is also present in this case. MBNA
did not file the arbitration agreement with its request for confirmation of the award
letter against Capps or Carroll.
Other states have protected their residents from MBNA in a similar
manner. Ohio also dismissed MBNA's application to confirm an arbitration award
letter for the very same reason in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Berlin, 2005 WL
3193850 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.). Texas also denied MBNA's application to confirm
an arbitration award letter in MBNA America Bank v. Perese, 2006 WL 398188
(Tex.App.-San Antonio). Indiana dismissed MBNA's application to confirm an
arbitration award letter because MBNA waited more than one year to file for
confirmation in MBNA America Bank, N.A., 838 N.E.2d 475, 2005 lnd. App.
LEXlS 2261.
Capps and Carroll's case is also closely paralleled by a case in
Connecticut, where MBNA filed an arbitration action in the National Arbitration
Forum [NAF]. Teofil Boata, the Defendant, filed an objection to arbitration with
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the NAF and refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings based on no
agreement to arbitrate. The NAF issued the award letter anyway. When MBNA
came into Connecticut to confirm the award, the alleged arbitration agreement
was challenged. The trial court confirmed the award and the appellate court
reversed and remanded in MBNA America Bank, N.A.,

v. Boata, 893 A.2d 479,

2006 Conn. App. LEXlS 137. The appellate court's decision was based on a lack
of jurisdiction due to subject matter. The arbitrator did not have jurisdiction
without a court order confirming an agreement to arbitrate, an argument raised
by Capps and Carroll during reconsideration.

EFFECTIVE NOTICE AND THE NEGATIVE OPTION
MBNA argues that "MBNA properly amended its agreement pursuant to
Idaho Code §28-42-203." MBNA used what is referred to as a "negative option"
in its notification of the proposed arbitration clause in its cardholder agreement.
The "negative option" means that a cardholder does not have to actually do
something to "agree" to changes in the contract, but has to actively opt-out or
reject the proposed changes. AT&T used the same scheme in notifying
California residents of its new contract terms. The court in Ting (supra) found
that the Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) as a "negative option" process
was unenforceable for several reasons. Prime among them was the method of
notification. AT&T mailed the new contract terms in its monthly billing envelope
as a bill stuffer. AT&T's own research revealed that only 30% of its customers
would actually read the new contract terms. The Plaintiff in the Ting (supra) case
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commissioned its own study, referred to as the "Lake-Snell" survey where they
found only 10% to 13% of the respondents read the new contract terms. AT&T's
Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) was similar to MBNA's arbitration clause.
The court decided that the lack of proper notification, the negative option, and the
lack of reasonable options for the consumer rendered the arbitration clause in the
contract unconscionable and unenforceable. The gihCircuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Legal Remedies Provision (arbitration) was unconscionable and
unenforceable.
MBNA has used the same process. MBNA sent their proposed arbitration
agreement as a bill stuffer when they either knew, or should have known, that 7
out of 8 customers would not see the notification. The "acceptance" of the
arbitration provision was structured as a "negative option" and credit card
customers are left without a reasonable option, as almost all credit card
companies have incorporated arbitration clauses in their agreements. This
cannot be considered effective notice, or knowledgeable consent, rendering the
alleged arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Under ldaho case law, an agreement must represent a "meeting of the
minds" and both parties must agree as to the terms and conditions, or there is no
agreement. See Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107
ldaho 890,693 P.2d 1092 (1984),131 "No enforceable contract exists unless it
reflects a meeting of the minds and embodies a distinct understanding common
to both parties." The "negative option" does not fulfill the "meeting of the minds"
requirement, and there is no demonstrable common understanding or agreement
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on the terms and conditions with a "negative option". Under ldaho case law, the
MBNA arbitration agreement fails from ineffective notice and no "meeting of the
minds" and must be rendered unenforceable.
The ldaho Credit Code specifically authorizes a change in terms in openended consumer credit accounts (28-43-203 ldaho Code). This does not
authorize a unilateral amendment to the agreement, which is not allowed in
Idaho, (see Yellowpine Wafer User's Association v. Imel, 105 ldaho 349, 670
P.2d 54 (1983), [3] "One party cannot unilaterally change terms of a contract, and
attempts to add terms without consent of all parties are ineffectual.") nor does the
ldaho Credit Code authorize the addition of new terms to the agreement. All
agreements, and all modifications to existing agreements, require a "meeting of
the minds" and a common understanding of the terms by both parties. This
requirement is not present in MBNA's alleged arbitration agreement. This is
another example of the unfair business practices employed by MBNA.
MBNA's selection of the NAF is also an unfair business practice. In
Toppings, v. Meritech Mortgage Services, 569 S.E.2d 149 (W.Va. 2002)
numerous examples of NAF bias were submitted to the Circuit Court in Lincoln
County (a sample of which was submitted to this court in Capps and Carroll's
motion for reconsideration). That court invalidated the arbitration clause as it
stated:

"A compulsory arbitration clause or rider in a lender's form for consumer
transactions impinges on neutrality and fundamental fairness and is
unconscionable and unenforceable, where the lender-designated decision
maker is compensated through a case-volume fee system and the
decision maker's income as an arbitrator depends on continued referrals
from the creditor."
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
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This is also a condition which is present in this case. MBNA selected the NAF as
the arbitral forum for all of its disputes when it either knew, or should have
known, that the NAF was biased in favor of the corporate creditor. The
consumer had no input in the selection of the arbitration organization or the
arbitrator.
The "negative option" does not function to waive 7'h Amendment
protection of the right to a trial by jury. Since the right to a trial by jury is highly
favored, a waiver of the right to a jury trial will be strictly construed and will not be
lightly inferred or extended. See Nafional Acceptance Co. v. Myca Products,
inc., 381 F.Supp. 269 (1974) [ I ] "Right to trial by jury is a fundamental one and
courts will narrowly construe any waiver of the right and will indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 7."
Accordingly, a party seeking to enforce such a provision must demonstrate that
consent is both knowing and voluntary. See Howard v. Bank South, H.A., 433
S.E.2d 625 (Ga.App. 1993) [5] "Jury trial waiver which was contained in guaranty
agreement was not enforceable as consent to trial without jury; waiver could not
have demonstrated full understanding of all circumstances surrounding
relinquishment of known right when it was executed before facts and
circumstances underlying request for jury trial arose." Where the waiver clause
is buried inconspicuously in a contract such that the party's waiver could neither
be knowing or intentional, the waiver is deemed invalid. See Gaylord Dept.
Stores ofAlabama v. Stephens, 404 So.2d 586 (1981) [I]
"Where contract
between pharmacist and department store appeared to be a New Jersey form
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
-Pg11 of15.
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contract with boiler plate provisions, where the jury waiver provision was buried
in paragraph 34 in a contract containing 46 paragraphs, where the equality of the
bargaining power of the parties was questionable, and where it did not appear
that waiver by pharmacist was intelligently or knowingly made, provision waiving
jury trial in a prospective action between the parties did not constitute a proper
waiver of the right to trial by jury. Rules of Civil procedure, Rule 38(a); Const. §

11."
While MBNA's notice of arbitration may, on the face of it, appear to
constitute proper notice, the method of delivery of that notice had the same effect
as the notice being buried inconspicuously in a contract. With 7 out of 8
consumers not likely to see the notice, it cannot constitute a valid waiver of the
consumer's 7'h Amendment protection of the right to a trial by jury. MBNA cannot
demonstrate that the waiver of the right to a trial by jury in the alleged arbitration
agreement was knowing and voluntary. The "negative option" by its very nature
fails to demonstrate either a knowing or a voluntary waiver of the right to a trial by
jury, and as such the alleged arbitration agreement must also fail.
The court may find it instructive that New Jersey has had experience with
the same schemes used by MBNA. In this case the bank is Discover. In
DiscoverBank v. Shea, Clearinghouse No. 53,553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Division,
Oct. 26, 2001), unpublished (attached as EXHIBIT B), Discover claimed a
unilateral right to amend the cardholder agreement to include arbitration under
Delaware law Title 5 § 952, just as MBNA has done. Notification was done in the
same manner as MBNA, via the periodic statement as a "bill stuffer." The New

BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
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Jersey court rejected Discover's demand to compel arbitration on several
grounds. New Jersey, like ldaho, does not allow unilateral amendments to
existing agreements. The New Jersey court, following California's lead, just as
Capps and Carroll have argued for ldaho, rejected the notion that a consumer's
silence can constitute a waiver of the substantive right to a jury trial, in effect
nullifying the "negative option" described above. The New Jersey court stated,
"Both New Jersey and California, rely on basic contract principles in interpreting
arbitration clauses; both hold only a mutual agreement to arbitrate can be
enforced.
The New Jersey court also stated, "While Discover's credit card
agreement provides that Delaware law applies, the Delaware law clearly violates
New Jersey Public policy and under New Jersey law that choice of law provision
cannot be given effect." This is the same effect the ldaho Credit Code has in this
case.

CONCLUSION
Through the above examples, it should become clear to the court that
MBNA is employing precisely the type of unfair practices the ldaho Credit Code
is intended to curtail. ldaho has a strong public policy of protecting its residents
from the type of unfair practices MBNA is using. State after state is realizing that
the imposition of unfair arbitration through ineffective "negative option" notices
and unilateral amendments to agreements, where the cardholder has little, if any,
options, is not acceptable. State after state is striking down MBNA's and other

BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE W A N D THE IDAHO
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bank's attempts to unfairly modify their cardholder agreements to gradually erode
and eliminate the rights of their cardholders, moving them into a system of unfair
arbitration (as with the NAF) effectively controlled by the banks through the
promise of a wealth of repeat business. Capps and Carroil therefore urge this
court to change its previous decision regarding an agreement to arbitrate to
determine that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate, and subsequently vacate
the two NAF award letters against Capps and Carroll.
Dated this

h

L s+k

day of February, 2007.

c--t\

6-

Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of this BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO
CREDIT CODE to the attorneys for the DefendantsIPlaintiffs by Certified Mail #
7006215000034551 1057(Wilson)and#7006215000034551 1064(Bishop)
this 1 s+h day of February, 2007 at the following addresses:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
William L. Bishop
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle. WA 98101
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 94,380
MBNA AMERICA BANK. N.A.
Appellant:

LORETTA K. CREDIT
Appellee,
SYLLABUS BY TI-IE COURT

1. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award may be challenged through a motion to vacate
filed within 3 months after the award was filed or delivered. The federal act is silent on the proper
methods for filing or delivery. The Kansas version of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides that the
arbitrators shall deliver a copy of the award to each party personally or by registered mail, or as
provided in the parties' arbitration agreement. Any application to vacate the award must be made within
90 days after delivery of the award to the applicant.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act requires a party moving to confirm an arbitration award to attach a copy
of the agreement to arbitrate to the motion.
3. An appellant must designate a record on appeal regarding an arbitration award that is adequate to
substantiate contentions made to the reviewing court. Without an adequate record, any claim of alleged
error fails.
4. On the record in this case, the district court was empowered to vacate the asbitration award
Appeal from Butler district court; CHARLES M. HART, judge. Opinion filed April 28, 2006. Affirmed.
DavidJ. Weirner, ofKramer & Frank, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Jason J
Lundt, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.
Loretta K. Credit, appellee, argued the cause and was on the brief pro se
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEIER, J.: This appeal arises out of a district court's decision vacating an arbitration award and its ruling
that no arbitration agreement existed between plaintiff MBNA America Bank (MBNA) and defendant
Loretta K. Credit.
MBNA submitted a dispute regarding what it alleged to be defendant Credit's credit card debt in excess
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of $21,000 to arbitration. Credit's pariicipation in the arbitration was limited to sending a letter to the
arbitrator, objecting to the proceeding because she believed there was 110 agreement to arbitrate. There is
no copy of this letter in the record on appeal or ally information about how, if at all, Credit's objection
was considered in the arbitration.

Tile record does reflect that, on September 7,2004, an arbitration award in the amount of $21,094.74
was entered in favor of MBNA. The award, which states "the Parties entered into an agreement
providing that this matter shall be resolvcd through binding arbitration," was signed by arbitrator Henry
Cox and by Ilarold Kalina, Director of Arbitration for the National Arbitration Forum in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. The fact that the same date appears on the document near each signature, when Cox and
Kalina would have been in two states distant from one another is unexplained.
The award also contains the followi~lglanguage above the signature of Kalina:
"ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby certifies that a copy of this Award was sent by first
class mail postage prepaid to the parties at the above referenced addresses on this date."
Other than this language, there is nothing in the record 011 appeal tending to show that Credit received a
copy of the award or, if so, when. Credit acknowledged at oral argument before this court, however, tbat
the address set forth for her on the award was correct at that time. She said she did not know whether she
ever received a copy.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, Credit would have had 3 months after the award was "filed or
delivered" in which to challeilge it. 9 U.S.C. 5 12 (2000). The federal act is silent on the proper metllods
for filing or delivery of the award. The Kansas version of the Uniform Arbitration Act is somewhat more
specific. "The arbitrators shall deliver" a copy of the award "to each party personally or by registered
mail, or as provided in the agreement." K.S.A. 5-408(a). Any application to the court to vacate a11 award
"shall be made within ninety (90) days after dclivery of a copy of the award to the applicant." 1C.S.A. 5412(b).
It 1s undisputed that Credit did uothing to respond to the award at issue in this case until MBNA filed a
motion to confirm it in late December 2004 in the district court in Butler County. When notified of
MBNAts motion to confirm, Credit filed several pro se pleadings, which, MBNA concedes, may be read
together to constitute a motion to vacate the award. In these pleadings, Credit again asserted that there
was no arbitration agreement between her and MBNA. In an affidavit filed with the district court, she
specifically said that MBNA had not provided her with a copy of the alleged agreement. MBNA had not
attached a copy of any agreement to its motion to confirm the award, although the Federal Arbitration
Act requires a copy to be attached. No copy of any agreement appears anywhere else in the record on
appeal.
Approximately 6 weeks after Credit filed her responsive pleadings, and a day after the district court
judge resolved a discovery dispute in her favor, he vacated the arbitration award, ruliug that "there is 110
existing agreement between the parties to arbitrate and therefore the award entered against Defendant is
null and void."
011 this

appeal, MBNA advances various arguments on what it characterizes as three issues. We discern
question: Did Credit's effort to thwart confirmation of the award come too late? If so,
but one controlli~~g
the district court did not have authority to vacate
the award. If not, the district court had the authority it
-

!
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needed to enter its rulings.
Before addressing this issue, we note that MBNA takes the position that the Federal Arbitration Act, see
9 U.S.C. 5 1 et seq. (2000), is controlling. It nevertheless invokes the Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act,
see K.S.A. 5-401 et seq., and Kansas cases. MBNA also acltnowledges that Kansas procedure governs
as long as it is not in conflict with substantive federal law. See U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2; Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. l , 7 9 L. Ed. 2d 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984). We have therefore evaluated both federal
and state law as well National Arbitration Forum rules when relevant to our resolution of this case.
The record before us is extremely sparse. MBNA's argument on the tilneliness of Credit's motion to
vacate the award is doomed both by what it fails to contain and what it does contain. An appellant must
designate a record onappeal regarding an arbitration award that is adequate to substantiate contentions
made to the reviewing court. K.S.A. 5-401 et seq., 5-412(a), 5-418(a)(3), (b); Rural Water Dist. No. 6 v.
Ziegler Corp., 9 Kan. Aplp 2d 305, Syl. 7 4,677 P.2d 573, rev. denied 235 Kan. 1042 (1984); see also
Unrau v. Kidron Bethel Retirement Services, Inc., 271 Kan. 743,777,27 P.3d 1 (2001). Without an
adequate record, any claim of alleged error fails. In re B.MB., 264 Kan. 417,435, 955 P.2d 1302
( 1 998).
We uote first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness in challenging the award if the arbitrator
never had jurisdiction to arbitrate and enter a1 award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows such
jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court
before the arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402.
All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently timely objection to the
arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this objection is in
the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral argument before this court that his client "probably" has a
copy oTt11e objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to demonstrate that t l ~ eobjection was
somehow ineffective to trigger its responsibility to seek court illtervention to compel arbitration. See 9
U.S.C. S 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a demonstration, we, like the district court, have no
choice but to accept Credit's version of events.
tinder both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to
MBNA to litigate the issue of the agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. Neither
MBNA, as the party asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator was simply free to
go forward with the arbitration as though Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do
SO.

" I f there is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to decide whether the
agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate.

"Under either t l ~ eFederal Act or the Kansas Act, the arbitrator's power to resolve the dispute must find
its source in the agreement between the parties. The arbitrator has no independent source ofjurisdiction
apart froin consent of the parties. . . . Dreyer, Arbitration Under the Kansas Arbitration Act: The Role of
the Courts, 59 J.K.B.A. 33,:s (May 1990).
"Substantive arbitrability is concerned with the question of whether the parties have contractually agreed
to submit a particular dispute to arbitration. The courts decide this question because no one must
arbitrate a dispute unless he has so consented." (59 J.K.B.A. at 35 n.42 quoting Denhardt v. Trailways,
-. .
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Inc., 767 F.2d 687, 690 [loth Cir. 19851).
The record, such as it is, also undercuts ally assertion that Credit was properly served with a copy of the
award. Tlle Aclcnowledglnel~tand Certificate of Service signed by Kalina states oilly that the award was
served on September 7, 2004, by first class mail, postage prepaid U~llessthe parties' agreement to
arbitrate-which, agaln, is not in the record-provided for this method of service, it did not meet the clear
requiremeilt of K.S.A. 5-408. We are not willing, despite MBNA's urging, to apply any coinmoll law
presumption of receipt of a docume~~t
after first class, postage prepaid mailiilg when there is a statute
that appears to dictate specific alternate methods for service.
The I<ansas statute also requires that Credit have been served by "the arbitrators," and it is unclear
exactly what Kalina's personal role in the arbitration, if any, was. See K.S.A. 5-408. He may have
qualified as one of "the arbitrators," but the ambiguity of the award itself leaves room for a contrary
argument.
Also, in the absence of proof in the record of proper service of a copy of the award on Credit on any
date, it is obvious that ncither the district court judge nor we could have arrived at the conclusion that
proper service of the award was effected on a date more than 3 months or more than 90 days before
Credit filed her first pro se pleadings to vacate the award. A copy of the award must have been properly
served on Credit by that time in order for MBNA's timeliness argument to have any merit.
As mentioned above, MBNA failed to attach a copy of the arbitration agreement to its motion to confirm
the award. This violated the Federal Arbitration Act for which MBNA intermittently expresses respect.
See 9 U.S.C. 5 13 (2000). This alone would have justified the district court in its decisioil to deny
MBNA's motion to confirm the award.
Should the district court have taken the additional step of vacating the award on the scanty record before
it? That action was proper as well. I11 addition to failing to attach a copy of the agreement to arbitrate
when it filed its motion to confirm, MBNA filed no response to Credit's various pleadings adding up to a
motion to vacate. Its only further pleading was a lnotioil for protective order and suggestiolls in support
when she sought discovery. The filings on the protective order issue asserted entitlement to
confirmation, but they did so primarily because of the tilneliiless issue, which, on this record, is without
merit.
In these circumstances, K.S.A. 5-412(5) permitted Credit to tile a timely motion to vacate and raise the
argument that no arbitration agreement existed. MBNA made no legally sufficient response to her
arguments. Approximately 6 weeks passed. The district court judge finally ruled in Credit's favor.
MBNA's assertion that this ruling came without warning or adequate time for response also is without
merit. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err.
Finally, we note that a panel of our Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in
another case involving MBNA's efforts to arbitrate a dispute. See MBNA America Bank v. Barben, No.
92,085, unpublished opinioil filed May 20,2005. We also note that these Kansas cases appear to reflect
a natioilal trend in which consumers are questioning MBNA and whether arbitration agreements exist.
See e.g., MBNA America Bank, N A . v. Boata, 94 Conn. App. 559, 893 A.2d 479 (2006); MBNA
America Bank, N.A. v. Rogers, 838 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. App. 2005); MBNA America Bank, N A . v. Hart,
710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 2006); MBNA Am. Bank, MA. v. Terry, 2006 WL 513952 (Ohio); MBNA
America Bank, N.A. v. Berlin, 2005 WI, 3193850 (Ohio App.); MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Perese,
2006 WI, 398 188 (Texas App.). Given MBNA's casual approach to this litigation, we are not surprised
that the trend may be growing.

-- MBNA America Bank v
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Affirmed.

END
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Defendant, James B. Shea, is a plaintiff in a class action
filed in California on behalf of Discover's credit card customers
who were allegedly charged improper overlimit fees by Discover.
Mr. Shearsindividual claim is less than $100, but the class claims
a r e alleged

to be in the tens of millions.

Mr. Shea alleges two

types of wrongful conduct by Discover in the California Action:
1.

Incorrect identification of "available creditN on the

credit cardholders' monthly statements which results in cardholders
seten incurring improper overlimit fees.
2,

Incorsect ''minimum payment due" figures on card holders'

nonthly statements which, is often not sufficient, even if timely
.?aid, to avoid the imposition of an overlhit fee.
Based on these allegations, #r. Shea asserts claims in the
c:alifocnia Class Action for breach of contract, tortious breach 02
the implied covenant of good f&ith and fair dealihg, fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation, and deceptive business practices.

The New Jersey action

was institutedby Discover by way of an

Clrder to Show Cause seeking relief that would effectively block the
C:alifornia Class Action. Discover seeks to force James B. Shea to
qndlvidually arbitrate his $100 claim.

m e original agreement
for arbitration.

Discover seeks to compel arbitration based on an "amendment"
its credit card agreements which it purported

to make

which abrogates Mr.

.

I'

I

Shea's right to trial and right to bring a class action. Mr. Shea
claims, by way o f certification that he never noticed the "bill
stuffex" amendment; had he been aware of the acbitration provision,

he would not have agreed to it.
UNDER NEW JERSEY LbrW THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL CANNOT BE
J ? A m D BY UNfLATERAI, "BILL STWFER" AMENRMEN1:

The courts in New Jersey rely on basic contract principles in
interpreting arbitration clauses; only those disputes Eor which
here is a ~ t u a 1agreement to arbitrate can be compelied to

rbit~ation. See Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Gal.arza, 306 N. J.
uper. 384, (App.Div. 1997).

.J. Super.

397,

Sea

also prick towns hi^ Municiual

(App.Div. 1979);

PilLs v.

J,

Daunoraa

, 278 N. J. Super, 373, 377 (App-Div. 1995); &
0 N.J.

221, (1979)r and Rasserman v. Kovatch, 261 N.J. Super. 277,

84, (App.Div. 1993).
New

Jersey Courts also do not pernit unilateral amendments to

xlsting agreements to change material terms. In Countv o f Morris
153 N.J. 80, (1998) the court held that unilateral
tatements or actions made after an agreement has been reached or
ded to a completed agreement clearly do not serve to modify the

iginal terms of a contract, especial.1~where the other. party
does
.
t have knowledge of the changes} knowledge and assent are
sential to an effective modificatioh. see also New Jersw
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0;Connsll. 300 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1991).

In Harchak v . C1arid.e

Commons. Inc., 134 N . J . 275, (1993) the

court held a contractual provision in which a consumer elects
arbitration as the exc2t1sive remedy, must be read in light of its

effect on the' consumer's right to sue,

clause depriving a

citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose.
The point is to assure that the parties know that in electing

arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time2

onored right to sue.

'

No New Jersey case has directly decided the issues of validity
f a unilateral "bill stuffer" change to a credit card agreement;

owever, California courts have in the well reasoned decision of

,

79 Cal.Rptr 2d 273 (1998).

Bank of

erica sought to add an arbitration clause to its existing account
greements by sending its customers a "bill stuffer" with their
onthly account statements, notifying them of a new arbitration
lause, just as Discover: sought to do here.

Bank of America

urported to do so under the "change of terms" provision in its
ciginal agreement, which provided that Bank of America could
ange any 'term,

condition, service or feature'' of a customer1$

ccount .
The court held that Bank of Amesica could npt unilaterally add
e arbitration clause to existing account agreements, and

the clause was not enforceable. The court acknowledged
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements (which is

[ually applicable under California law as it is under New Jersey
w),

but: noted that in order to be enforceable, both must have

nsented to arbitrate. The court stated at page 790:
"That: poLicy Ct'avoring alternative depute resoluttonf,
whose existence we readily acknowledge, doee not even
come into play unlasa it is first determined that the
Bank's cuatamers agreed to use so- form of AllR to
resoLve didputes regarding their deposit and credit cazd
aocounts, and that: determination, in turn, requires
analysis of the account agreements in light of ordinary
litate law principles that govern the formation and
intawretation of contracts."

The court went on to hold that the change of terms provision

the original customer agreements, which did not address how
sputes were to be resolved, did not contemplate that an
bitration clause could be added. The &&& court, at page 800,
ted that, "[ilmportankly, no 'term, condition, s t ? r v i ~ @ or
,
aturer in the original credit account agreement addressed the
thod or forum for resolving legal claims related to customer
;aunts."

In interpreting this contract language which the court

m d to be anbiguous, the court held at page 801:

\!bur focus is on whether the wards of the original
acabunt agreements tnean that the Bank's customere, by
agreeing to a unilateral change of terns provision,
intended to give the Bank the power in the future to
terminate its austomersl existing right to have disputes
resalved in the civil justice system, including their
consCitutionally based right to a jury trial. In our
view, the obgect, nature and subject matter of these
agregments strongly support the conclusion that the
customers did not so intend, and that they, as promisors
with respect to the change of this proviaion, had no
inkling that the Bsnk understood the provision
differently.

The court in &+&&@ also found it significant that in order to
nd that the original account agreements authorized the addition
the arbitration clause, khe court would have to assume that the
stomers "intended to permit a modification that would amount to
iver of their constitutio~aLlybased right to a j u r y trial." Id.
803-04.

The court rejected this contention, finding "no

ambiguous and unequivocal waiver of the right: to a jury trial
ther in the language of tha change of terms provision or in any

her past of the original account agreements."

Idrat 805. The

u r t also found nQ waiver of the right to a 3ury trial in
$tomersr failure to close their accounts or in continuing to use
e i r accounts after receipt of the bill stuffer announcing the

endment. The court held at page 806:
%3ecausewe find no unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of
that right hexe, and beCauee the right to select a
judiaial forum, whether a bench trial or a jury trial, as
distinguiehed frotn arbitration or scam other nethod of
dispute resolution, is a substantial right not lightLy to
be deemed waitred (aibtions omikted), the Bank's
interpretation of the change of terms provision must: ha
rejected."

The &&& court was ale0 concerned w i t h the Bank's claim that
had the WilateraL attd nonnegotiable right to vary every aspect

the perfomance required by the parties to the account
eementa. The Court suggested that the Bank's interpretation Of
r broadly it could exercise its rights, with no limitation on the

mtantive nature of the changes it could make, would virtually
iminate the good faith and fair deaiing tequirement from the

Bank's r e l a t i o n s h i p with i t s c r e d i t account customers, and would
open the door t o a Claim t h a t the agreements a r e i l l u s o r y .

/

applving

the

persuasive

reasoning

of

the

&&g

case,

( ~ i s c o v e r ~u sn i l a t e r a l attempt t o amend i t s o r i g i n a l cardholder

I

The

agreement t o include an a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e i s i n e f f e c t i v e .

(original agreement here, i i k e the agreement i n B B b g , contains no

I
1.

relevant provisions about how disputes a r e t o be resolved.

There

\is no arguable language t h a t i n any way suggests the agreement

auld allow a fundamental change, a s t h e waiver of t r i a l b y s j u r y ,

bithout t h e express consent of both p a r t i e s .

The change of terms

brovision i n t h e o r i g i n a l agreement s t a t o r Discover may "chanqg any

I
I

e r n or p a r t of ttbis Agreement," but goes on t o c l a r i f y exactly

.,

b a t types o f chaniJes it: can make by s p e c i f i c Language.

New Jersey law i s similar t o ~ a l i f o r n i alaw w i t h respect t o
Both
a.

New

contract p r i n c i p l e s

in

911 of the f a c t o r s r e l i e d upon by t h e c o u r t i n

P

,

ersey

and C a l i f o r n i a

r e l y on b a s i c

k e r p r e t i n g a r b i t r a t i o n clavaes; both hold only a mutual agreement

10 a r b i t r a t e

can be enforced.

See

plamo Rent. A Car, 1nc.

V-.

I a l a r z a , Super. As t h e court i n Brick Township M l n i ~ i v a lI J r i l i t i e q
t h o r i t v v. Divessified R. 8 .
eper.397.

402 A

p

&

T.

Construction Co.,

171 N.J.

i 1979) s t a t e d :

\\While publia p o l i a y favors the arbitration psoceae, and
contracts should be read liberally to find arbitrability
i f reasonably possible, there survives the prinaipls that
the authoriw of the a r b i t r a t o r i s derived from the
mutual a S S B n t of the partie8 t o the terms of submiasion;
the p a r t i e a are bound only t o the e x t e n t , and i n the
manner, and under the circumstanaes pointed out i n their

/

aq~errunt,and no further."
See also Mills v. J. Daworas Construction, X%,

278 N.J. Super.

373, 377 (App.Div. 1998); In the Matter of Grover and Universal,

Underwriters Ihsurance ComDanv, 80 N.Y. 221 (1979) ("In the absence
o f a consensual understanding, neither party is entitled to force

the other to arbitrate their dispute."); Wasserstein

v.

Kovatch,

*

261 N.J. Super. 277, 284, (App-Div.1993) ("It is axiomatic that a
person cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute with another
.?arsonunless there is a mutual agreement to do so.") and Fairfield,
,;eas ina Corvora~ion.
v. Techni-Graahics. Inc., 256 N.J. Super. 538
(Law Div. 1992) the court held a non-negotiated jury waiver clause

.:hat appears inconspicuously in a standardized form contract
bntered into without assistance of counsel, should not be enforced.

/

These principles of law as set forth by the New Jersey courts

+

dre the same principles relied upon by the California courr in the
'e decision.

Therefore, this Court finds the

@
&,,&

reasoning

dervasive and applicable.

I

principles of
~issoverarternprsto avoid &&Us and the similar
. .

-

aw Jersey law by arguing that, under Dekware law (namely, 5 pel.

. S:

..H.

952), it

was permitted o make such a unilateral addition to
O

U

.*.

a

agreement,
While Discover's credit card agreement provides that Delaware

."
Delaware law clearly violates New Jersey Public

licy and under New Jersey law that choice of law provision cannot

given effect.

Ib

New Jersey, the unilateral addition of an

+;.

: b i t r a t i o n agreement ink0 a contract. of adhesion cannot be given
!gal e f f e c t ,

I n F a i r f i e l d Leasina Corporation v. Techni-Graohlcs, Inc.,
lpra, the court refused t o apply a New York law provision on t h e
;sue of jury waiver.

The court a t page 544 quoted Professor

~bert:A. Leflar:
"Even an express pzovision i n a aontxaot s t a t i n g an
inkent t h a t it be governed by the laws of a named s t a t e
m a y be held n o t t o axpxess the real i n t e n t of t h e
p a r t f e s . Such a stated i n t e n t should be dieregarded when
i t i s contained i n an adhesion oontract auah as the f i n e
p r i n t i n an insurance policy prepared by one o f t h e
p a r t i e s p r i m a r i l y f o r h i s own advantage and inserted
without the a c t u a s knowledge of t h e o t h e r p a r t y .
At
l e a a t air)is t r u e i f t h e court i s Looking Eo'or t h e a c t u a l
i n t a n t , i f any, o f both t h e p a r t i e e .
ff the s t a t e d
i n t e n t i s a purposeful atatembnt joined i n by both
p a r t i e s , ao that: they aan know i n advance what law w i l l
govern their t r a n s a c t i o n and e f f e c t u a t e it, t h e r e i s much
good sense i n a rule w h j i o h make8 such a genuine 'mutual
i n t a n t contkolling. This good sense is, hornwar, l i m i t e d
to t h e cases where t h e staked intent: i a a r e a l one.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law, p. 302 (JR' ed. 1977).
To deviate from the law as described by Professor Leflar
would be i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e publla p o l i c y of t h i s State
a s t h a t concept has b&n a r t i c u l a t e d i n Kenningsen,
supra, 32 N. J. a t 403-404, 161 A.2d 69, and its progeny."
The court wenk on t o void t h e choice of law provision i n p a r t
cause it: was n o t conspicuous ahd stated a t 256 N.J.

Super.. 538,

"Although the Code does not expressly r e q i r e t h a t choiae
of law provisions be conspicuous, i t seems t o m e that a
contractual d o i c e of l a w provision raise6 a unique
problem i n c o n k a o t l a w . The meaning of the rest o f the, .
contkact may be gleaned simply be c a r e f u l reading.
However, t h e incorporation i n a contracrt of another
s t a t e 1 s e n k i r a body of l a w a f f e c t i n g the r i g h t s and

liabilities of the parties may have serious conaequencas
which are eesentially unknowable to the layman, It is
euxely a minimal imposition, if any, on the freedom of
contraat to construe the Code ao as to require that
choiae of law provisions be 'consgiauoust as that conaept
is defined in N.J.S.A.
1ZA:l-201.(10) ,
The Code
specifically requires conspicuousness for warxant-y
disclaimere, and, as not&, the Appellate Division in
Herdaman v. Eaabnm X(ad8.k Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 330
A,2d 384 (App. DSv. 1 9 7 4 ) , extended that requirement to
limitations of remedy under N.3.S.A. 12ar2-719. In my
view, choice o f law provisions are at least as important
as provision limiting remedies, and ahould be similarly
treated in centracts of adhesion. Consequently, Z find
the choice of law provision in t h i s contract to be void.#
The choice of law provision in Discover's agreement is far

om conspicuous.

It is contained in the final paragraph of the

iginal cred~tcard agreement (paragraph 2 4 ) , and it is in the
me font and print as the body of the agreement (some other
svisions are more conspicuously in bold). Clearly, Delaware Law,
5er the holding of Fairfield, should not be enforced.

An ordinary choice of law analysls mandates the same result;.
d

Jersey courts apply the "most significant relationship t e s t r of

;Restatement

(Second} Conflict of Lawq

ich state's

laws apply,

§§

6 and 188 to determine

See Gilbert Svrwance Comoanv v.

vlsvlvania ManuIacturersr As~ociationInsurance Comaanv, 134 N. J.

,

102-03

(1993).

The relevant considerations include: the

[ties domiciles or residences; the places of incorporation and
nces of business of the parties; the place of contractingr the
nee of perfomahce; the relevant policies of the form: the
i.evant policies of other interested states and the relative

:crests of those states with respect to the particular issue: the

lproteotion of justified expectations; and the ease in the
Ibstemminalion and application of the law to be applied.

An

analysis o;E these factors mandates an application of New Jersey
law.

Mr. Shea is a New Jersey resident who entered into his

1.

contract with Discover in New Jersey; the contract was accepted in
New Jersey; Mr. Shea receives'his bills and makes his payments in

ew Jersey and therefore performs his part of the contract: in New
ersey;

The subject matter of the contract (the credit card) is

2.

P

ocated in New Jersey;
New Jersey has strong policy interests in protecting its

3.

kitizensr rights to sue in court as well as their rights to jury
:rials.

The waiver of rights must be clear, knowing, informed,

rrithout coercion and unequivocal.

Delaware has no legitimate

:.aterests in having its law in this regard applied:
While Discover i s located in Delaware, Delaware has a much

4.

:.ess significant relationship to Mr. Shea's claims than does New
i.erBey.

Clearly, New Jersey law applies with tespect to the issue of

~
ktiether Discover could unilaterally add an arbitratioh C L ~ U Sto
r

Shea's agreement.

Under New Jersey Law, which is in all

elevant respects identical to California law, Mr. Shea should not
j e forced to arbitrate his claims.
n
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Discover has argued t h a t , while Mr. Shea did not a f f i r m a t i v e l y
waive h i s r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l , he "consenteti" t o the amendment by

f a i l i n g t o Close h i s .account and f a i l i n g t o infofm Discover t h a t he
d i d not want t o be bound by t h e a r b i t r a t i o n provision and by
ht,

which was r e j e c t e d by the

court i n &&4,i s also r e j e c t e d by th.is court as without merit.
The amendment t o t h e agreement was included with a monthly
tatemen'c, as a " b i l l ~ c t u f f e r "and not seen by M r . Shea.

M r . Shea

i d not have an unconditional. "rightf' t o opt out of the a r b i t r a t i o n
l a u s e since Discover adrnits t h a t it wouuL have closed M r . Shea's
ccount i f he had not agreed t o be bound by t h e a r b i t r a t i o n clause.

M r . Shea has a s u b s t a n t i a l investment i n the c r e d i t he has
eveloped with Discover.

ff Mr.

Sheaf s c r e d i t with Discover was

enninated, he would have had t o apply f o r new czedit, which may
o t have been p o s s i b l e t o o b t a i n .

he'

p o t e n t i a l l o s s of c r e d i t

hich would have accompanied a r e j e c t i o n of t h e a r b i t r a t i o n clause,
f f e c t i v e l y created a b a r r i e r t o such r e j e c t i o n , making t h e i s s u e
.

.

f p r o p e r n o t i c e and consent t h a t much inore important.

M r . Shea

ompleted no affirmative a c t t o be bound by t h e arfditration clausel
e.never "consented" t o it, and .it cannot be enforced against him.
he a r b i t r a t i o n clause cannot be applied i n t h i s case.
N. J.S.A.

2A:24-1 p ~ o v i d e s' t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n clauses a r e not

forceable i f t h e r e a r e "grounds.. .at: law o r i n equity f o r the
o n a b i l i t y i s such a ground.

, 195 N.J.

In

Super.. 435 (App.Div.

'

84), the court relied upon the reasoning of the California

preme Court and held that an alternative dispute resolution

ovision in a contract was unconscionable and ugenforceable. The.
urt noted that "[olut Supreme Court has granted relief from
ovisions in contracts that are against public policy and arcs not
eeLy negotiated becauae of unequal bargaining power of the

rtfes." Id. at 442.

Xa the instant matter, the arbitration clause is contained in
conklcact of adhesion. There is clearly unequal bargaining power

tween the partXes and the only purpose of the provision .
rporting to prevent class-wide litigation i s to effectively
nove the only legitimate remedy for cardholders with small

N.J.S.X.

17:3B-41 does not support Discover's position.

st statute firovides in relevant: part:

if the agreement governing a rwolving
credit plan so provides, at. any time, or from time to
time, amend the terms of the agreement, including without
"A bank may,

limitation, t h t a terms governing the periodic pe~centage
rate or rates used to calculate intereat, the metnoa af
computing We outstanding unpaid indebtedness f a which
the rate or zates are applxed, the amount of other
uhargbas and the applicable inetallment repayment
sahedule, in aacoxdance with the furth6l: provisions of
this seation."
This statute does not apply under the circumstances presented.
?re is a clear distinctioh between amending the finahcia1 terms
1 rates of a credit: card agreement and the unilateral addition of

provision not contemplated at the time of the original

MOSS & INGLEF
,,
,

1.

.,

i

agreement. Such distinction is persuasively discussed and decided

[in

supra.

N.J.S.A. 17:3B-41 applies only when the original crrdmenbsr
(kgreement
specifically provides that the particular type of

/amendmentcan be made; here it does not. The statute provides only
/that the agreement c a n be "amended", not materially altered with
kew terms that by New Jersey case law require notice and mutual
188eII~.

The statute does not specifically refer to arbitration

blauses.

The examples in the statute cleerly lndicaee the only

arnendmenks permitted are to changes relating to charges on the
kccount. Discover is not permitted to unilaterally amend it

I

greement to add an arbitration clause. Additionally, the statute

{hoUld not be cead to authorize the addition of a provision which

1

ould be unconscionable.

UNDER THE LAW OP ANY JURXSDICTION, mCLUDING BOTH NEY
JERSEY AND DELPIPW, THZ CLAUSE IN THE ARBXTRATION
4nceEMZNT mfRPORTINp TO PRECLUDE CIJW-2
REZZEF XB

~ N S C L O N A B Z EAND UNENMRCEABLE

I

The law relating to unconscionability is universal.

th

New

Jersey

Under

and Delaware law, unconscionable contract

7

ovisions a r e unenforceable.

See N.J.S.R.

2A:24-1

and Chimes v..

itani &tor HoteL. I n c . , Supra, where the Court stated at page

'

H [ o ] u r Supreme Court: has granted reliafl Eram provisions
i n conkracta that are a g a i n s t publia policy and ate not
freely negotiated because of unequal bargainibg power oP

I

the parties.

(

The arbitration clause at issue ia contained in a contract of

(adhesion, the parties are of unewsl bargaining power, and clcariy,

lthe only plupose of the provision purporting to prevent class-vide
,

I
II
I-

arbitration is to benefit Discover.

Jcourt finds

the

term

Under New Je~seyLaw,

precluding

.class wide

the

arbitration

unconscionable and as such unenforceable.
Delaware law also mandates the same result.

conscionable contract provisions,

pitration clauses, are yenforceable.

bet, 10 Delaware Code BS 5701.

et. s
e
.
,

In Delaware,

including unconscionable
The Uniforn Arbitration

acknowledges that an

jlbitration clause ie enforceable 'save upon such grounds as exist

/t

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract..

..".

~ c l o n a b i l l t yis such a ground for revocation of a contract. 6
+elaware Code S 2-302 provides in relevant part as follows:
"Unconsaianabls contract or clause,
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the
contraat or,any cLau8e of the aantract to have been
unaoneaionabrs at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the aontraat, or it may enforce the
remainder of the. contraat: without khe unconscionable
clause, or it may SO limit the application of any
unconsaionable clwuusa as to avoid any unaonaciohabie

result,a
In Graham v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del.
891,

the Delaware Supreme Court stated that an arbitration

chanism could be unconscionable i f it was contained in a contract

adhesion and unfairly structured. See also Worldwide Ins, Grour,

.
F

603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992).

muss a

/

LlYUUJc

The provision preventing class actions and the consolldatlon

of claims is contained in. a contract of adhesion under either body
lo£ law.

The provisiorl against class-wide relief in Discover's

I

amendment benetits only DiscoveE, at the expense of individual

I

,cardholders. While Discover can use the provision to preclude

t

lass actions and therefore, effectively immunize itself completely

from small claims, individual cardholders gain nothing, and in

Fact, $re effectively deprived of their a l l individual claims.
biscover can completely avoid accountability whenever the harm to

I

ach class member i s small. enough.

1la.a

Such a provision preventing

actions and the consolidation of claims is unconscionable

kder Delaware and New Jersey law..

The persuasive reasoning of Bolter v. Sunerior Court, 87 Gal+
4Ch 900, modified 88 Cal. App. 4th 238 A (2001),.dictates the

I/mviLiion at issue i s

both piocedurally and substantively

~anscio*sble. in Bolter, the arbitration agreement contained,the
fllowing provision quoted at page 894:
~*[Franchieeeal agree that at1 arbitration ahax1 be
conducted on an individual, not class-wide, basis and
that an arbitration proceeding between [franchisor] and
[franchisee] shall. not be consolidated w i t h any other
arbitration pmceeciing involving [franchisor] and any
other natural pere9n.. .*

b

I

The

court

acknowledged

the

arbbitration

agreement's

u conscionability with regard to the foreclosure of a class-wide

1

p oceeding. The court.recognized that plaintiffs were individuals

t

w th little financial means, therefore, the court: held the

Iprohibition against: consolidation had no justification other .than
Ias a mans of maximiring an advantage over the plaintifis.

I

In this matter, Discover's arbitration agreement includes the

"Neither you nor w e s h a l l be e n t i t l a d t o join o r
consolidate claim in a r b i t r a t i o n by QE a g a i n s t other
aardmembers with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r acaounts, o r a r b i t r a k e
any claims ae a zepresentativa o r membtP'r of a a l a s s o r i n
a private attorney general capacity."
f

enforced, the provision against class actions and consolidations

1

ould allow Discover to create an economic advantage over each

F v i d u a l cardholder

10

t

proceed.

60

great that none would reaeofiabiy be able

By depriving cardmembers of any farun in which they

ould reasonably vindicate their rights, Discover seeks to leave

Itself

in

a

icmuntability-

position

where

it

could

completely

amid

This type of power cannot be the purpose of

Jrbltration. In Powertel, k c . v. Bexlev, 743 $0.26570.

(Ct. App.

i l a . 1999) the court stetad in a similar context at page 574-516:
ndlthouqh not d i s p o s a t i v e of thie point, it: is
s i g n i f i s a n t that t h e a r b i t x a t i o n c l a u s e is an adhesion
contract...Powertdl
prepargd t h e a x b i b a t i o n clause
u n i l a t e r a l l y and s e n t it: along to i t s customeca as an
i n e e s t to t h e i r monthly telephone biT1. The cusromexe
did n o t bargain fsr t h e a r b i t r a t i o n alause, nor did they
have the powes to reject it. One of t h e hallmarks' of
procedural Unaonsoionability is t h e absence of any
meaningful choice on the part o f t h e coneumer.
See
BeXcher; Kohl. Hers, We customers had no choice but t o
agree t o W e new a k b i t r a t i o n clause i f they wished to
continue b U s e the c e l l u l a r telephone plans they had
puEchapre f rcan Powertel

.

I

****

"It i e true, as Powe.rte1 argues, t h a t custaners can avoid

t h e effect of t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e by canceling t h e i r
phone s e r v i c e and signing an agreement w i t h another
provider. The f a l l a c y of that argument, however, ia t h a t
switching provider8 would r e e u l t i n a l o s s of the
investment t h o customers have f n t h e agreements they mgde
with Powertel. They purahased equipment: t h a t works o n l y
with t h e Powertel s e r v i c e and f&ey have obtained
telephone numbers than cannot be t r a n s f e r r e d t o a new
provider. I t i a reaeonable t o assume t h a t soma customcars
may s u f f e r a g r e a t d e a l of inaonvenience and expense t o
obtain and publish a new teLephone number, Hence, it i s
no answer to say t h a t t h e custoaeref can simply awitah
providers.
Many customers may have continued t h e i r
service with Powextel d e e p i t s their objection t o the
a r b i t r a t i o n olause simply because they had no
economFcally feasible a l t e r n a t i v e . "

I

a r b i t r a t i o n clause a l s o e f f e c t i v e l y removetl
Powertells exposure t o any remedy that could be pursued
on behalf of a a l a s s of conewn2are.. .Class l i t i g a t i o n
provides the most economically feasible remedy f o r the
kind o f claim t h a t has been asserted hers. The p o t e n t i a l
claims a r e too amall t o litigate individually, b u t
oolleotrively they might amount t o a large. sum of money.
The prospect of c l a s s l i t i g a t i o n o r d i n a r i l y h a s some
deterrent: effect on a manufacturer o r sewice provider,
but that is absent here. By r e q u i r i n g a r b i t r a t i o n oE all
claims, Powertel has precluded tAe p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a
group of i t a customers mSght j o i n together t o seek relief
that would be impractical f o r any of them t o o b t a i n
alone. Again, t h i s i s an advantage that inures only t;o
Powertel .
The a r b i t r a t i o n olause precludes class
l i t 5 g a t i o n by e i t h e r p a r t y , b u t it is di.fficvlt t o
envision a scenario i n which that would work to
Powertelrs d e t r h m n t . "
"The

ee also Lozada

Mich.

'I
I.

v. D a l e Baker ~ l d s m o b i l e .Inc., 9 1 F. Supp.

2000) (refusing to enforce an a r b i t r a t i o n

c ntaining a 'no

2d

1087

clause

class action" clause on t h e ground t h a t t h e

a b i t r a t i o n agreement w a s unconscionable).

Banks such as Discover have immeme power over t h e i r c r e d i t

I card customers, 'Discovercan effectively destroy the cardholder's
credit standlng and ability to obtain future credit by mailing
negative credit comments about: the cardholder to the major
Ireporting agencies. The refusal of a cardlaamber to pay an improper
even if that refusal is justified, could result in making it
irtually impossible for the cardholder to' refinance a home or
ease a car. This huge leverage gives a bank like Discover an all

i

owarful mechanism to entorce its rights without: ever having to
enture into a court or meaningful arbitration proceeding. Without

he potential of some classwide relief, the cardmember has no
evecage at all.

The threat of the cardholder filing for

1.ndivi.dual arbitration of a $25 or $50 claim is meaningless
(:ompared to class wide multimillion dollar litigation to redress
the alleged wrong to hundreds! of thousands of cardholders.
The requirement for a cardmember to pursue a claim against

ciscover on an "individual" basis, in the current context, is an
unconscionable restriction that should not be enforced.
Ms. Shea had no market alternatives. This is not a situation

wnere a consumer can simply purchase an identical product from a
d.fferent source. Mr. Shea would have had to cancel his Discover
c..-editoasd and apply for new credit with-anotherbank for which he

1
t me and there is no guarantee of receiving credit: with equivalent

m y or may not have been approved. This is a process that takes

i

limits and interest rates. The mere act of applying for new credit

i

c n itself

damage

consumers by inpacting on a consumer's FICA

MOSS B lNULtaC
1.
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1

/score, which then imparts the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c r e d i t and the r a t e s

a t which c r e d i t i s offered, i f it is o f f e r e d a t a l l .
Here,

the California c l a s s a c t i o n i s brought on behalf of

Discover c r e d i t cardholders who ware a l l e g e d l y improperly charged
overlimit fees a s a r e s u l t of Discoverfs conduct.

By d e f i n i t i o n ,

c l a s s members a r e consumers who a r e o r have been a t t h e i r credit:

limits.

These a r e the types of consumers who cannot simply apply

f o r and o b t a i n another cretilt card from another bank, p a r t i c u l a r l y

I.

t t h e same c r e d i t Z i m l t and the same ' i n t e r e s t r a t e they have b u i l t
over a period of t h e with.Discover.
For t h e reasons skated above the p l a i n t i f f ' s demand t o compel

b r b i t r a t i o n is denied and the complaint dismissed.
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XSCOVER BANK

SUPERIOR C O W OF NEW JERSEY
MONMOUTH COUNTY
LAW DIVISION
DOCKET NO.L-1183-01

CIVIL ACTION
ORDER DISMLSSING COMPLAINT

This matter having been brought before the Court on April 12,2001 by Glen
A. Ranis, Esq., ofthe firm of Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & ingexsoI1, LLP on behalf of the

PIaintZfand Samuel C. Inglese, Esq., o f the firm of Moss and Inglese, attorneys for the
D~?fendant,aad papers being submitted and for good cause shown:
..
d
~tis on this;tz;Y;Yay of O&&H 2001 ORDEW that tbe complaint in the

i.

ab ve matter is herewith dismissed.
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R ly papers submitted by:

